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ABSTRACT 
The present work examines whether user’s trust of and reliance on automation, were affected 
by the manipulations of user’s perception of the responding agent. These manipulations included 
agent reliability, agent type, and failure salience. Previous work has shown that automation is not 
uniformly beneficial; problems can occur because operators fail to rely upon automation 
appropriately, by either misuse (overreliance) or disuse (underreliance). This is because 
operators often face difficulties in understanding how to combine their judgment with that of an 
automated aid. This difficulty is especially prevalent in complex tasks in which users rely 
heavily on automation to reduce their workload and improve task performance. However, when 
users rely on automation heavily they often fail to monitor the system effectively (i.e., they lose 
situation awareness – a form of misuse). However, if an operator realizes a system is imperfect 
and fails, they may subsequently lose trust in the system leading to underreliance. In the present 
studies, it was hypothesized that in a dual-aid environment poor reliability in one aid would 
impact trust and reliance levels in a companion better aid, but that this relationship is dependent 
upon the perceived aid type and the noticeability of the errors made. Simulations of a computer-
based search-and-rescue scenario, employing uninhabited/unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) 
searching a commercial office building for critical signals, were used to investigate these 
hypotheses. Results demonstrated that participants were able to adjust their reliance and trust on 
automated teammates depending on the teammate’s actual reliability levels. However, as 
hypothesized there was a biasing effect among mixed-reliability aids for trust and reliance. That 
is, when operators worked with two agents of mixed-reliability, their perception of how reliable 
and to what degree they relied on the aid was effected by the reliability of a current aid. 
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Additionally, the magnitude and direction of how trust and reliance were biased was contingent 
upon agent type (i.e., ‘what’ the agents were: two humans, two similar robotic agents, or two 
dissimilar robot agents). Finally, the type of agent an operator believed they were operating with 
significantly impacted their temporal reliance (i.e., reliance following an automation failure). 
Such that, operators were less likely to agree with a recommendation from a human teammate, 
after that teammate had made an obvious error, than with a robotic agent that had made the same 
obvious error. These results demonstrate that people are able to distinguish when an agent is 
performing well but that there are genuine differences in how operators respond to agents of 
mixed or same abilities and to errors by fellow human observers or robotic teammates. The 
overall goal of this research was to develop a better understanding how the aforementioned 
factors affect users’ trust in automation so that system interfaces can be designed to facilitate 
users’ calibration of their trust in automated aids, thus leading to improved coordination of 
human-automation performance. These findings have significant implications to many real-world 
systems in which human operators monitor the recommendations of multiple other human and/or 
machine systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Advances in modern technology are increasing the ability of human beings to travel and 
communicate, as well as automate their work. The development of complex robotics and 
mathematical algorithms to guide artificial intelligence allows for the technology to permit non-
human agents to simulate and hence automate many human intellectual functions. The capacity 
of these electronic avatars is growing as a function of increasing computational capacity (see 
Moore, 1965), granting automation functions that include actively selecting data, transforming 
information, making decisions, and associated output processes (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 
2002; Lee & See, 2004). Such advances have revolutionized the role of semi-autonomous and 
autonomous agents in military, transportation, medical environments, and a spectrum of other 
applied realms.  
The use of robotic-agents offers a wide range of advantages, including increased safety 
for human operators. With the application of a non-human agent with a remote operator, the 
human becomes one-step removed from the dangerous situation (e.g., gathering reconnaissance 
information in a combat environment). This allows Unmanned Vehicles (UVs) to act “fearlessly” 
in battle, operate in areas contaminated with biotoxins or radiation, and removes the need for 
expensive on-board environmental systems (Mouloua, Gilson, & Hancock, 2003). Further, a 
large potential benefit for the military and industry is that employing autonomous and semi-
autonomous agents reduces personnel requirements. A hypothetical example of this benefit 
would be a single operator controlling multiple UVs, perhaps hundreds of Unmanned Arial 
Vehicles (UAVs) to a single operator (Hancock, Mouloua, Gilson, Szalma, & Oron-Gilad, 2007; 
Squire, Trafton, & Parasuraman, 2006). This can be compared to traditional manned vehicles 
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which may each require a separate individual operator or in some cases multiple operators (e.g., 
M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle System requires a crew of 3: the commander, gunner, and driver; 
Global Security, 2007). Additionally, one of the primary uses of automation is to make repetitive 
or detailed tasks easier (e.g., using automated speed dial rather than dialing a phone number one 
digit at a time; Wiener, 1988).  
However, automation is often applied haphazardly without regard to the intricacies of the 
human-automation interaction. This can often lead to negative consequences, such as, operator 
complacency (Chappell, 1997; Morgan, Herschler, Wiener, & Salas, 1993), increased user 
monitoring requirements (Kantowitz & Campbell, 1996), and degeneration of operator manual 
skills (McClumpha, James, Green, & Belyavin, 1991). One factor that has been shown to 
strongly affect how an operator will interact with a system is operator system trust (i.e., one’s 
confidence in an automated system). If an operator has too little trust in a system they may fail to 
use the automated system, which in effect negates the potential of the automated system to 
benefit operator performance (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Automated systems are often 
developed at great cost to the organization, but operator trust is essential to ensure that they are 
utilized. On the other hand, if an operator overtrusts a system this may lead to complacency and 
automation bias (Barnett, 2000).  
As the goal of automation is to extend human capabilities, often by using multiple 
machine systems, it becomes imperative to examine whether individuals are able to 
compartmentalize their trust of individual automated systems or if there is a blending of trust 
levels across systems. That is, could a soldier working with a network of UVs observe an error 
on one of the robotic systems and still respond in an unbiased manner to the other vehicles, or 
would this error then predispose the soldier to lose trust in the other systems (i.e., trigger disuse 
2 
across all systems)? To ensure the future of successful collaboration between humans and 
machines, it is imperative that designers know in what way operators are able to calibrate their 
actions with those of ‘intelligent’ machines (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002) and in what ways 
their calibrations are influenced by defective agents. 
Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis proposes that complex (i.e., dual-aid) environments will encounter carry-over 
bias between mixed reliability aids. However, it is believed that this effect will be influenced by 
the type of the agent (i.e., whether operators believe they are working with other humans or 
robotic aids). This problem is examined first by setting the theoretical and empirical grounding 
for the following studies and subsequently explicating the methodology ad results of a series of 
four experiments. 
The first and second experiments focus on validation and construction of the 
experimental test bed. Drawing from methods from psychometrics, these studies sought to 
minimize potential sources of error and variance associated with the task itself. The results from 
study one determined the pace of the task while study two was critical for determining stimuli 
error salience (i.e., the difficulty of the trials). Thus the goal of the first two experiments was to 
employ a simulation of a computerized search-and-rescue scenario without a decision-aid to 
determine required trial duration, trial inter-stimulus interval (ISI), and analyze stimuli difficulty.  
The third experiment was designed to extend experiment one and two, by applying a 
single automated-decision aid to the created search-and-rescue test bed and varying the reliability 
3 
of the aid. The goal of the third experiment was to examine trust and reliance levels on the 
automated aid and to determine appropriate low and high levels of reliability. 
The fourth experiment extended this information one step further by adding a second 
decision-aid. This final experiment examined operator trust and reliance on automatic decision 
aids when working with multiple agents. This experiment provides empirical evidence on the 
influence and possible biasing effects of monitoring multiple decision-aid agents of varying 
reliability, agent type, and error salience. The overall goal of this research was to develop a 
better understanding how the aforementioned factors affect users’ trust in automation so that 
system interfaces can be designed to facilitate users’ calibration of their trust in automated aids, 
thus leading to improved coordination of human-automation performance. 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
Automation has often been touted as a panacea for improving how human beings interact 
with their environment. Indeed, automation has given us modern day assembly lines, automobile 
cruise control, aircraft autopilot features, and even semi-autonomous vacuum cleaners. As almost 
any task can be, and often is, automated, we find that automation is becoming increasingly 
prevalent in modern day society. With this progress the shift from operators serving as active 
controllers (i.e., directly involved with the system) to supervisory controllers (i.e., indirect 
management of a system) has become more common (Lee & Moray, 1994). Accompanying this 
evolution of the operator from their original role, there is a need to explore the components that 
influence effective cooperation between operators and semi-autonomous agents. One particular 
area of study is that of when the use of automation backfires (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
Problems with Automation 
There can be potentially harmful consequences of automation when users fail to rely 
upon automation appropriately, through either misuse (overreliance) or disuse (underreliance; 
Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). That is, human judges may face difficulty in understanding how to 
calibrate their judgment with that of an automated aid (Bass & Pritchett, 2006).  
Misuse 
Individuals may misuse automation by over relying on automation when a manual 
alternative would have achieved a better end (Mouloua, Gilson, & Koonce, 1997). Operators 
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who have high levels of trust in an automated system may assume, often incorrectly, that it is 
highly reliable and requires little to no monitoring (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993). 
Overdependence on automated systems has been related to skill degeneration or inattention in 
the lab; which may result in more serious consequences in the real world (Young & Stanton, 
2001). For example, pilots trusting the ability of their autopilot, failed to intervene and take 
manual control even as the autopilot crashed the Airbus A320 they were flying (Lee & See, 
2004). In another instance, an automated navigation system malfunctioned and the crew failed to 
intervene, allowing the Royal Majesty cruise ship to drift off course for 24 hours before it ran 
aground (National Transportation Safety Board, 1997). Misuse of automation often occurs in 
cases where people have attributed greater intelligence to the automation than it actually 
possesses. Bergeron and Hinton (1985) pointed out that “the pilot thinks of the autopilot as a 
copilot and expects it to think for itself. He allows himself to become completely engrossed in 
other tasks once the autopilot is set. Hence, he is frequently late in resetting new functions, or he 
may become confused as to exactly where he is in the approach” (p. 145). Trusting automation to 
function on its own without supervision is a flawed approach. Automation is inherently limited 
to what it was programmed to do (i.e., dumb and dutiful) which may not always be desirable or 
even expected by the operator (Wiener, 1988; Sheridan, 2002). These ‘automation surprises’ 
occur when the system is behaving according to its programmed specifications, yet in a way that 
is contrary to what the operator expects or desires (Young & Stanton, 2001).  
 
6 
Disuse 
On the other hand, disuse occurs when users under-utilize automation by manually 
performing a task that could best be done by automation. For instance, some operators rejected 
automated controllers in paper mills, undermining the potential benefits of competent and 
reliable automation (Zuboff, 1988). In one form of disuse automation may hinder performance 
by raising workload levels. This can occur when operators perform the task manually but then 
check the automation anyway thereby adding to their workload (Bainbridge, 1983). Indeed, 
unwillingness of workers to accept effective technology is frequently cited as an impediment to 
improving worker productivity (DiBello, 2001). 
In the case of automated internet commerce technology trust becomes a critical factor in 
determining if potential customers are willing to submit personal information (e.g., credit card 
numbers) to a commercial website. Research by Karvonen and Parkkinen (2001), found that trust 
was a necessary factor in order to indulge in the risk to personal privacy (i.e., identity theft). This 
research points out how the use of automation entails a certain amount of accepted vulnerability 
by the user. In a separate study by de Vries and colleagues (2003), in which participants wagered 
study credits on the likelihood of accurate automation performance, it was found that higher risk 
was correlated with higher ratings of system trust. With distrust users are less willing to take risk 
and in the case of internet commerce they withdraw from the website and the company loses 
business.  
One of the most dangerous forms of disuse is that of the ‘cry wolf effect’ (Bliss, 1993), in 
which case a user ignores warning signals that have previously signaled a false alarm (e.g., a fire 
alarm that has previously only been yearly tests). In his book Set Phasers on Stun (1993), Casey 
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points out a particularly ingenious use of automation disuse, in which a prisoner deliberately sets 
off a motion detector alarm during his escape. While this might seem counter-intuitive the 
prisoner (a very astute fellow) was well aware of the previous high false alarm rates and the 
subsequent distrust of the alarm by the guards. Thus, even though the alarm correctly signaled a 
prisoner’s break out, the guards responded slowly to the alarm believing it was merely another 
automation error, allowing the prisoner to escape! 
Calibrated Reliance 
Misuse and disuse are two examples of inappropriate reliance on automation that can 
compromise safety, profitability, and performance. Ideal reliance in an automated system 
requires discriminating operators who can determine a proper calibration between their own and 
system performance; that is, they know when to and when not to depend upon automation (see 
Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Reliability calibration (Gempler & Wickens, 1998). 
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When operators place unquestioned trust in the perceived reliability of the automation, 
that is not appropriate given the actual reliability of the automation, they fall into the region of 
over-trust/complacency. In this case operators often fail to monitor the automation adequately 
because they exhibit excessively high confidence in the system. A lower level of trust in this case 
would be more appropriate.  On the other hand when operators fall into the region of under-trust, 
they perceive the reliability of the automation as lower than the actual reliability of the system. 
In this case their lack of trust in the automation leads to disuse. Between these two extremes is 
the region of proper trust calibration, in which the operator trusts the automation enough to use it 
when it is helpful but distrusts it enough to monitor it for proper operation (Barnett, 2000).  
Human-Automation Interaction 
To appreciate the impact of trust on properly calibrating user reliance, an understanding 
of how humans and machines work together is needed. While, neither humans nor machines are 
infallible, exploiting the strengths of each can lead to a joint performance that is higher than 
either’s individual performance alone (Young & Stanton, 2001). That is, the hybrid human-
automated system should exhibit superior performance compared to the human alone (Hancock 
& Parasuraman, 1992; Hancock, Parasuraman, & Byrne, 1996). An optimally calibrated 
interaction involves a human user who knows when to heed or ignore an aid’s suggestion (Bass 
& Pritchett, 2006). The question then becomes what processes do people use to determine when 
to rely on themselves or when to rely on an automated aid? Several studies have established that 
humans actually respond socially to technology, and reactions to computers can be similar to 
reactions to human collaborators (Muir & Moray, 1996; Reeves & Nass, 1996). 
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Social Response to Technology 
Research suggests that misuse and disuse of automation may depend on certain feelings 
and attitudes that operators hold. These feelings and attitudes may be miscalibrated and distort 
one’s perception of the automation. One particular factor that past research has shown to guide 
reliance is trust (Halpin, Johnson, & Thornberr, 1973; Muir, 1988; Sheridan & Hennessy, 1984).  
Trust  
Trust is a basic feature of all social situations that demand cooperation and 
interdependence (Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2001). This social psychological concept is 
particularly important for understanding human-automation partnerships, and can be defined as 
the belief that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterized by 
uncertainty and vulnerability (De Vries, Midden, & Bouwhuis, 2003). In this definition, an agent 
can be any entity that actively interacts with the environment on behalf of the individual (e.g., 
another human being, an automated aid, etc.). Research has shown that just as trust mediates 
interactions between people (Deutsch, 1958, 1960; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Ross & 
LaCroix, 1996; Rotter, 1967), it has also been established that trust mediates the relationship 
between people and automation (Lee & Moray, 1992; Lee & See, 2004; Lewandowsky, Munday, 
& Tan, 2000; Muir, 1994; Seong, Bisantz, & Gattie, 2006; Sheridan & Hennessy, 1984). Indeed, 
in a series of empirical studies by Jian, Bisantz, and Drury (2000) it was demonstrated that 
people do not perceive concepts of trust differently across general trust, human-human trust, and 
human-automation trust. 
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One model of trust is Barber’s (1983) taxonomy of trust which divides trust into three 
specific expectations: persistence, technical competence, and fiduciary responsibility (See Table 
1). Barber defines persistence as the foundation for trust. Persistence allows for trustors to form 
the expectation that something will work in a predictable way; this reduces the complexity of a 
task by limiting the possible outcomes. Without persistence an operator would have to consider 
every possible positive and negative outcome at each step of the interaction. Of equal importance 
is the notion of technical competence. Technical competence reflects the ability of the teammate 
in regards to technical facility and expert knowledge. Indeed, an individual may increase or 
decrease vigilance depending upon the perceived competency of a teammate (Mosier & Skitka, 
1998). Perceived technical competence may vary depending on whether a task is routine or 
unusual. For instance, an operator may trust automation to be technically competent to perform a 
routine task, but switch to manual control for more difficult or unusual tasks. The third 
dimension of trust in Barber’s model is fiduciary responsibility. Fiduciary responsibility refers to 
moral and social obligations that people have to hold the interest of others above their own, and 
has been contended to be irrelevant to the human-automation interaction (Uggirala, 
Gramopadhye, Melloy, & Toler, 2004). 
11 
Table 1. Barber's Taxonomy of Trust (recreated from Uggirala, Gramopadhye, Melloy, & Toler, 
2004). 
Expectation Impact Description 
Persistence Provides basis for all other forms of trust. 
The foundation of trust that establishes a 
constancy in the fundamental moral and 
natural laws. 
Technical Competence 
Supports expectations of future 
performance based on 
capabilities, knowledge or 
expertise. 
The ability of the other partner to 
produce consistent and desirable routine 
performance, technical facility, and 
expert knowledge. 
Fiduciary Responsibility 
Extends the idea of trust beyond 
that based on performance to one 
based on moral obligations and 
intentions 
The expectation that people have moral 
and social obligations to hold the interest 
of others above their own. 
 
Another three-stage model of trust was proposed by Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna (1985); 
this model is based on a hierarchical model of trust, and contends that certain factors of trust may 
change with time and increasing emotional investment (See Table 2). In this model the first stage 
of trust is predictability, which is judged by the operator as the consistency and desirability of the 
machines recurrent behavior (i.e., the confidence they have in their ability to predict future 
behaviors). Predictability is drawn from the actual predictability of the machine’s behavior, the 
operator’s ability to estimate the predictability of the machine’s behavior, and the stability of the 
environment in which the system operates (Uggirala et al., 2004). The more variable a machine’s 
performance the lower its predictability. As the relationship progresses an operator may enter the 
second stage of trust: dependability. Dependability is an understanding of the stable dispositions 
that guide a partner’s behavior. In terms of monitoring machine systems, or human systems for 
that matter, this factor is dependent on positive assessments of predictability in the realm of 
personal vulnerability and conflicts of interest. The final stage is that of faith, in faith an operator 
summarizes past predictability and dependability experiences to summarize them into a belief in 
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how the machine will operate in unknown future situations. In order to develop faith in any 
particular machine, a human operator must have extensive experience with the system to let faith 
develop. 
 
Table 2. Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna's (1985) model of trust. 
Stage of Trust Description 
Stage 1: Predictability 
Judged by actual predictability (variance) 
of the system, operator’s ability to estimate 
that predictability, and environmental 
factors. 
Stage 2: Dependability Related to the reliability of the system over time. 
Stage 3: Faith 
Based on extensive past experiences with 
the system. Summarize past experiences 
based on predictability and dependability. 
 
 
Both Barber (1983) and Rempel et al. (1985) have major benefits. Barber’s model 
provides a broader context and richness of meaning needed to characterize many interactions in 
automated systems. On the other hand Rempel and colleagues provide the dynamic factor needed 
to predict how trust may change as a result of experience with the system.  Muir (1994) 
combined these two models to develop a more comprehensive model of trust in automation that 
contains six components: predictability, dependability, faith, competence, responsibility, and 
reliability (See Table 3). Muir and Moray (1996) were able to empirically prove that subjective 
trust ratings, along these constructs, from an operator could be used to measure user trust in a 
system.  
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Table 3. Muir's model of trust. Replicated from Uggirala and colleagues (2004). 
Basis of expectation at different levels of experience 
Expectation Predictability 
(of acts) 
Dependability 
(of disposition) 
Faith 
(in motives) 
Persistence    
Natural 
Physical 
Events conform to 
natural laws Nature is lawful Natural laws are constant 
Natural 
Biological 
Human life has 
survived 
Human survival is 
lawful Human life will survive 
Moral 
Social 
Humans and 
computers act 
decently 
Humans and 
computer are 
inherently good and 
decent. 
Humans and computers 
will continue to be good 
and decent in the future 
Technical 
Competence 
One’s behavior is 
predictable 
One has a 
dependable nature 
One will continue to be 
dependable in the future 
Fiduciary 
Responsibility 
One’s behavior is 
consistently 
responsible 
One has a 
responsible nature 
One will continue to be 
responsible in the future 
Self-Confidence 
The benefit of using trust to guide one’s attitude towards automation is that it serves as a 
heuristic to quickly and easily compare one’s self-confidence in doing the task themselves (i.e., 
one’s own perceived reliability) to the perceived reliability of the automation doing the task 
correctly. While perceived reliability in the automation is strongly determined by the actual 
reliability of the system, self-confidence in one’s ability to manually perform a task is related to 
Bandura’s (1986) concept of self-efficacy. Self-efficacy “refers to beliefs in one’s capacities to 
organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given attainments” (Bandura, 
1997, p. 3). However, self-efficacy is situation specific and while an individual may have high 
self-efficacy in general or in one area (e.g., academics) they may have lack self-efficacy 
concerning another area (e.g., athletics). 
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In this vein, if one has worked with a system that has consistently helped them to achieve 
their goals, and they have low perceived self-confidence in accomplishing the task themselves, 
then most likely their trust and reliance on that system should be high. On the other hand, if the 
system consistently fails in helping the individual achieve their goals, and they have high self-
confidence in their own ability to perform the task, the individual’s trust and reliance on the 
system should be low. Indeed research supports that when trust in an automated agent exceeds 
operators’ self-confidence, automation is likely to be used; while, if self-confidence exceeds 
automation trust, then manual control is more likely to be maintained (Lee & Moray, 1994).  As 
one’s feelings of trust in a system vary, according to how they view the reliability of both 
themselves and the automation, their corresponding use (i.e., reliance) of that system should 
change as well. 
Trust and Reliance 
Automation reliance relates to the use of automatic rather than manual control 
(Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001). Research has shown that perceived trust in an automated 
system is tightly coupled with reliance upon that system (Muir, 1989). These findings typically 
indicate that ratings of trust tend to be slightly more conservative than users’ reliance (i.e., actual 
agreements with the aids; Muir & Moray, 1996; Wiegmann; 2001). It is also important to 
mention that empirical findings by Jian et al. (2000) indicate that ratings of trust and distrust are 
opposites lying along a single dimension of trust, so that low measures of trust actually reflect 
distrust of a system.  
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Before moving on it is important to emphasize that there is a distinction between 
measures of reliance and those of performance. Reliance is the tendency to employ automation to 
replace manual control. For instance, selecting the automated option 80% of the time exhibits 
greater reliance than selecting the automated option 50% of the time. On the other hand, 
performance is directly related to the number of correct and incorrect responses, which may or 
may not be related to reliance. In this vein trust may lead to more or less reliance (i.e., 
cooperation) with the aid, which may be desirable or undesirable (i.e., calibrated or 
miscalibrated) in regards to performance (Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2001). Indeed, 
Gempler and Wickens (1998) found that individuals became complacent when observing highly 
reliable traffic-information displays. In their study, observers relied heavily on the automation 
even though several automation failures reduced overall performance dramatically. Surprisingly, 
no changes occurred to user reports of trust in the automation. Alternatively, Lee and Moray 
(1992) found that operators, performing a simulated processing control task, demonstrated drops 
in automation trust and reliance after an automation failure even though performance did not 
change significantly. In a hypothetical example, you can imagine two users may have the same 
level of system performance and yet their subjective interaction may be quite different. One 
operator may trust the automation and use it while concurrently performing other tasks; 
meanwhile, the other operator may distrust the automation, monitor it intensively or even do the 
task manually, experiencing greater stress, time pressure, and mental workload. Thus, achieving 
ideal performance requires that the operator properly calibrate their level of trust, and hence 
reliance, in the automation to maximize performance (i.e., minimize both misuse and disuse) and 
optimize their subjective interaction.  
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Trust as a Function of Experience 
Research by Rotter (1967) established that an individual’s general level of trust has a 
temporal factor, in that it is based on past experiences with others (e.g., parents, teachers, peers, 
etc.), that leads an individual to develop their generalized attitude of trust. That is, the way one 
reacts in a particular situation is not only determined by that situation but by previous 
experiences that individual has had. This relates to social learning theory in that “expectancies in 
each situation are determined not only by specific expectancies in that situation but also, to some 
varying degree, by experiences in other situations that the individual perceives as similar” 
(Rotter, 1980, p. 2). Thus, children who have experienced a higher proportion of promises kept, 
including threats of punishment, by parents and authority figures in the past have a higher 
generalized expectancy for interpersonal trust from other authority figures (Rotter, 1971). 
Research has carried these finding over to the human-automation literature as well. In this vein if 
the trustee, whether human or automation, performs according to the trustor’s expectations, trust 
may be maintained or increased based on these experiences. On the other hand, not living up to 
expectations will lower trust (de Vries et al., 2003). Pritchett and Bisantz (2006) found that when 
an alerting systems acts contrary to an operator’s expectations or produces alerts that are 
interpreted as false alarms, user trust and acceptance of the automated alerting system decreases. 
That is, as a user observes or believes that an automated aid has made an error they develop an 
expectancy that the aid is unreliable (Lee & See, 2004).  
It is also commonly accepted that individuals generally differ in their trait generalized 
expectancy of trust in others (Rotter, 1967). Research has shown that individual differences in 
generalized trait expectancy for automation also exist. In a national survey by Halpin, Johnson, 
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and Thornberry (1973) evidence of a generalized technology trait trust expectancy was found. 
Their findings indicating that while most people believed computers and other forms of 
technology would improve their lives, others viewed these as dehumanizing and prone to errors. 
In a similar study by McClumpha and James (1994), aircraft pilots were shown to demonstrate 
previously established favorable or negative views of cockpit automation. These results were 
further supported by Lee and Moray (1994), who found that individual differences in the 
preference of using automation heavily influenced reliance upon automation in a laboratory 
based study. That is, some operators were consistently prone to using, or not using, automation 
regardless of their ratings of trust and self-confidence (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002). On a 
short-term scale, Lee and Moray (2004) conducting a time series analysis, found that future 
reliance upon automation was also influenced by past use of the automation. In their discussion 
of these results, the researchers took this information to mean that human beings are reluctant to 
change, and that includes the use (or alternatively the disuse) of automation.  
In research by Riley (1994), a definite difference in allocation strategy was found 
between students and pilots using faulty automation. While nearly all the students turned off the 
faulty automation, almost half of the pilots used the automation when it failed. This difference in 
allocation strategy may be due to pilots employing automation more often in their work 
environment; hence they were more influenced by using automation in the past. Indeed, 
experience with automation has been shown to mediate generalized trust expectancies in 
technology. For instance, those with experience with automation and/or computers tend to have 
more favorable attitudes toward automation then those without such experience (Lee, 1991; 
Lerch & Prietula, 1989; McQuarrie & Iwamoto, 1990). However, the reverse has been found 
with extensive experience with the task being automated. Thus, individuals who are experts in 
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the task to be automated tend to have more negative opinions of the automation. However, this 
may be because they have greater self-confidence in performing the task and thus less need for 
the information the aid is providing (Sheridan, Vamos, & Aida, 1983).  
Task Complexity 
A second related factor influencing the human-agent team interaction is that of 
complexity of the task (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Task complexity can be defined as 
increasing the cognitive and/or physical characteristics of a task, which correspondingly increase 
demand on operator resources. It has been found that as task complexity increases it negatively 
impacts operator self-confidence (Lee & Moray, 1994). Complexity makes a complete 
understanding of the automation impractical, thus resulting in greater reliance upon the 
automation. By guiding reliance, trust helps to overcome the cognitive complexity people face in 
managing increasingly sophisticated automation. Therefore, it is theorized that task complexity 
has a moderating impact on trust in automation, that is, increased trust in automation serves as a 
heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing, thus simplifying the 
complexity of the task at hand (Moiser & Skitka, 1996; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  
In the following studies complexity has been imposed upon the operator by having them 
monitor multiple agents. Automated decision recommendations help reduce the complexity of 
the task if the operator trust and relies upon them, thus reducing their own processing 
requirements. The concern then becomes how does trust/distrust in automation spread in a 
system with multiple decision aids? If operators come to distrust one component of a system, 
will their distrust spread to other components of the system? A study by Muir and Moray (1996) 
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found that distrust in one automated system did spread to reduce the trust of structurally, 
functionally, or causally related components. The impact of this is that distrust of a poor system 
often lead to unwarranted distrust of a concurrently running correctly functioning automated 
system. However, Muir and Moray also found that distrust of one component did not spread 
indiscriminately over the entire system. That is, trust levels of two subsystems that are 
structurally and functionally independent may not be contingent upon each other. It is important 
to mention that both aids in the Muir and Moray (1996) study were not cognitive aids but 
physical aids which guided several processes in a process control simulation. Additionally, Lee 
and Moray (1994) were able using discriminate validity measures, to prove that operators were 
able to partition their trust and self-confidence independently among several subsystems in a 
pasteurization process control simulation similar to that used by Muir and Moray (1996). An 
extension of this work would be to look at the effect of complexity on trust and reliance in 
several different types of automated aids (see Source Characteristics below), and how this 
relationship depends on agent reliability and error salience. 
Agent Reliability.  
Experiments assessing the association between machine reliability to performance have 
yielded a collection of myriad findings (Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001). While the dominant 
viewpoint has been that as automation reliability increases so does reliance upon that automation 
(de Vries et al., 2003; Liu & Hwang, 2000; Moray, Inagaki, & Itoh, 2000; Muir, 1987; Muir, 
1994; Riley, 1994), other lines of research found that overall reliability was not related to 
reliance upon the automation (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993; Singh, Molloy, & 
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Parasuraman, 1997). As with human teams increasing the reliability of one team member’s 
performance may not necessarily affect the overall team’s performance (Dzindolet, Peterson, 
Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003). 
In one of the first studies on trust upon automation usage, Muir (1989) found that 
automation accuracy had a strong correspondence with automation use. However, different 
results were found in a study by Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, Dawe, & Anderson (2001). In this 
study individuals were told that the automation would be correct on 60%, 75%, or 90% of the 
trials; additionally, there was a control condition in which no automation was presented. 
Analysis indicated that there were no significant differences in the probabilities of errors 
associated with the four reliability conditions; that is, reliability of the aid did not affect 
accuracy. One explanation for this null effect could be that participants were unaffected by the 
detector; they ignored the aid and continued with manual performance. If this is true than 
participant accuracy should be independent of aid accuracy; that is, the probability of an operator 
error when the aid was correct (p(error │ aid correct)) should equal the probability of an error 
when the aid was incorrect (p(error │ aid incorrect)). A reliable difference between the 
probabilities of an operator error associated with the agents correct and incorrect 
recommendations would suggest that the detector’s responses influenced the operators’ 
decisions. This is exactly what they found, an incorrect recommendation by the machine caused 
significantly greater probability of an operator error, than a correct recommendation by the 
machine (0.27 vs. 0.13 respectively). Thus, operators’ decisions were related to the detectors 
recommendations but not to the accuracy of the machine in general. Other research has shown 
that trust is greatly reduced by small automation errors (compared to perfect automation 
performance), and increasingly less sensitive to larger automation errors (Muir & Moray, 1996).  
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System designers should not assume that more reliable decision aids will always produce 
better performance by human-machine teams (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002). In fact the 
literature has shown that with perfect reliability, individuals tire of monitoring it (i.e., become 
complacent), and are less able to deal with errors when they occur then if they were responding 
autonomously or with a less reliable aid (Sheridan, 2002). Indeed, in a study by May, Molloy, & 
Parasuraman (1993) it was found that the detection rate of automation failures varied inversely 
with automation reliability. That is, the more reliable the automation the more complacent the 
operator.  
Object of Trust  
The object of trust may simply be defined as what the trustor is trusting. In this definition 
the object of trust may be another individual or even an entity (e.g., robot; Corritore, Kracher, & 
Wiedenbeck, 2001). Based on past research there are some cases in which trust differs between 
machines and fellow humans. One well documented case of these differences is polarization 
bias.  
Polarization bias refers to the unrealistic extremely favorable (perfection bias) or 
unfavorable views (rejection bias) of automated decision aids. Due to this effect individuals tend 
to be unforgiving of automation that deviates from perfection (Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 
2001). On the other hand, human beings are imperfect; no one is immune to occasional mistakes. 
Thus, a human operator could be expected to make a mistake on one problem and then be correct 
on the next. However, automated devices are generally considered to work perfectly or not at all. 
For instance, if the numbers are entered correctly a calculator it will give one the correct or 
22 
incorrect answer to every problem (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002). Machines, like calculators, 
tend to be either functional or dysfunctional.  
In a study by Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, and Dawe (2001) individuals were asked to rate 
the expected performance of either a human or a machine partner in a detection study. The 
detection study asked participants to view slides that displayed only terrain or terrain plus a 
camouflaged soldier (in various levels of camouflage). The users were also presented with their 
partner’s (who they were lead to believe was either human or machine) decision on whether the 
photo contained a human form. Participants consistently rated the machine as being more 
accurate, “perfection bias”, prior to experience using the automation. However, after practice 
with the soldier detection task there were no significant differences in user expectations between 
human and machine partners. In another study by Wiegmann and colleagues (2001), “rejection 
bias” was found in which user’s underestimated a system’s true reliability because the automated 
diagnostic aids were not perfectly reliable. While this bias has been found it has not been 
investigated among multiple agents of varying reliability levels. 
Failure Salience  
Failure salience is defined as how visible an automation failure is to users. Failure 
salience may significantly impact trust in automation (Barnett, 2000). In a study by Beck and 
colleagues (2001), participants were briefly shown pictures that did or did not contain a 
camouflaged soldier. For each trial, participants first reported whether or not they had detected a 
soldier; after their response they received a recommendation from an automated contrast detector 
as to whether or not it had detected a soldier in that trial. When a user did detect a signal, but the 
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aid did not, they could be certain that the detector had indeed missed the signal. On the other 
hand, when an operator did not detect a signal, but the aid did, they were unsure whether they 
had missed the signal or the automation was in error. That is, if the human monitoring the 
display detected nothing and the decision aid reported the presence of a signal, one would not 
know if there really was nothing present (a false alarm on part of aid) or that the human observer 
actually did miss a signal (a miss on part of the participant). One study by Mosier and Skitka 
(1998) observed the effect of faulty automation cues on aircrews during a flight simulation. One 
such faulty automation cue was a false alarm indicated an engine fire. Rather than lose trust in 
the automation, 74% of the aircrews erroneously recalled diagnostic cues to support the engine 
fire alert. Thus, it appears that operators may interpret automation false alarms in varying ways, 
even to the point of misremembering information to support the automation false alarm. On the 
other hand operators tend to lose automation trust and be more confident in their own responses 
when confronted with highly salient misses by the automation. Operators may thus establish a 
false belief in their superiority because the detector’s misses may be more noticeable than their 
own misses. Another potential explanation is that initially users have a “perfection bias” in 
automation, observing errors made by the automation are inconsistent with the expectation (i.e., 
schema) of perfect automation performance and are thus going to be more vivid in memory and 
play a larger role in information processing. 
To examine this issue of failure salience Beck and colleagues (2001) paired students with 
machines that performed at an inferior or superior level to their own manual performance. They 
then instructed students that their extra credit for participation in research would be dependent on 
the number of correct trials among 10 random trials drawn from their or the machine’s 
performance (200 total trials). No misuse occurred, students working with inferior machines 
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made no biased decisions. However, despite being given feedback that the machine had superior 
overall performance, it was found that 31 of 36 students made extra credit contingent on their 
own inferior performance (disuse). There are several potential explanations for this finding, 
students may have felt a desire to be mentally engaged in the activity (i.e., avoid boredom), a 
moral obligation to contribute to the task, a need to be in control of the process, or a false and 
distorted belief perseverance (Lee & Moray, 1994; Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001). In regards 
to belief perseverance this is when false ideas (e.g., more salient machine error rate) can continue 
to influence attitudes after they have been discredited (i.e., when the students were informed of 
the machines superior overall performance). In this vein memory is highly selective and not all 
mistakes are going to have an equal influence on future judgments (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 
2002); that is, an operator who may have vivid memories of the detector’s errors may have less 
prominent recollections of their own errors. Operators are attuned to the worst observed machine 
behaviors, so to encourage trust automation must be desirable and consistent. Thus, even if 
automation only degrades system performance momentarily it may still highly degrade trust.  
Another potential avenue related to failure salience is the difficulty of the trial in which 
the automation makes the error. That is, in easier trials in which a signal is highly apparent an 
error in the automation would be quite obvious. However, an error in a more difficult trial would 
be less salient. A hypothetical example would be to use a automated weapon shape contrast 
detector with a baggage screening task; in this case a large assault rifle would be a highly salient 
signal (an error in the detector would be quite blatant), compared to a less salient partially 
occluded handgun (an error would be less obvious). It would stand to reason that the more 
apparent and vivid an error the greater the decrement to user trust. This has been found in the 
case of Lee and Moray’s work (1992) examining the effect of automation with different levels of 
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error (i.e., large or small error). They found that trust was found to decline with increasing 
magnitude of the faults. However, the nature of the aid and the task was quite different from the 
current research. It is of theoretical and practical important to see if these findings, with a 
physical aid in a simulated pasteurization task, hold true with a decision aid in a simulated 
search-and-rescue task.  
Additional Moderating Factors.  
Of course, these variables are not the only influencing factors upon trust and reliance of 
automated aids. Other factors include workload, situational awareness (SA), validity, 
transparency, utility, etc (Liu & Hwang, 2000; De Vries et al., 2003). Further there are other 
constraints that may interfere with reliance. For example, the operator may not have enough time 
to engage the automation even if they trust it and intend to use it, the effort to engage the 
automation may outweigh its benefits, or they may simply use automation they don’t trust 
because they are unable to do the task themselves (Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2001). 
For example, in one study by Desmond, Hancock, and Monette (1998) it was found that 
monitoring an automated system that drove an automobile was just as fatiguing as actually 
driving the automobile. Another important issue is that of social loafing which can occur when 
individuals operate in groups in which their individual performance is masked by the efforts of 
others (Burdick, Skitka, & Mosier, 1997; Dzindolet, Beck, Pierce, & Dawe, 1998). Indeed, 
research has shown that merely providing operators with the opportunity to rely on an automated 
aid actually decreases their motivation to perform the task, though conflicting research has found 
that social loafing does not occur in human-automated-interaction as there is still only one person 
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who bears responsibility for the system. In this light another human must be present for the 
responsibility to be shared between the individuals (Lewandowsky, Mundy, & Tan, 2000). 
Another factor influences trust is the consistency of error within the automation. If an automated 
system has constant error users learn to compensate for the constant error and trust in the 
automated system increases, on the other hand with variable error systems trust stays low even 
with practice with a system. Indeed, Muir and Moray (1996) found that a small variable error is 
just as damaging as a large constant error on trust. All of these factors may influence operator 
trust and reliance in an automated system, but are beyond the scope of the current dissertation, it 
would be recommended that future research examine these factors in combination with the 
variables examined in the current research. 
Purpose of the Current Study 
Although several researchers have examined the differences in trust in relating to humans 
or machines agents separately, the literature is severely lacking in examining how operator trust 
is impacted by interacting with multiple human or machine agents who vary in their actual 
reliability levels. Therefore, the present study was undertaken to determine if operator trust in an 
agent is affected by a concurrent agent, and to what degree this relationship is moderated by 
agent type, mixed reliability levels, and salience of the automation failures. 
Mixed Reliability Levels 
Several researcher mentioned previously have examined the effect of various automation 
reliability levels on user acceptance of the automation. Muir (1994) has suggested that 
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developing trust in an automated system requires being able to predict its operation. This stands 
to reason that increased experience with a transparent system will increase users’ ability to 
predict an automated systems response. However, when users are monitoring multiple automated 
aids of mixed reliability (i.e., low and high reliability), increased experience with a low 
reliability aid may negatively impact user reliance on a concurrent high reliability aid. However, 
the degree of impact of this automation bias crossover is currently unknown. It is also, for 
theoretical and practical interest, important to examine whether this bias works in the opposite 
direction; that is, whether experience with a high reliability aid increases reliance in a concurrent 
low reliability aid. 
For the present research, it was decided to evaluate a human operator monitoring two 
automated agents. To accomplish this goal four experiments were conducted employing a 
search-and-rescue task. The testbed was created and adjusted in experiments 1 and 2. Based on 
the results of experiment 3, the reliability of the low- and high-reliability aids were determined. 
In Experiment 4, effects of reliability conditions (i.e., both low, mixed, both high) and agent 
characteristics (i.e., human agents, same-type robotic agents, different-type robotic agents) were 
tested. Bias between the mixed reliability levels were examined by comparing them to the 
uniform reliability levels. 
Agent Type 
Differences, such as polarization bias, have been found in the way humans trust other 
humans versus how they trust machines. In general, it has been found that operators are less 
forgiving of machine failures. In this study I examined how agent type influenced operator trust 
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and reliance on multiple agents. It’s predicted that robotic-agents will suffer greater drops in trust 
following errors compared to human agents, due to polarization bias. Additionally, I believe that 
agent type will influence the biasing effect that I expect to occur between mixed reliability 
levels. That is, two human agents will be perceived as independent so the mixed reliability bias 
should not occur. However, two similar machine agents will be perceived as very similar so the 
mixed reliability bias should occur. An intermediate level was chosen for comparison in which 
two unique machine agents performed the task. In this last case it is believed that some bias 
would occur but to a lesser degree than it would with two similar machine agents. This effect 
was examined, in Experiment 4, by having participants monitoring what they believe is two 
human agents, two same-type robotic agents, or two different-type robotic agents. 
Salience of Automation of Failures 
It is known that number of errors, in the form of overall reliability, often affects user’s 
trust and reliance in an automated system (Lee & Moray, 1992). Given this it would be 
interesting to examine if type of automation error impacted user trust and reliance in different 
ways. That is, will automation errors on easier difficulty trials cause greater drops in operator 
trust and reliance? It stands to reason that how visible a failure is to users may have a significant 
effect on their confidence in the automation they use. Further, it is believed that this effect will 
be moderated by the object of trust. The literature demonstrates that automation bias indicates 
that any error on the part of the machine is detrimental to operator trust and reliance. However, it 
is believed that if the error comes from a human agent that users will be more forgiving of an 
error, especially if the error occurred on a particularly difficult trial. 
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Testing the Theories 
The following studies tests the above theories by having participants perform a task in 
which they are aided by two automated systems. The experimental groups were divided into the 
cells of a 3 (reliability condition) x 3 (source characteristics) x 3 (failure salience) mixed design 
with within subjects on the latter factor. Participant self-confidence, trust, reliance, and 
performance in the automated systems were measured. 
During the task the automated systems would occasionally fail, the number of times 
would be dependent upon the reliability condition. The participants’ trust and reliance in the two 
automated agents would be compared between the mixed vs. uniform reliability groups for each 
reliability level (i.e., low and high). Any differences between group scores would support the 
theory that mixed reliability levels experience a biasing effect. 
The interface of the design will be manipulated so that the automated agents are either 
represented as distributed human agents, machine agents of similar types, or machine agents of 
dissimilar types. The participant responses across these groups and the interaction between 
reliability levels and agent type will be examined. Difference in a main effect would support the 
theory that operators respond differently to other humans compared to machines. An interaction 
would indicate that not only do operators respond differently to humans compared to machines 
but that this is impacted by the reliability levels of the agents. 
Finally the failure salience will be manipulated so that trials in which automation errors 
occur will vary in their difficulty. This examines whether aids are viewed as more reliable if their 
errors occur on more difficult stimuli. One way to examine this would be to look at participant 
reliance following automation errors on easy trials compared to reliance following automation 
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errors on more difficult trials. Here an effect would indicate that the salience of the error impacts 
user reliance. It would be most advisable to include multiple levels of automation error difficulty 
levels so as to examine interaction effects. That is, to examine whether the salience of an 
automation failure would differ depending on what reliability level a user was experiencing (i.e., 
a difficult error may go unnoticed in a high reliability condition due to operator complacency) or 
particular agent characteristics (i.e., humans may differ in how they treat difficult errors by other 
humans and automation, but not to how they treat easy errors by either group). In regards to 
agent type, Dzindolet et al. (2003) mention determining agent competence based on item 
difficulty is a somewhat flawed strategy, due to the fact that humans and automated aids often 
process information differently. What might be considered an easy unambiguous stimulus for a 
human decision-maker may be considered an ambiguous and difficult stimulus for an automated 
decision aid. The greater this difference, the less trustworthy an automated aid may be perceived 
to be. 
Research Hypotheses 
Therefore, the present studies were designed to test these theories. Regarding the role of 
reliability, source characteristics, and failure salience with an automated system, a number of 
hypotheses emerge. 
1. In a complex, dual-aid, condition there will be bias between two agents of mixed 
reliability compared to two uniform agents. 
a. Trust and reliance of a high-reliability agent will be negatively influenced 
by a concurrent low-reliability agent. 
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b. Trust and reliance of a low-reliability agent will be positively influenced 
by a concurrent high-reliability agent. 
2. Operators experiencing high automation reliability will have significantly more 
subjective trust in the automation than those experiencing both low or the mixed 
reliability conditions. Additionally those with low automation reliability will 
experience significantly less subjective trust of the automation than those in the 
mixed reliability condition (HO = There is no significant difference between 
reliability group trust scores). 
a. Increased levels of automation trust will be accompanied by increased 
levels of reliance on the aid and lower levels of reported workload. 
b. Decreased levels of automation trust will be accompanied by decreased 
levels of reliance on the aid and higher levels of reported workload. 
3. Subjective levels of trust, automation reliance, and workload are expected to 
differ across agent type (i.e., human, similar computer agents, dissimilar computer 
agents). Such that human agents have increased trust, increased reliance, and 
decreased workload, compared to the computer agents. The computer agents are 
not expected to differ in overall trust, reliance, or workload (HO = There is no 
significant difference between agent type group trust ratings, reliance, and/or 
workload). 
4. In a mixed reliability condition the agent type is expected to significantly impact 
crossover bias between the two agents. (HO = There is no significant interaction 
between reliability and agent type). 
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a. Two agents perceived to be human will experience the least crossover bias 
in the mixed reliability condition. Thus, a low-reliability human aid will 
have little impact on a concurrent high-reliability human aid. 
b. The same-type robotic agents will experience the most crossover bias in 
the mixed reliability condition. Thus, a low-reliability same-type robotic 
agent will have a strong impact on a concurrent high-reliability same-type 
robotic agent. 
c. The different-type robotic agents will experience an intermediate level of 
crossover bias in the mixed reliability condition. Thus, a low-reliability 
different-type robotic agent will have an intermediate impact on a 
concurrent high-reliability different-type robotic agent. 
5. The failure salience of the automation error is expected to influence the likelihood 
of relying on the aid in the future trials. Such that as the salience increases the 
lower temporal reliance becomes (temporal reliance is measured by the agreement 
with an aid on the trial following an aid error). (HO = There is no significant effect 
between failure salience groups for temporal reliance). 
a. High salience failures (i.e., obvious errors) will cause a significantly less 
temporal reliance on the aid compared to less salient errors (moderate and 
low salience failures). 
b. Moderate salience failures will cause less temporal reliance compared to 
low salience failures but maintain higher temporal reliance than high 
salience failures. 
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c. Low salience failures will maintain the highest level of temporal reliance 
compared to the more salient errors. 
6. It is expected that source characteristics of the agents and the salience of the agent 
errors will interact to affect temporal reliance. (HO = There is no significant 
interaction between source characteristics and failure salience). 
a. Agents perceived to be human will experience drops in temporal reliance 
proportional to the increasing simplicity of the error made. Also it is 
expected that participants will be more forgiving of human errors 
compared to robotic errors, especially on more difficult stimuli. 
b. The computer agents will experience equivalent drops in reliance across 
all types of errors. This reflects automation bias, in which automation is 
expected to work perfectly or not at all. Participants will be unforgiving of 
all robotic errors regardless of error salience. 
Independent Variables 
Agent reliability will be manipulated so that there will be a low-reliability and a high-
reliability condition. As reliability levels are highly dependent upon the task in question, 
Experiment 3 will serve to determine appropriate values for this study. As prior research has 
shown that prior experience with one reliability level impacts trust/reliance of subsequent 
reliability levels agent reliability was kept as a between-subjects measure (i.e., both high, both 
low, or mixed: one high and one low). 
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Source characteristics will be manipulated so that individuals are told that they are 
monitoring decisions from either two human agents, two similar computer agents, or two 
dissimilar computer agents. Images of the agents were placed on the display to increase the 
salience of this independent variable. To increase the believability of agent type, source 
characteristics was kept as a between-subjects measure. 
Error salience will be manipulated so that the automation makes errors that are low, 
moderate, and high salience. The salience of the errors were determined by experiment 2 which 
will evaluate the difficulty of the clips, with more difficult clips (i.e., fewer participants correctly 
identifying) as being less salient (i.e., less obvious). Error salience will be a within subjects 
measure. 
Dependent Variables.  
Subjective Measures.  
As Muir (1989) found people are able to generate meaningful subjective ratings of trust. 
Participant trust ratings are sensitive to the properties of the automation and related in a sensible 
way to those properties (Lewandowsky, Mundy, & Tan, 2000). Thus, the following studies 
employed previously used subjective measures of trust before and after experience with the 
agents. The pre-questionnaire, used in the fourth study, asked participants to estimate their and 
their automated aids expected performance on the coming trials (See Table 1). The post-
questionnaire queried participants on their subjective experience of the trials they have just 
completed and asked them to make a decision regarding how their performance score would be 
calculated (See Table 2 for post-questionnaire questions; format varied depending on whether 
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questionnaire was used in experiment 3 or 4). The use of the choice for score calculation was 
selected because trust involves some degree of vulnerability on the part of the trustor. 
Additionally personality measures were obtained to examine general trust expectancies, 
anthropomorphic tendencies, and automation complacency potential. 
Table 4. Pre-questionnaire questions for experiment 4. Questionnaire adapted from Dzindolet, 
Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003.  
Question Scale 
How well do you think the agent will 
perform during the 120 trials? 
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Not Very 
Well” – “Very Well” 
How well do you think you will perform 
during the 120 trials? 
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Not Very 
Well” – “Very Well” 
Who do you think will make more errors 
during the 120 trials? I will make… 
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Many More 
Errors” – “Far Fewer Errors” 
How many errors do you think you will 
make during the 120 trials? I will make 
about _______ errors. 
Numerical value entered by participant, 
range from 0 to 200. 
How many errors do you think the agent 
will make during the 120 trials? The agent 
will make about _______ errors. 
Numerical value entered by participant, 
range from 0 to 200. 
To what extent do you believe you can 
trust the decisions the agent will make?  
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – 
“A Great Amount” 
To what extent do you believe you can 
trust the decisions you will make?  
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – 
“A Great Amount” 
How would you rate the expected 
performance of the agent relative to your 
expected performance? The agent will 
perform… 
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Better Than I 
Will Perform” – “Much Worse Than I Will 
Perform” 
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Table 5. Post-questionnaire questions. (Questionnaire adapted from: Dzindolet, Peterson, 
Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003; Master, Gramopadhye, Bingham, & Jiang 2000). 
Question Scale 
Competence: To what extent does the agent 
perform this search-and-rescue task effectively? 
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – “A 
Great Amount” 
Predictability: To what extent can you anticipate 
the agent’s behavior with some degree of 
confidence? 
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – “A 
Great Amount” 
Reliability: To what extent is the agent free of 
errors? 
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – “A 
Great Amount” 
Faith: To what extent do you have a strong belief 
and trust in the agent to do the search-and-rescue 
task in the future without being monitored? 
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – “A 
Great Amount” 
Overall Trust: How much did you trust the 
decisions of the agent overall? 
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – “A 
Great Amount” 
What percentage of responses by the agent do 
you think were correct? Range 0% to 100% 
How often did you notice an error made by the 
agent? 
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Not At All” – “Many 
Times” 
To what extent did you lose trust in the agent 
when you noticed it made an error? 
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – “A 
Great Amount” 
Imagine that there are ten more video clips that 
need to be examined for terrorists, civilians, and 
IEDs. Also imagine that we were to offer you an 
additional compensation, of either $5.00 or an 
extra credit point for each of these ten additional 
video clips that is correctly identified. However, 
due to a software problem only you or Teammate 
B can make the decisions. Would you prefer that 
this additional compensation be based on the 
decisions made by the automated aid or the 
decisions made by you? (circle one) 
“Agent’s Decisions” or “My Own Decisions” 
We would like to know what led to your decision 
to base your performance on either your decisions 
or on the decisions of the aid. Please tell us 
everything you thought of in coming to this 
decision. Do not worry about spelling or 
grammatical errors. Use the back side of this 
paper if necessary. 
Free Response. Previous study divided answers 
into 4 major categories. 1) Trust in computers (“I 
don’t trust computers that much. I know a lot 
about their tendency for errors”), 2) detection of 
obvious errors (“There were a few times that I’m 
pretty sure I saw a terrorist, but the program said 
he was absent”), 3) confidence in self (“I was not 
that confident in what I saw” or “I chose to use 
‘my decisions’ because I trust my observations, 
and I never second guess my self”), & 4) relative 
performance (“I had less errors than the 
computer”, “The contrast detector made less 
errors”, or “The computer made more mistakes 
compared to mine”). 
 
37 
Behavioral Measures 
To measure objective trust of an automated system, reliance was analyzed. Reliance was 
measured as the combined total of the times the participant agreed with the aid. Additionally, 
temporal reliance was examined by looking at the likelihood of automation reliance on a trial 
immediately following an automation failure trial. In all cases, the automation correctly worked 
on the trial immediately following an automation failure. 
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EXPERIMENT 1: METHODOLOGY 
Experimental Purpose 
Due to the requirement for certain features to address the overarching research questions 
in this line of research, it was required that an experimental platform be developed that could test 
these questions. An experimental platform was designed that could serve as an interface for users 
to monitor the progress of an Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) through an office building. 
Experiment 1 served as a pilot study to determine that users monitoring the UGV are receiving 
adequate time to view the video clips (i.e., duration of the stimuli) and adequate time to respond 
to the video clips (i.e., inter-stimulus interval; ISI). The goal of this experiment is to ensure that 
the basic task itself was possible for participants to perform. That is, the task is set to a pace that 
is neither too fast nor too slow for participants. The selected video durations and ISI were 
maintained for the other studies in this dissertation. 
Experimental Participants 
Twenty-five participants were recruited through the University of Central Florida extra-
credit website and they received course credit for their participation. Participation were limited to 
those with normal or corrected to normal vision. Total participation time did not to exceed 1 
hour. 
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Experimental Procedure 
Participants first completed an informed consent (See Appendix B), followed by a brief 
introduction to the task (See Appendix C) and a practice session. Participants then completed the 
experimental session, which is composed of 108 trials divided into 9 blocks. After each block the 
participant completed a brief questionnaire (See Appendix D). At the end of the experimental 
blocks the participant were thanked for their participation. 
Training Procedure 
The purpose of the training was to acquaint the participant with the nature of the task, the 
response buttons, and the stimuli. Participants received the training in the form of an 
experimenter read script (See Appendix C) and a computerized practice session. The script 
described in detail the scenario, what stimuli the participant would view, and how they were to 
respond. The computerized practice session had the same layout as the experimental display with 
the addition of three stationary images of the critical signals above the video feed (See Figure 2). 
The video feed presented 4 video clips during the practice session. These clips were presented 
for 5 seconds, with 5 second inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs). Four video clips were chosen to 
demonstrate each of the four potential stimuli: a terrorist (See Figure 3), an Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED; See Figure 4), a civilian (See Figure 5), and an empty room (See Figure 
6). Participants were able to respond to the practice trials to become familiar with the interface.  
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Figure 2. Practice interface for experiment 1. 
 
 
Figure 3. Video clip demonstrating a terrorist. 
 
 
Figure 4. Video clip demonstrating an unconscious civilian. 
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Figure 5. Video clip demonstrating an IED. 
 
 
Figure 6. Video clip demonstrating an empty room. 
Experimental Task 
The experimental interface of the UGV search-and-rescue scenario was similar to the 
practice session, the main difference being the removal of the stationary stimuli images from the 
top of the screen (See Figure 7). Participants were able to respond after each video clip ends, by 
using the mouse to click on one of the response buttons (located beneath the video feed). 
Participants were able to respond only once per trial, this limitation was imposed by having the 
response buttons become deactivated after a participant had made a selection. Additionally, since 
the ISI was held constant during each block, participants were informed that it may take several 
seconds to move onto the next video after they have made their selection and that this was 
perfectly normal.  
42 
  
Figure 7. Video presentation interface for experiment 1. 
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Figure 8. Response interface for experiment 1. 
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Experimental Conditions 
The properties of video duration and ISI were manipulated in this study. Video duration 
was either 5, 7, or 10 seconds (video panning rate was held approximately constant). ISI was also 
either 5, 7, or 10 seconds in length. This lead to nine possible experimental conditions (See Table 
6). Each experimental condition was composed of 12 randomly selected video clips, with the 
restriction that the 12 clips contained 3 of each kind of stimuli (i.e., terrorist, civilian, IED, and 
empty).  
Table 6. Duration and ISI conditions. 
Block Trial Duration ISI 
Total Time in 
Minutes (12 trials 
per block) 
1 5 5 2 
2 7 5 2.4 
3 10 5 3 
4 5 7 2.4 
5 7 7 2.8 
6 10 7 3.4 
7 5 10 3 
8 7 10 3.4 
9 10 10 4 
Measurement and Analysis 
Subjective Measures 
Subjective measures were obtained after each block by using a post-block questionnaire 
(See Appendix D). All questions were presented in a Likert-style format, with the scale range of 
0 to 10. Question 1 and 2 measured subjective satisfaction with the duration and ISI of each 
block, the scale endpoints were set so that an ideal satisfaction was rated in the midpoint of the 
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scale (5; with higher and lower values reflecting either too much or too little time respectively). 
Questions 3 thru 6 queried participants on whether they believed they would be able to monitor 
and respond to either 2 or 4 UGVs given the same durations and ISIs; scale endpoints were set to 
‘Definitely Yes’ and ‘Definitely Not.’ This measure was used to reflect the participant’s 
confidence in taking on a more complex task and provides some exploratory data as to whether 
individuals will be able to monitor multiple aids in following experiments.  
The final six questions on the questionnaire, Question 7 thru Question 12, are the six 
rating scales from the NASA-Task Load Index (NASA-TLX; Hart & Staveland, 1988). The 
NASA-TLX uses six dimensions to assess workload: mental demand, physical demand, temporal 
demand, effort, performance, and frustration. Each dimension was rated by the participant on a 
scale from 0 to 10 with higher numbers reflecting greater workload. These values were then 
averaged into an overall rating of workload. Though the individual scales of temporal demand 
and perceived performance were of particular interest and were also examined individually. 
Objective Measures 
Objective measures were obtained for performance accuracy and reaction time (RT). In 
regards to performance accuracy I examined performance in terms of percentage correct across 
the different durations and ISIs manipulations. However, because the experiment was within-
subjects different video clips were randomly selected for each block, thus performance 
comparisons may reflect differences in the inherent difficulty of the selected clips rather than 
differences due to the duration/ISI manipulation.  
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Reaction-time data was examined to determine the average reaction time needed to 
respond to a trial and its 95% confidence interval. This provided a general measure of the time 
most individuals would require for responding to the stimuli. 
Experimental Equipment 
The videos were recorded in three commercial and educational office buildings in the 
Central Florida area. Recordings were made using a standard digital video recorder set on a 
tripod dolly. To maintain maximum consistency a single operator, experienced with musical 
timing, controlled the pan rate of the camera. The terrorist in the video clips was held constant; 
such that, in each clip he was portrayed by the same individual, carried the same simulated 
assault rifle, an airsoftTM AK-47, and was outfitted in the same black outfit/mask to prevent any 
gender/racial/ethnic stereotyping (See Figure 3). Civilians were composed of a variety of 
volunteer participants of various genders and ages who were recruited at random from the three 
office locations. In all civilian clips the volunteers averted their faces; this was done to minimize 
the chance that participants might recognize any of the particular individual civilians (See Figure 
4). The IED was held constant in all clips, and was composed of two metal canisters connected 
via wires to a timer (See Figure 5).  
After obtaining the video stimuli it was then edited for length and noise using Adobe 
Premiere 2.0. Static was overlaid onto the video and the frame per second (fps) rate was reduced, 
from 30 fps to 15 fps, to develop brief choppy and realistic first-person video clips simulating an 
UGV exploring a commercial office building after a terrorist attack. The interface used to present 
the videos was created using Visual Basic.net. The interface contained one video display and 
47 
four response keys. Responses were recorded into a data file that records accuracy and response 
time (See Table 7). The simulation itself was presented on a desktop computer with a 20-inch 
widescreen monitor and an optical mouse for responding. Participants were instructed to wear 
headphones during the task to block out any extraneous noise. 
Table 7. Recorded output from UGV simulation. All variables are recorded for each trial with the 
exception of participant # and date/time. 
Name Meaning Example 
Participant # Identifies each participants data file 1 
Date/Time Records date and time of participant 7/27/2007 4:51:56pm 
Clip The video clip file name.  G5C1.avi 
Group The experimental condition (Duration and ISI) 5 
Signal The type of stimulus that is presented Civilian 
Response The participants response Empty 
Correct Whether the response is correct “C” or an error “E” E 
Reaction Time The response time in seconds. 01.0156875 
Hypothesized Outcome 
The main determinant of ensuring adequate video duration and ISI are the responses to 
questions 1 and 2 from the subjective questionnaire. It was hypothesized that, while all the tested 
durations and ISIs would be sufficient for performance and reaction time measures, a subjective 
preference would emerge benefiting moderate durations and ISIs (e.g., 7 second duration and 
ISI; Hypothesis 1). It was further postulated that this would be reflected in both overall and 
subscale workload scores (Hypothesis 2). However, self-confidence in handling additional video 
feeds is hypothesized to be greater for longer durations and ISIs (Hypothesis 3; see Table 8). 
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These hypotheses were based on experimenter experience with the task during the development 
phase. 
Table 8. Hypotheses for Experiment 1. 
 Hypothesis Number 
Dependent Measure 1 2 3 
Response Time Ample Time = [D5, D7 , D10] Ample Time = [I5 < I7 < I10] 
  
Performance 
(% Correct) 
Ample Performance = [D5, D7 , D10] 
Ample Performance = [I5 < I7 < I10] 
  
Satisfaction with Video 
Duration D7 > [ D5, D10]   
Satisfaction with Video ISI I7 > [ I5, I10]   
Overall and Subscale Workload 
Scores  
D7 > [ D5, D10] 
I7 > [ I5, I10] 
 
Self-confidence in monitoring 
two feeds   
D5 < D7 < D10
I5 < I7 < I10
Self-confidence in responding 
to two feeds   
D5 < D7 < D10
I5 < I7 < I10
*D5 = Duration 5 Second, D7 = Duration 7 Second, D10 = Duration 10 Second, I5 = ISI 5 Second, I7 = ISI 7 Second, 
I10 = ISI 10 Second 
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 EXPERIMENT 1: RESULTS 
The purpose of the first experiment was to ensure adequate video duration and response 
ISI for manual performance of the UGV monitoring task. Below the results are discussed for the 
performance and subjective data (see Table 9). 
Table 9. Findings for hypotheses for Experiment 1. 
 Hypothesis Number 
Dependent Measure 1 2 3 
Response Time Ample Time = [D5, D7 , D10] Ample Time = [I5 < I7 < I10]
  
Performance 
(% Correct) 
Ample Performance = [D5, D7 , D10] 
Ample Performance = [I5 < I7 < I10]
  
Satisfaction with Video 
Duration D7 > [ D5, D10]   
Satisfaction with Video ISI I7 > [ I5, I10]   
Overall and Subscale 
Workload Scores  
D7 > [ D5, D10] 
I7 > [ I5, I10] 
 
 
Self-confidence in monitoring 
two feeds   
D5 < D7 < D10
I5 < I7 < I10
Self-confidence in responding 
to two feeds   
D5 < D7 < D10
I5 < I7 < I10
*D5 = Duration 5 Second, D7 = Duration 7 Second, D10 = Duration 10 Second, I5 = ISI 5 Second, I7 = ISI 7 Second, 
I10 = ISI 10 Second 
 
Performance Data  
Response Time 
The 95% CI for overall RT was examined. The mean overall reaction time (RT) was 
921.7 ms, with a lower bound of 852.2 ms and an upper bound of 991.3 ms. Additionally, a 3 
(duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on RT. The main effect in all 
cases for duration, ISI, and the interaction between ISI and duration was not significant (p > .05). 
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Percent Correct 
A 3 (duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the percentage of 
correct detections. Video duration was statistically significant, F(2, 42) = 43.48, p < .0005, η² = 
0.67. Pairwise comparison indicated that the 10 second duration had significantly fewer correct 
answers then the 5 or 7 second duration, which did not significantly differ from each other (See 
Figure 9). The interaction between duration and ISI was also significant, F(4, 84) = 10.35, p < 
.0005, η² = 0.33 (See Figure 10). The main effect for ISI was not statistically significant (p > 
.05). 
 
Figure 9. Percent correct as a function of duration of the video clips. 
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Figure 10. Percent correct as a function of video duration and ISI. 
Subjective Data  
Duration and ISI Subjective Satisfaction 
The main determinant of ensuring adequate video duration was question 1 which 
concerned participant’s subjective feeling of satisfaction with the amount of time they had to 
view each video clip. A 3 (duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the 
data. The main effect for duration was significant, F(2, 42) = 6.69, p = .003, η² = 0.24. The main 
effect for ISI (F(2, 42) = 0.08, p = .92, η² = 0.004) and the interaction effect between duration 
and ISI were both not significant (F(4, 84) = 2.09, p = .09, η² = 0.09). Pairwise comparisons 
were conducted on duration, which indicated a significant difference between the 5 second and 
10 second conditions, all other groups were not significantly different (p > .05; See Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Perceived satisfaction of time to view each video clip as a function of video clip 
duration. Note that the line across the center represents optimal satisfaction with duration (a rating 
of 5), values above this line represent too much time, below this line too little time. Bars represent 
standard error. 
 
The main determinant of ensuring adequate response ISI was question 2 which concerned 
participant’s subjective feeling of satisfaction with the amount of time they had to respond to 
each video clip. A 3 (duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the data. 
The main effect for ISI was significant, F(2, 42) = 4.65, p = .015, η² = 0.181. The main effect for 
duration (F(2, 42) = 0.60, p = .55, η² = 0.028) and the interaction effect between duration and ISI 
were both not significant (F(4, 84) = 0.91, p = .46, η² = 0.042). Pairwise comparisons were 
conducted on ISI, the 10 second ISI was significantly different from both the 5 and 7 second ISIs 
(the latter two did not significantly differ from each other, p > .05; See Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Perceived satisfaction of time to respond to each video clip as a function of ISI of each 
video clip. Note that the line represents optimal satisfaction with ISI (a rating of 5), values above 
this line represent too much time to respond, below this line too little time to respond. Bars 
represent standard error. 
Overall and Subscale Workload 
A 3 (duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on overall workload 
and each of the individual subscales. The main effect in all cases for duration, ISI, and the 
interaction between ISI and duration was not significant (p > .05). 
Confidence in Handling Additional Video Feeds 
To examine user’s confidence in handling two agents Q3 and Q4 of the subjective 
questionnaire examined user confidence in monitoring and responding to two aids. A 3 
(duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on Q3 regarding perceived 
confidence in monitoring two video feeds. Video duration was statistically significant, F(2, 42) = 
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5.10, p = .01, η² = 0.20. Pairwise comparison indicated that the 5 second duration was rated 
significantly lower in perceived confidence then the 7 or 10 second duration, which did not 
significantly differ from each other (See Figure 13). The main effect for ISI and the interaction 
between ISI and duration were both not significant (p > .05). 
 
Figure 13. Perceived confidence in being able to monitor 2 video clips as a function of duration 
of video clips. 
 
A 3 (duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on Q4 regarding 
perceived confidence in responding to two video feeds. The main effect for duration, ISI, and the 
interaction between ISI and duration were all not significant (p > .05). 
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EXPERIMENT 1: DISCUSSION  
It was hypothesized that all the tested durations and ISIs would be sufficient for 
performance and reaction time measures but that a subjective preference would emerge 
benefiting moderate durations and ISIs (e.g., 7 second duration and ISI).  
Duration Results 
This original hypothesis was confirmed, in that all duration did not significantly impact 
participant RT. It was incorrect in that there was a main effect for duration in regards to percent 
correct. However, by examining the data it was concluded that the performance data was quite 
noisy. That is, by randomly distributing the video clips, some groups received easier or more 
difficult clips than others (See Appendix E). Visual inspection of the distribution of errors across 
videos in the conditions demonstrated that the 10 second duration groups (i.e., with 5, 7, and 10 
second ISI) indicated not a random distribution of errors but instead a clustering of errors on just 
a few videos that proved to be particularly difficult. Therefore, it is believed that the performance 
duration main effect and the duration by ISI interaction are merely artifacts of random selection 
of videos without regard to their innate difficulty, which is the focus of study 2. Nevertheless, 
regardless of the difficulty of the videos that made up a condition it was apparent that user’s had 
adequate time to view the videos as evident by their high accuracy across all conditions (all 
scores over 80% correct).  
 In examining the subjective data it was demonstrated that users preferred a shorter video 
duration (5 seconds) over a longer video duration (10 seconds; the 7 second duration was not 
significantly different from either of these conditions). In examining confidence in observing an 
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additional video feed, users rated themselves as less confident for the 5 second condition as 
compared to the other two conditions. While, this might indicate that a longer duration should be 
used to improve user confidence, it is actually in the interest of this research program, more 
experimentally useful to cause a drop in user’s confidence in manually performing the task with 
the addition of added task complexity (i.e., increasing their need for automated aids).  
While my initial hypothesis had suggested a 7 second duration, the results of this study 
indicate that a 7 second duration offers no measurable advantage over the 5 second duration. It 
was further evident that the 5 second duration did indeed offer a measurable advantage over the 
10 second duration. Thus, the 5 second video duration was chosen. 
ISI Results 
The hypothesis was correct, in that all ISIs were more than adequate given user average 
response time (M = 0.92 seconds). Further, no significant differences in RT or percent correct 
were found across the main effects for ISI conditions. A duration by ISI interaction was found 
for percent correct but as previously mentioned this effect appears to be the result of error caused 
by the random distribution of video clip difficulties across conditions. However, regardless of the 
difficulty of the videos that made up a condition it was apparent that user’s did have adequate 
time to respond (all scores over 80% correct).  
In examining the subjective measures I found that users preferred the 5 second ISI over 
the 10 second ISI, which they reported as reflecting too much time to respond (i.e., the task 
seemed to drag). There was no significant difference in their satisfaction with the time between 5 
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and 7 seconds. In regards to the perceived workload and confidence data there was no significant 
difference among any of the ISI conditions.  
While the initial hypothesis suggested employing a 7 second ISI, the results of this study 
indicate that a 7 second ISI offers no measurable advantage over the 5 second ISI. It was further 
evident that the 5 second ISI did indeed offer a measurable advantage over the 10 second ISI. 
Thus, the 5 second ISI was chosen.  
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EXPERIMENT 2: METHODOLOGY 
Experimental Purpose 
The first study has established that the basic task is set at a pace that allows manual 
performance. That is, when automation is added in the following experiments users may choose 
to employ it or they may manually complete the task themselves. However, as the first study 
demonstrated when performance accuracy was examined, the inherent difficulty of the video 
clips may not be sufficiently or uniformly sensitive (i.e., restriction of range of the task itself). In 
order to ensure sensitivity of the performance measure I conducted a second pilot study, using 
Item Response Theory (IRT; Inman, 2001) to ensure that a range of video clips difficulties (i.e., 
easy, moderate, and hard discriminations) for stimulus types was selected. The goal of this 
experiment was to prevent a possible ceiling or floor effect from stimuli difficulty. An additional 
purpose of having item difficulty quantified is that it allowed me to examine the impact of 
automation error salience on user reliance.  
Experimental Participants 
To determine item difficulty I examined the responses of sixty-five undergraduate 
students. Participants were recruited through the University of Central Florida extra-credit 
website and they received course credit for their participation. Participation was limited to those 
with normal or corrected to normal vision, and to those that had not participated in the prior 
experiment. 
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Experimental Procedure 
Participants first completed an informed consent and demographic questionnaire (See 
Appendix B and F). Next participants received a short training and practice session, followed by 
the full experimental session. After completion of the experimental session the participants were 
thanked for their participation. The entire experiment took approximately 1 hour. 
Training Procedure 
Training was the same as in experiment 1, with minor exceptions (See Appendix G).  
Experimental Task 
The same computer-based simulation of a UGV search-and-rescue scenario that was used 
in experiment 1 was used in experiment 2. However, in this study all video clips were the same 5 
second duration and the same 5 second ISI. Additionally, the number of trials was increased to 
300. To minimize the effect of a vigilance decrement, participants were offered a short break 
every 10 minutes of participation. Additionally video clips were presented in a random order to 
each participant to further prevent a vigilance decrement from influencing only certain video 
clips. 
Experimental Conditions 
The properties of stimulus difficulty were examined in this study. That is, the video clips 
were altered using various levels of added static noise and statistically tested to obtain a range of 
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stimuli difficulties. The final goal of the experiment was to take the 225 video clips with signals 
embedded in them (75 videos were empty rooms and served as distracters during the task) and 
divide them into easy, moderate, and difficult categories for the three signals (i.e., terrorist, 
civilian, & IED) so that at least 8 clips fell into each category (See Table 10).  
Table 10. Division of trial difficulties. 
Stimuli Difficulty Clips 
Terrorist Easy 8 
 Moderate 8 
 Hard 8 
Civilian Easy 8 
 Moderate 8 
 Hard 8 
IED Easy 8 
 Moderate 8 
 Hard 8 
Total Clips 72 
Measurement and Analysis 
Item Response Theory 
Stimuli were mapped for difficulty using the item difficulty index βi from Item Response 
Theory (IRT). The index of item difficulty βi is often used to determine the difficulty of multiple-
choice questions; however, in this study it will be used to determine the difficulty of the stimulus 
(i.e., the video clips). That is the difficulty parameter βi refers to the proportion of participants 
who answered an item correctly; thus, the smaller the value of βi the harder the item (Inman, 
2001). The equation for deriving item difficulty is presented below (see Equation 1). According 
to this equation a difficulty index of 100% indicates that all participants selected the correct 
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answer and that item was very “easy.” A value of 0% indicates that none of the participants 
selected the correct answer and so that item was very “difficult” (Hotiu, 2006). 
 
Equation 1. Difficulty index formula. Where c is the number who selected the correct answer and 
n is the total number of respondents. 
βi = (c/n)*100  
 
 
In this study items were categorized into three distinct levels of difficulty; that is, low 
difficulty, moderate difficulty, and high difficulty. Item difficulty could range between 0 and 
100, with higher values indicating a greater proportion of participants responding correctly to the 
item (i.e., an easy item). For the purposes of our research easy items were defined as those 
ranging in βi from 67 – 100 (i.e., detected by 2/3 or more of the participants), moderately 
difficult items will have βi scores from 34 - 66 (i.e., detected by 1/3 to 2/3 of the participants), 
and difficult items will have βi scores from 0 – 33 (i.e., detected by 1/3 or fewer of the 
participants). These difficulty levels were selected across the full possible difficulty range to 
obtain a full array of item difficulties and prevent restriction of range.  
Experimental Equipment 
The video stimuli were 300 video clips obtained from three commercial and educational 
office buildings (75 clips of each potential stimulus: terrorist, civilian, IED, and empty). All 
features of the videos and interface were the same as those used in experiment 1, the only 
difference being that the duration of the videos were held constant in this study and the amount 
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of noise added to the clips in Adobe Premiere 2.0 varied to improve the differentiation between 
the difficulty levels. 
Hypothesized Outcome 
The outcome of this study will be a division of videos based on item difficulty that will 
be employed in experiments 3 and 4 of this dissertation. The purpose of this is to prevent 
restriction of range in the performance measure of these studies. Additionally, it is of interest to 
quantify item difficulty so that the impact of automation errors upon subsequent user reliance, in 
experiment 4, may be related to the salience of that error (with easier items being typically more 
salient than more difficult items).  
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EXPERIMENT 2: RESULTS  
The purpose of the second experiment was to select the videos, based on their difficulty, 
for use in experiments 3 and 4. Item difficulty was determined for each of the civilian, terrorist, 
and IED clips. The resulting item difficulties for each of the 225 clips are presented in Appendix 
H.  
The results of experiment two were not as predicted. People were far better at picking 
critical signals out of the video clips than originally anticipated. Initially it was desired to include 
8 easy (more 2/3 participants detect), 8 moderate (more 1/3 less 2/3), 8 hard video clips (less 1/3 
correct detection) from each kind of stimuli (terrorist, civilian, and IED) for a total of 72 signals. 
Unfortunately the data did not cooperate, after removing all 100% detection rates (which were 
not diagnostic; there were no 0% detection rates), there were five out of 9 divisions that did not 
contain the minimum number of clips (see Table 11). These results required that the video 
inclusion criteria be altered to allow for an equal selection of video clip difficulties while 
maintaining adequate number of trials for study power. 
Table 11. Division of type of video clips into difficulty levels.  
Stimuli Difficulty Clips Needed Actual Clips 
Terrorist Easy 8 53 
 Moderate 8 0 
 Hard 8 0 
Civilian Easy 8 58 
 Moderate 8 7 
 Hard 8 1 
IED Easy 8 51 
 Moderate 8 18 
 Hard 8 5 
Note: Video clips with 100% detection were removed as they were viewed as being not 
diagnostic. 
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EXPERIMENT 2: DISCUSSION  
It was hypothesized that there would be sufficient video clips across the full spectrum of 
possible signal types and item difficulties (i.e., 8 clips from each difficulty level for each of the 
three types of signals: terrorist, civilians, and IEDs). However, results indicated that participants 
exceeded performance expectations and that the detection rate across subjects was quite high (M 
= 87.97, SD = 6.38). Thus, there were fewer hard and moderate difficulty clips than anticipated 
(i.e., only 6 total video clips meet current requirement for high difficulty compared to the desired 
24 clips). Thus, several adaptations had to be made to the methodology.  
First, due to effects outside of our experimental controls (e.g., human-beings exceptional 
detection of biological motion) no terrorist clips fit into either the hard or moderate difficult 
classification (see Table 11). Thus, in order to maintain the measure of item difficulty, signal 
type was collapsed. This was a viable solution since hypotheses for study 4 were concerned with 
the difficulty of the detection more so than ‘what’ per say was being detected. 
Therefore, the selection of equal numbers of each type of stimulus in each difficulty level 
was abandoned and instead equal numbers of video clips in general from each difficulty level 
was used. However, due to the excellent detection rate across subjects (M = 87.97, SD = 6.38) 
there were fewer hard and moderate clips than anticipated. Study plans had called for 240 clips 
with a 30% event rate, thus requiring 72 videos with embedded stimulus (i.e., terrorist, civilian, 
or IED). However, even after collapsing over stimulus-type there were only 6 rather than the 
anticipated 24 high difficulty clips. This would substantially reduce the number of video clips in 
the following two studies from 240 to only 60 total video clips. Thus to increase the number of 
potential total videos (i.e., trials) in the following two studies the difficulty index associated with 
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low, moderate, and high difficulty was slightly adjusted. So that, low difficulty index became 75-
100 (i.e., more than 75% of participants detect), moderate difficulty index 50-75, and high 
difficulty index 25-50. This resulted in the exclusion of a single video clip that had a 17 
difficulty index. By adjusting difficulty level slightly, I was able to maintain a natural 
progression in difficulty of the video clips, but double the number of future trials from 60 (with 
18 signals) to 120 (with 36 signals). 
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EXPERIMENT 3: METHODOLOGY 
Experimental Purpose 
The first and second experiments have been concerned with the stimulus durations, the 
given ISI for responding, and the difficulty of the stimulus. The third experiment will now 
examine the addition of an automated decision aid to a participant monitoring a single agent in 
the search-and-rescue task. The purpose of this study was to establish appropriate high- and low-
reliability levels for the automated-aids. While, aid reliability levels in the literature can vary a 
great deal, they are often task dependent. In order to maximize the potential effects of conflicting 
reliability levels in experiment 4 (i.e., improve power of the aid mixed-reliability manipulation) I 
tested seven potential reliability levels and compared them for user automation reliance and 
perceived automation trust.  
Experimental Participants  
To obtain 20 participants per reliability condition and a control condition (i.e., no aid), 
one-hundred-forty participants were recruited through the University of Central Florida. 
Participants received either course credit or cash payment for their participation (equivalent to 
1pt extra credit or $5). Participation was limited to those with normal or corrected to normal 
vision, and who have not participated in any of the prior experiments. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the seven conditions with the restriction that equal genders were 
present in each group (70 male, 70 female). Average age of the participants was 21 years old (SD 
= 5). 
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Experimental Procedure 
Participants first completed an informed consent and demographic questionnaire (see 
Appendix I and F). Next, participants received a short training session (see Appendix J and K). 
Finally, participants completed the experimental session, which was composed of 120 trials 
(approximately 20 minutes). After completion of the experimental session the participants 
completed the exit questionnaire (see Appendix L) and were thanked and compensated for their 
participation. The entire experiment took approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
Training Procedure 
The purpose of the training was to acquaint the participants with the basic task, as before, 
but also to familiarize them with the automated aid. This was accomplished using an 
experimenter read script (see Appendix J), a follow-along mission folder (see Appendix K), and 
a computerized practice session. The script and mission folder described in detail the scenario, 
what stimuli the participant would view, how to respond, and how the automated aids worked. 
The computerized practice session had the same layout as the experimental display (see Figure 
14). For practice the participants were presented with 8 video clips, 4 without the aid (see Figure 
15) followed by 4 with the use of the aid (see Figure 16). The video clips were all of easy 
difficulty and were drawn from the four types of potential stimuli, such that each type of 
stimulus appeared once without the aid and once with the aid. Participants were to respond to the 
practice trials to become familiar with the interface.  
68 
 
Figure 14. Practice interface for experiment 3. 
 
 
Figure 15. Experimental interface experiment 3 without the aid. 
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Figure 16. Experimental interface with the automated-aid. Note that: Aid recommendation reads 
“Terrorist Present.” 
Experimental Tasks 
Participants were given the same basic search-and-rescue scenario from the prior 
experiments, with the addition of an automated decision aid. Participants were told that the 
automated aid works as a ‘contrast detector’ using an algorithm to identify certain patterns such 
as civilians, terrorists, and IEDs in complex scenes. Users were informed that use of the aid was 
completely optional and that the responsibility of the final decision was their own and that they 
could choose either to accept the aid’s proposed diagnosis or to ignore it. Users were not 
informed about the aid’s reliability. 
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Experimental Conditions 
The property of aid reliability was examined in this study. The aid had a set reliability of 
either 75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95%, 99%, or Control (i.e., no aid recommendations). The aid had 
occasional misses and false alarms, within each reliability condition the number of misses and 
false alarms were equal (see Table 12). In all cases one-third of the trials (36 trials of the total 
120) contain an embedded signal (i.e., terrorist, civilian, or IED). Automation errors were 
randomly distributed throughout the automation so as to prevent operators from developing a 
strategy for compensating for the automation errors. It is important to stress here that all 
participants received the same number of embedded signals the only variation is the accuracy of 
the automated decision aid in detecting those embedded signals. 
Table 12. Reliability level false alarms and miss rates 
Reliability Level False Alarms Misses N 
99% 1 1 20 
95% 3 3 20 
90% 6 6 20 
85% 9 9 20 
80% 12 12 20 
75% 15 15 20 
Control (No Aid 
Recommendations) N/A N/A 20 
Measurement and Analysis 
For performance I examined reliance (which is defined as the percent of times the users 
decision matched the aids decision) and performance. The two reliability levels chosen for the 
fourth study must have significantly different reliance, with higher reliance for the high-
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reliability condition and lower levels of reliance for the low-reliability condition. Additionally, in 
terms of performance control performance (% correct) should be higher than the actual reliability 
of the low-reliability aid and lower than the actual reliability of the high-reliability aid. 
In terms of trust I examined subjective evaluations of perceived trust after interacting 
with the automation (see Appendix L). The subjective trust ratings were based on the self-report 
measures used by Dzindolet et al. (2003) and Master et al. (2000) Dzindolet et al (2003) and 
administered after participants interacted with the automation (see Table 5). In the questionnaire 
participants were asked to rate their perceived trust in the automated decision aid. The two 
reliability levels chosen for the fourth study must have significantly different perceived trust, 
with higher trust for the high-reliability condition and lower levels of trust for the low-reliability 
condition. 
Experimental Equipment 
As in the previous studies the simulation was presented on a 20” widescreen monitor on a 
desktop computer. Participants responded using a mouse. The interface was created using 
VisualBasic.net. 
Hypothesized Outcome 
The outcome of this study was the selection of a high- and low-reliability level for study 
4. The purpose of this was to improve the measure of mixed reliability in experiment 4 (i.e., have 
improved power of the measure). To accomplish this purpose it is required that the aids differ in 
perceived trust, reliance, and performance. It is hypothesized that differences will be consistently 
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obtained between reliability levels of 99% and 75%; however, it has been shown that if 
automation is faulty beyond a certain point operators will completely ignore it and focus solely 
on manual control. To prevent complete misuse of the low-reliability aid in experiment 4, it is 
desirable to use as high a reliability level for the low-reliability aid as possible that still maintains 
significantly less reliance and trust compared to the high-reliability condition. A final restriction 
is that the actual reliability for the low-reliability condition must be below control user 
performance and the actual reliability for the high-reliability must be above control user 
performance. 
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EXPERIMENT 3: RESULTS  
The purpose of the third experiment was to ensure appropriate high- and low-reliability 
levels for the automated aids in experiment 4. While, aid reliability levels in the literature can 
vary a great deal, they are often task dependent. Thus, in order to maximize the potential effects 
of conflicting reliability levels in experiment 4 (i.e., improve power of the aid mixed reliability 
manipulation) I tested six potential reliability levels and compared them for performance, 
reliance, and trust differences.  
Performance and Behavioral Data  
Percent Correct 
It was required that the set reliability of the low-reliability aid be below average operator 
performance. Since, the control group indicated that average operator performance on this task 
was around 82% accuracy (SD = 5%), the 75% reliability level was selected to serve as the low-
reliability level, as it was the only reliability level below average user performance. It was also 
required that the set reliability level of the high-reliability aid be significantly above average 
operator performance, this criteria was satisfied by the 90%, 95%, and 99% reliability 
conditions. However, these values were for the set reliability (i.e., actual reliability of the aid), a 
univariate ANOVA was conducted on all 140 participants for overall performance accuracy (i.e., 
how participants calibrated their performance with that of the aid; See Figure 17). A significant 
effect for reliability of the aid on user overall performance, as measured by percent correct, was 
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found, F(6, 133) = 9.72, p < .0005, η² = 0.31. Correlation data indicated that as aid reliability 
increased so did user performance (r = .34). 
 
 
Figure 17. Percent correct as a function of automation reliability. Note that the control group that 
received no automated recommendations. 
Reliance 
A univariate ANOVA was performed on the 120 participants who interacted with the aid 
to examine reliance, as measured by the number of times the participant agreed with the 
automated aid. Aid reliability was found to have a significant effect on participant reliance, F(5, 
114) = 19.62, p < .0005, η² = 0.46. Correlation data indicated that as aid reliability increased so 
did user reliance on the aid (r = .66; see Figure 18). Given that the 75% reliability condition has 
been selected for the low reliability, it is important that the high reliability condition is relied on 
significantly more than the 75% reliable condition. All reliability conditions, except the 80% 
reliable condition, had significantly higher reliance than the 75% reliable condition (p < .05 in all 
cases). 
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Figure 18. User reliance as a function of automation reliability. Note that user reliance is 
measured as the percent of time the participant agreed with the aid. 
Subjective Data  
Perceived Trust 
A univariate ANOVA was performed to examine trust of the aid, as measured by a 9-
point Likert scale, with higher numbers reflecting greater trust. Aid reliability was found to have 
a significant effect on participant trust, F(5, 114) = 2.86, p = .018, η² = 0.11. Correlation data 
indicated that as the aid’s reliability increased, so did user perceived trust of the aid (r = .29; see 
Figure 19). Given that the 75% reliability condition had been selected for the low-reliability, it 
was important that the high-reliability condition garnered significantly more trust than the 75% 
reliable condition. Only the 95% and 99% conditions had significantly higher levels of self-
reported trust compared to the 75% reliable condition (p < .05 in all cases). 
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Figure 19. Participant perceived trust as a function of reliability of aid. 
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EXPERIMENT 3: DISCUSSION  
Given the findings for experiment 3 it was decided that the low-reliability condition 
would be 75% based on the fact that it was the only reliability condition with an actual set 
reliability level below average user performance. Either the 95% or 99% reliability conditions 
would work for the high-reliability aid, in that they both had set reliabilities above average user 
performance, both were significantly more trusted than the low-reliability aid, and both were 
relied upon significantly more often than the low-reliability aid.  However, it was decided to go 
with the 95% reliable aid, as it would allows for 6 automation errors during the 60 trials in study 
4 (3 for each agent) and thus allow the examination of error salience (i.e., high difficulty, 
moderate difficulty, or low difficulty) on subsequent automation reliance. Whereas, use of the 
99% reliable measure would allow for only 2 automation errors during the 60 trials (1 for each 
agent), thus forcing the measure of error salience to be dropped from study 4 (since making error 
salience a between-subjects measure would be prohibitive in terms of the increase to sample-
size; i.e., from 300 to 840 participants). 
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EXPERIMENT 4: METHODOLOGY 
Experimental Purpose 
The first three experiments resulted in the creation of a test bed for the fourth experiment; 
which examined operator trust and reliance on automatic decision aids when working with 
multiple agents. In this experiment, participants monitored two video feeds and two concurrent 
automated decision agents. These agents were manipulated in terms of their reliabilities and 
agent type. The purpose of this study was to examine how inappropriate biasing of trust  and 
reliance calibrations occur when an operator is exposed to two agents of different reliabilities 
(e.g., does disuse of a high-reliability aid occur when combined with a low-reliability aid and 
does misuse of a low-reliability aid occur when combined with a high-reliability aid). 
Additionally, it was of interest to examine whether this biasing effect was influenced by the 
perceived independence of the agents. That is, can ‘what’ one believes the agents are, influence 
how one reacts to them (i.e., reliance) and thinks of them (i.e., perceived trust)? In the following 
study this question was examined by looking at three levels of agent independence (i.e., two 
human agents – highest independence, two different-type robotic agents – moderate 
independence, and two same-type robotic agents – intermediate independence; see Figures 20, 
21, & 22) and three levels of reliability (uniform low, mixed, and uniform high).  
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Figure 20. Human agent condition. 
 
 
Figure 21. Same-type robotic agent condition. 
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Figure 22. Different-type robotic agent condition. 
 
Experimental Participants 
A total of 330 participants (150 males, 180 females) from the University of Central 
Florida volunteered to participate in the study, this ensured adequate power of measurement 
(assuming ΔI = 0.55, α = .05, & β = .20). Participants were compensated with course credit or 
cash payment for their participation (2pts course credit or $8 paid). Participation was limited to 
those with normal or corrected to normal vision and to those who have not participated in any of 
the prior experiments. Participants ranged from 18 to 57 years of age, with most subjects being 
close to the mean age of 21 years (SD = 5).  
Due to the large sample size the laboratory was set-up to allow running of up to eleven 
participants at a time. Cubicle dividers and noise-canceling headphones were employed to 
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mitigate any visual or auditory interference between participants. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the cells of a 3 (source characteristics: humans, generic machines, unique machines) 
x 3 (reliability: both low, mixed, both high) between participant design (or a control condition), 
with the restriction that equal genders were equally distributed in each condition. One male 
participants data was lost due to a technical failure and the following results are thus based on 
329 participants. 
Experimental Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups ranging in size from 1 to 11. Regardless of size of the 
group participants completed the same experimental order. That is, they first completed an 
informed consent (see Appendix M), demographic questionnaire (see Appendix F), 
anthropomorphism questionnaire (ATS; see Appendix N), interpersonal trust scale (ITS; see 
Appendix O), and complacency potential rating scale (CPRS; see Appendix P). Next participants 
completed a short training session (see Appendix Q) followed by a trust pre-questionnaire (see 
Appendix R). Finally, participants completed the experimental session, which entailed 
monitoring two video feeds with agent recommendations for 60 trials each (10 minutes; see 
Figure 23). After completion of the experimental session the participant completed three exit 
questionnaires. One questionnaire queried participants on their own performance by asking them 
to rate their own self-confidence in performing the task and to complete the NASA-TLX (which 
was computer based; see Appendix S). The other two exit questionnaires queried the participants 
on their trust in their Teammate A and Teammate B (see Appendix T). After completing the exit 
questionnaires participants were debriefed on the nature of the study (See Appendix U), 
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compensated, and thanked for their participation. The entire experiment took approximately 1 
hour to complete. 
 
 
Figure 23. Experimental interface experiment 4. 
Training Procedure 
The training for experiment 4 was identical to the training session for experiment 3 
except that participants were instructed on performing two monitoring tasks concurrently and 
informed that they would be interacting with a particular kind of agent. This was accomplished 
by using an experimenter read script (see Appendix Q) and a computerized practice session (see 
Figure 24). The practice session presented 8 sets of video clips, the first four without the aid of a 
teammate and the last four with the aid of a teammate (see Table 13). Participants were to 
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respond to the practice trials to become familiar with the interface. Participants were informed 
that the practice sessions were preprogrammed for demonstrational purposes and did not reflect 
the recommendations of their future teammates. During the practice session decision aids were 
held at 100% reliable.  
 
Figure 24. Practice interface for experiment 3. 
 
Table 13. Video orders for experiment 4 practice session. 
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Trial Video 1 Video 2 
1 Terrorist Empty 
2 Empty Civilian 
3 IED Empty 
4 Empty Empty 
5 Terrorist Terrorist 
6 Civilian Civilian 
7 IED IED 
8 Terrorist Civilian 
Experimental Tasks 
Participants were given the same basic search-and-rescue scenario from experiment 3, 
with the addition of a second video feed and automated decision aid (See Figure 23). The size of 
the display was held constant. The instructions participants received in the training condition 
differed depending on whether they were in the same-type robotic aid (see Figure 20), different-
type robotic aid (see Figure 21), or human condition (see Figure 22). Participants in the robotic 
aid conditions were informed that they would be monitoring the responses of two robotic agents; 
they were informed that the robotic agents made decisions based on mathematical algorithms. To 
maximize the perceived difference between different-type and same-type robotic aids their 
different nature was emphasized in the instructions and also the UGVs were represented by 
either two of the same-type or two different-type robots (see Figure 25). The robots were both 
wheeled prototypical robots that differed in color and exact form. On the other hand participants 
in the human condition were informed that they would be interacting with two students who had 
previously completed this study. It was stated that the students had previously completed the 
study to account for the fact that their pictures were employed in the simulation. The pictures of 
the two students were actually facial compilations of 65 female faces and 35 male faces to give 
an ‘average’ male and an ‘average’ female. Averaged faces were used to minimize the chance of 
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participants recognizing the ‘student’ and to provide a level of control for the manipulation of 
human agents (see Figure 26). Male and female faces were used to allow for the examination of 
any differences in trust and reliance on the agents based on sex characteristics of the operator and 
the agents. 
 
Figure 25. Robotic teammates. Note that robots were counterbalanced so that half of the 
participants in the same-type aid received the yellow robot and half the white robot. 
 
 
Figure 26. Human agent facial compilations for male and female teammates. 
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Regardless of the specifics of the agent type (i.e., whether they are distributed human 
agents, unique computer agents, are identical computer agents) the participant received the same 
experimental task and always played the role of monitor (i.e., observing the scenario, and the 
recommendations by the agents, to make a final decisions). Users were explicitly informed that 
use of the aids was completely optional and that the responsibility of the final decision was their 
own and that they could choose either to accept the agents proposed diagnosis or to ignore them. 
This low level of automation was used as it has been argued that trust is only relevant in 
situations that can be characterized by a certain degree of free will in placing oneself in a 
situation of risk (de Vries et al., 2003). That is, the users are free to agree with or ignore the 
automation, but the automation will not take action independently of the operator. Participants 
were not informed about the agent’s reliability levels. 
Experimental Conditions 
The properties of aid reliability and source characteristics were manipulated in this study. 
Agents were set at either the same reliability level (either low or high) or mixed reliability (one 
agent operates at high reliability and the other at low reliability). Additionally, participant 
attributions of the agent were manipulated so that they believed they are working with human 
teammates, same-type robotic teammates, or different-type robotic teammates. An additional 
condition in which the operator received no teammate recommendations served as a control. This 
results in a 3 by 3 between-subjects ANOVA (plus control condition). Between-subjects was 
used because it was believed that participants would be influenced by switching reliability levels 
87 
and agent source would become less effective as a within-subject variable (i.e., that agent source 
as a manipulation would become less believable if within). 
Measurement and Analysis 
It is critical to obtain subjective measures to measure the psychological construct of 
automation trust, as well as behavioral data to evaluate automation reliance, since often times 
performance and subjective measures are imperfectly calibrated (Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 
2001). 
Subjective Measures 
Exit questionnaires were administered to evaluate perceived workload, trust, and self-
confidence based on interacting with the automated agents (see Appendix S & T). Automation 
trust, self-confidence, and perceived reliability of the aids were obtained using 9-point Likert-
type scales.  
The literature provides evidence that it is important to examine how personality 
differences (e.g., generalized trust expectancies, anthropomorphic tendencies, and complacency 
potential) affect trusting behavior. For example, studies have shown that those who score highly 
on interpersonal trust are generally more cooperative with other people (Rotter, 1967), it would 
be interesting to examine if interpersonal trust is related to being more cooperative (i.e., higher 
reliance) with robotic aids. One method to do this is by employing the Interpersonal Trust Scale 
(ITS; Rotter, 1967).  
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The ITS is a 25 item questionnaire that examines an individual’s level of interpersonal 
trust. Some of the items on the scale measure trust in a variety of social objects and some items 
measure general optimism regarding society. Of the 25 trust items, 12 are written so that an 
“agree” response indicates trust and 13 are written so that a “disagree” response indicates trust 
(Rotter, 1967).  The items use five Likert response categories from (1) strongly agree to (5) 
strongly disagree. Scores can range from 25 (lowest trust) to 125 (highest trust), with a neutral 
score or midpoint of 75. Test-retest reliability for the questionnaire has been found to be .56 or 
.68 (Rotter, 1967). The scale was designed to measure one’s expectation that the behavior, 
promises, or (verbal or written) statements of other individuals can be relied upon (Wrightsman, 
1991). The ITS is not significantly related to intellectual aptitude, but have been found to be 
related to birth order (youngest lower trust), self religion (any religious beliefs reflects greater 
generalized trust), parents religion (individuals with parents of differing religions have lower 
interpersonal trust scores compared to those whose parents are of the same religion), and 
socioeconomic level (individuals in lower socioeconomic levels have lower ITS scores compared 
to individuals in higher socioeconomic levels; Rotter, 1967). Additionally, scores on the ITS 
have been related to the likelihood of giving others a second chance (Rotter, 1980), but not to 
gullibility or dependence (Rotter, 1967).  
Participants were also given the Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS). The CPRS 
is designed to assess attitudes (favorable and unfavorable) toward everyday automated devices 
(e.g., automatic teller machines). An attitude can be defined as a personal disposition common to 
individuals, but possessed by them to different degrees, which impels them to react to objects or 
situations in favorable or unfavorable ways (Singh, Molloy, & Parasuraman, 1993). That is, the 
CPRS is designed to measure one’s attitude toward automation (e.g., overconfidence) which may 
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in particular situations (e.g., high workload, routine, repetition) lead to complacent behavior. The 
concept of complacent behavior is defined by Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh (1993) as 
inaccuracy and/or delay in detecting a failure in an automated system. The CPRS measures this 
attitude with an internal consistency (r = .87), overall reliability (r = .90), and test-retest 
reliability (r = .90). The scale measures four main factors which lead to complacency, they are: 
confidence, reliance, trust, and safety. This scale is composed of 12-items, each measured by a 5-
point Likert-type scale with anchors ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). As 
these anchors were the opposite direction of the ITS all participants were cautioned of the 
conflicting anchors prior to filling out the questionnaires. Mean CPRS scores in validation 
research were 57.69 (SD = 6.09), and scores range from 40 to 75. 
Objective Measures 
Automation reliance was determined by examining the agreement probabilities of the 
operator with the agents. Temporal reliance was determined by examining the likelihood of 
agreement with a correct aid recommendation following an aid error. Distribution of the errors 
was constrained so that each error was followed by a correct automation recommendation. 
Experimental Equipment 
Decision agents were referred to as ‘Agent A’ and ‘Agent B’ during the duration of the 
experiment. This was done to emphasize that the agent is conducting an activity that could 
conceivably be done by a person or machine, and to reflect the collaborative nature of the 
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operator’s interaction with the agents (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002; Bowers, Oser, Salas, & 
Cannon-Bowers, 1996; Bubb-Lewis & Scerbo, 1997; Scerbo, 1996; Woods, 1996).  
Agents were set to reliability levels as determined in experiment 3: 75% for the low-
reliability agent and 95% for the high-reliability agent. Depending on the condition assigned 
participants interacted with two high-reliability agents, two low-reliability agents, or two agents 
of mixed-reliability. Reliability level was held constant for the duration of the experiment.  
In regards to the interface for Experiment 4 (see Figures 20, 21, & 22), there were 
illustrations next to each agent recommendation. These illustrations were employed because past 
research has shown that teammates using video channels or face-to-face interaction established 
trust and cooperation more quickly than did teammates using only textual communication 
(Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2001). Furthermore, in regards to the interface at large, past 
research using internet websites found that design quality as composed of strict grouping, formal 
language, the use of real photos, and employing empty space as a structural element, has been 
found to improve perceived trust (Karvonen & Parkkinen, 2001). Thus the use of these structural 
elements was utilized to minimize the negative effect of overall visual impression on perceived 
trust of the system, allowing participants to focus on the rational evaluation of the decision aids 
themselves (i.e., the utility and source of the recommendations) to guide their use of the agents. 
The agents themselves were set at automation level 5 according to the level of automation 
classification of Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000; see Table 14). Automation level 5 
was chosen based on research by Young & Stanton (2001) that found that ideally technological 
support systems should act like a driving instructor in the passenger seat – subtle enough so as 
not to cause interference, but accessible enough so as to provide assistance when needed. That is, 
the automation offered the operator a recommendation but did not automatically execute that 
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recommendation. Thus, the operator had to commit a voluntarily action of trusting the agent 
(Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2001). For example, if an aid identified a terrorist agent in a 
video clip the operator had a limited amount of time to approve the automation’s 
recommendation or enter their own decision before moving on to the next trial. Additionally, 
operators were told that using the automation was optional, and they could accept or ignore the 
automation on each trial during the experiment. Participants were not informed of the reliability 
level of the automated agent. Thus, the difficult position of determining whether or not one 
should rely on the decision aid was placed entirely upon the participant.  
 
Table 14. Table of automation levels (adapted from Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens, 2000) 
Automation 
Level Description 
10 The computer decides everything, acts autonomously, ignoring the human. 
9 informs the human only if it, the computer decides to 
8 informs the human only if asked, or 
7 executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, and 
6 allows the human a restricted time veto before automatic execution, or 
5 executes that suggestion if human approves, or 
4 suggests one alternative 
3 narrows the selections down to a few, or 
2 The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, or 
1 The computer offers no assistance: human must make all decisions and actions. 
Hypothesized Outcome 
There were six central hypotheses to experiment 4 (see Table 15).  
1. In a complex, dual-aid, condition there will be bias between two agents of mixed reliability 
compared to two uniform agents. 
a. Trust and reliance of a high-reliability agent will be negatively influenced by a 
concurrent low-reliability agent. 
92 
b. Trust and reliance of a low-reliability agent will be positively influenced by a 
concurrent high-reliability agent. 
2. Operators experiencing high automation reliability will have significantly more subjective 
trust in the automation than those experiencing both low or the mixed reliability conditions. 
Additionally those with low automation reliability will experience significantly less 
subjective trust of the automation than those in the mixed reliability condition (HO = There is 
no significant difference between reliability group trust scores). 
a. Increased levels of automation trust will be accompanied by increased levels of 
reliance on the aid and lower levels of reported workload. 
b. Decreased levels of automation trust will be accompanied by decreased levels of 
reliance on the aid and higher levels of reported workload. 
3. Subjective levels of trust, automation reliance, and workload are expected to differ across 
agent type (i.e., human, similar computer agents, dissimilar computer agents). Such that 
human agents have increased trust, increased reliance, and decreased workload, compared to 
the computer agents. The computer agents are not expected to differ in overall trust, reliance, 
or workload (HO = There is no significant difference between agent type group trust ratings, 
reliance, and/or workload). 
4. In a mixed reliability condition the agent type is expected to significantly impact crossover 
bias between the two agents. (HO = There is no significant interaction between reliability and 
agent type). 
a. Two agents perceived to be human will experience the least crossover bias in the 
mixed reliability condition. Thus, a low-reliability human aid will have little impact 
on a concurrent high-reliability human aid. 
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b. The same-type robotic agents will experience the most crossover bias in the mixed 
reliability condition. Thus, a low-reliability same-type robotic agent will have a 
strong impact on a concurrent high-reliability same-type robotic agent. 
c. The different-type robotic agents will experience an intermediate level of crossover 
bias in the mixed reliability condition. Thus, a low-reliability different-type robotic 
agent will have an intermediate impact on a concurrent high-reliability different-type 
robotic agent. 
5. The failure salience of the automation error is expected to influence the likelihood of relying 
on the aid in the future trials. Such that as the salience increases the lower temporal reliance 
becomes (temporal reliance is measured by the agreement with an aid on the trial following 
an aid error). (HO = There is no significant effect between failure salience groups for 
temporal reliance). 
a. High salience failures (i.e., obvious errors) will cause a significantly less temporal 
reliance on the aid compared to less salient errors (moderate and low salience 
failures). 
b. Moderate salience failures will cause less temporal reliance compared to low salience 
failures but maintain higher temporal reliance than high salience failures. 
c. Low salience failures will maintain the highest level of temporal reliance compared to 
the more salient errors. 
6. It is expected that source characteristics of the agents and the salience of the agent errors will 
interact to affect temporal reliance. (HO = There is no significant interaction between source 
characteristics and failure salience). 
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a. Agents perceived to be human will experience drops in temporal reliance proportional 
to the increasing simplicity of the error made. Also it is expected that participants will 
be more forgiving of human errors compared to robotic errors, especially on more 
difficult stimuli. 
b. The computer agents will experience equivalent drops in reliance across all types of 
errors. This reflects automation bias, in which automation is expected to work 
perfectly or not at all. Participants will be unforgiving of all robotic errors regardless 
of error salience. 
Table 15. Hypotheses for Experiment 4. 
 Hypothesis Number 
Dependent 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Perceived 
Trust 
MHR ≠ UHR 
MLR ≠ ULR
UHR > M > ULR H > [D, S] 
(ES: HMHR ≠ HUHR) < 
(ES: DMHR ≠ DUHR) < 
(ES: SMHR ≠ SUHR) 
 
(ES: HMLR ≠ HULR) < 
(ES: DMLR ≠ DULR) < 
(ES: SMLR ≠ SULR) 
  
Reliance MHR ≠ UHR MLR ≠ ULR
UHR > M > ULR H > [D, S] 
(ES: HMHR ≠ HUHR) < 
(ES: DMHR ≠ DUHR) < 
(ES: SMHR ≠ SUHR) 
 
(ES: HMLR ≠ HULR) < 
(ES: DMLR ≠ DULR) < 
(ES: SMLR ≠ SULR) 
  
Workload  UHR < M < ULR H < [D, S]    
Temporal 
Reliance     
FH < 
FM < 
FL
HFH < HFM < HFL 
 
[SFL , DFL] < HFL 
 
[SFH ,DFH] < 
[SFM, DFM ] < 
[SFL, SFL] 
*H = Human Agents, D = Different-Type Agents, S = Same Type Agents, UHR = Uniform High-Reliability, ULR = 
Uniform Low-Reliability, M = Mixed-Reliability, MHR = Mixed High-Reliability, MLR = Mixed Low-Reliability, FH 
= High Failure Salience, FM = Moderate Failure Salience, FL = Low Failure Salience, ES = Effect Size 
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EXPERIMENT 4: RESULTS  
The purpose of the fourth experiment was to examine the effect of agent type, reliability 
condition, and agent error salience upon subjective trust ratings, perceived workload, and 
behavioral measures (i.e., reliance; see Table 16). The following analyses focus first on main 
effects and then interactions. The final section of results examines findings regarding individual 
differences and how these may have influenced the results. Overall result means and standard 
deviations for each condition are given in Appendix V. 
Table 16. Results for hypotheses for Experiment 4. 
 Hypothesis Number 
Dependent 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Perceived 
Trust 
MHR ≠ UHR 
MLR ≠ ULR
UHR > M > ULR H > [D, S] 
(ES: HMR ≠ HUR) < 
(ES: DMR ≠ DUR) < 
(ES: SMR ≠ SUR) 
  
Reliance MHR ≠ UHR MLR ≠ ULR
UHR > M > ULR H > [D, S] 
(ES: HMR ≠ HUR) < 
(ES: DMR ≠ DUR) < 
(ES: SMR ≠ SUR) 
  
Workload  UHR < M < ULR H < [D, S]    
Temporal 
Reliance     
FH < 
FM < 
FL
HFH < HFM < 
HFL 
 
[SFL , DFL] < HFL 
 
[SFH ,DFH] = 
[SFM, DFM ] = 
[SFL, SFL] 
 
*H = Human Agents, D = Different-Type Agents, S = Same Type Agents, UHR = Uniform High-Reliability, ULR = 
Uniform Low-Reliability, M = Mixed-Reliability, MHR = Mixed High-Reliability, MLR = Mixed Low-Reliability, FH 
= High Failure Salience, FM = Moderate Failure Salience, FL = Low Failure Salience, ES = Effect Size 
 
Hypotheses in bold and underlined were supported by the results. Hypotheses with plain text were not supported. 
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Subjective Data 
Self-Rated Confidence 
Contrary to anticipated results operator perceived self-confidence in performing the 
search-and-rescue task themselves was not related to actual reliance on the automated aids (r = 
0.08, p = .20). Additionally, when self-confidence was subtracted from automation trust, agent 
correlations between trust-self-confidence and reliance were lowered or removed altogether 
(compared to direct automation trust and automation reliance correlations). Therefore, it was 
believed that self-confidence as measured in this study added more error than power to the 
analysis, and was therefore excluded from the rest of the analyses.  
Self-Rated Trust 
Self-Rated Trust Main Effect of Agent 
Results were analyzed using a 3 (agent type) * 3 (reliability condition) univariate 
ANOVA on self-rated trust. The main effect for agent was not significant, F(2, 287) = 0.41, p = 
.66, η² = .00 (see Table 17). 
Table 17. Self-reported trust of agents across agent-type. 
Agent Type Mean SD 
Human 6.27 1.56 
Different-Type Robotic 6.43 1.56 
Same-Type Robotic 6.21 1.75 
 Self-Rated Trust Main Effect of Reliability 
Results were analyzed using a 3 (agent type) * 3 (reliability condition) univariate 
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ANOVA on self-rated trust. The main effect for reliability condition was significant, F(2, 287) = 
23.73, p < .0005, η² = .14. Pairwise comparison indicated that the three reliability conditions 
were significantly different in the predicted direction (see Figure 27).  
 
Figure 27. Agent trust as a function of reliability condition. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Self-Rated Trust Bias by Reliability Condition 
It was hypothesized that there would be bias in the mixed reliability aids compared to the 
uniform reliability aids. That is, that a low-reliability aid would negatively affect the trust in a 
concurrent high-reliability aid, and that a high-reliability aid would positively affect the trust in a 
concurrent low-reliability aid. To measure this I first conducted paired-samples t-test to ensure 
that the trust ratings in the low and high-reliability mixed condition were significantly different, 
t(97) = 3.72, p < .0005, g = 0.45. Results were in the predicted direction with the low-reliability 
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aid (M = 6.02, SD = 2.07) being rated as significantly less trustworthy than the high-reliability 
aid (M = 6.84, SD = 1.60). I then conducted a paired-samples t-test for the two agents used in the 
uniform-high and uniform-low reliability conditions to ensure that they were sufficiently similar 
to take an average high and average low score. The uniform low (t(97) = 0.47, p = .64, g = 0.05) 
and high-reliability (t(96) = 0.21, p = .83, g = 0.02) aids were not significantly different in terms 
of self-reported trust. A one-tailed independent-samples t-test was conducted between the low 
reliability trust scores in the mixed-reliability condition and the averaged low reliability trust 
scores in the low-uniform-reliability condition. A one-tailed independent-samples t-test was also 
conducted between the high reliability trust scores in the mixed-reliability condition and the 
averaged high reliability trust scores in the high-uniform-reliability condition. A measure of the 
magnitude of the effect for each of the t-tests was obtained by calculating Hedges g from the 
means and standard deviations of each group. This gave me a non-significant result for the high 
reliability condition, t(194) = 1.06, p = .15, g = 0.15, though the means were in the right direction 
(High uniform: M = 7.07, SD = 1.43; High-mixed: M = 6.84, SD = 1.60). On the other hand, 
there was a significant result in the predicted direction for the low reliability condition (t(196) = 
1.71, p = .04, g = 0.24; Low uniform: M = 5.59, SD = 1.56; Low-mixed: M = 6.03, SD = 2.06). 
Self-Rated Trust Interaction between Agent Type and Reliability 
These results were analyzed for the effect-size difference for each agent for their trust in 
the mixed reliability vs. trust in the uniform reliability. The same process from the previous 
section was used to calculate ES for each bias measure. 
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Human Agent and Trust 
 
Limiting analysis to those participants in the human-agent condition only, a paired-
samples t-test was conducted to examine trust in the mixed reliability condition. It was evident 
that the low reliability aid (M = 6.30, SD = 1.57) and high reliability aid (M = 7.21, SD = 1.29) 
had significantly different perceived rated trust, (t(32) = 2.39, p = .02, g = 0.64; See Figure 28 
blue line). Paired-samples t-test were then used to examine trust in the two aids used in the 
uniform low-reliability condition (Agent A: M = 5.45, SD = 1.62; Agent B: M = 5.36, SD = 1.78; 
t(32) = 0.28, p = .78, g = 0.05; See Figure 29 blue line) and uniform high-reliability condition 
(Agent A: M = 6.70, SD = 2.02; Agent B: M = 6.61, SD = 1.98; t(32) = 0.32, p = .74, g = 0.04; 
Figure 30 blue line), both of which did not significantly differ. Since the perceived trust did not 
significantly differ, in terms of the t-test or ES values, for the Agents in either of the uniform 
reliability conditions, these values were combined to allow for comparison against the mixed-
reliability condition (See Figure 31; uniform values are represented by hollow diamonds). Using 
an independent-samples one-tailed t-test the perceived trust for the low-reliability human agent 
in the mixed-reliability condition (M = 6.30, SD = 1.57) was compared against the averaged low-
reliability human agent trust in the low-uniform condition (M = 5.40, SD = 1.42; t(64) = 2.42, p = 
.009, g = 0.59). Results indicated that the low-reliability agent in the human mixed-reliability 
condition was rated as significantly higher in terms of trust than the low-reliability human agents 
in the uniform low-reliability condition. Next the biasing effect on a high-reliability human agent 
was examined. Using an independent-samples two-tailed t-test, two-tailed was used because the 
means did not match the direction of the hypothesis, high-reliability human agent trust in the 
mixed-reliability condition (M = 7.21, SD = 1.29) was compared against the averaged high-
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reliability human agent trust in the uniform high-reliability condition (M = 6.65, SD = 1.83; t(64) 
= 1.44, p = .16, g = 0.35). Results were not significant for the biasing effects in the human agent 
condition for perceived trust. 
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Figure 28. Perceived trust as a function of agent reliability by agent type in the mixed-reliability 
condition.   
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Figure 29. Perceived trust as a function of agent type in the low-reliability condition.  
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Figure 30. Perceived trust as a function of agent type in the high-reliability condition. 
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Figure 31. Perceived trust as a function of agent reliability for human agents. Note that mixed-
reliability are the solid diamonds and uniform-reliabilities are represented by the hollow 
diamonds. 
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Different-Type Robotic Agent and Trust 
 
The next sets of analyses were limited to those participants in the different-type robotic 
agent condition. To conduct this analysis a paired-samples one-tailed t-test was conducted to 
examine trust in the mixed reliability condition. Surprisingly the low-reliability different-type 
robotic agent (M = 6.15, SD = 2.25) did not significantly differ in terms of perceived trust from 
the high-reliability different-type robotic agent (M = 6.64, SD = 1.60; t(32) = 1.33, p = .10, g = 
0.27; See Figure 28). However, additional analyses were still conducted to see if the degree of 
biasing in the agent scores was lower or higher in this agent compared to the other agents. 
Paired-samples t-test were used to examine trust in the two aids used in the low-uniform 
different-type robotic condition (Agent A: M = 5.82, SD = 1.81; Agent B: M = 5.61, SD = 2.00; 
t(32) = 0.56, p = .58, g = 0.11; See Figure 29) and high-uniform conditions (Agent A: M = 7.23, 
SD = 1.50; Agent B: M = 7.35, SD = 0.88; t(30) = 0.50, p = .65, g = 0.10; See Figure 30), both of 
which did not significantly differ. Since the perceived trust did not significantly differ, in terms 
of the t-test or ES values, for the Agents in either of the uniform-reliability different-type robot 
conditions, these values were combined to allow for comparison against the mixed-reliability 
condition. Using an independent-samples one-tailed t-test the perceived trust for the low-
reliability different-type robotic agent in the mixed reliability condition (M = 6.15, SD = 2.25) 
was compared against the averaged low-reliability different-type robotic agent trust in the low-
uniform condition (M = 5.71, SD = 1.56; t(64) = 0.92, p = .18, g = 0.23; See Figure 32). Results 
indicated that the low-reliability agent in the different-type robotic mixed condition was not 
significantly different in terms of trust than the uniform low-reliability agents in the different-
type robotic condition. Next, the biasing effect on a high-reliability different-type robotic agent 
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was examined. Using an independent-samples one-tailed t-test high-reliability different-type 
robotic agent trust in the mixed-reliability condition (M = 6.64, SD = 1.60) was compared against 
the averaged high-reliability different-type robotic agent trust in the high-uniform condition (M = 
7.34, SD = 0.98; t(63) = 2.15, p = .036, g = 0.53; See Figure 32).  
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
Low High
Agent Reliability
Se
lf-
R
ep
or
te
d 
Tr
us
t i
n 
th
e 
A
ge
nt
Different-Uniform
Different-Type Robotic
 
Figure 32. Perceived trust as a function of agent reliability for different-type robotic agents. Note 
that mixed-reliability are the solid squares and uniform-reliabilities are the hollow squares. 
 
Same-Type Robotic Agent and Trust 
 
The final set of analyses were limiting to those participants in the same-type robotic agent 
condition only. To conduct this analysis I used a paired-samples t-test to examine trust in the 
mixed-reliability condition, it was apparent that the low reliability aid (M = 5.63, SD = 2.33) and 
high reliability aid (M = 6.63, SD = 1.81) had significantly different perceived rated trust, (t(31) 
= 2.46, p = .01; See Figure 28). Paired-samples t-test were then used to examine trust in the two 
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aids used in the low-uniform (Agent A: M = 5.58, SD = 1.82; Agent B: M = 5.61, SD = 2.05; 
t(31) = 0.10, p = .78, g = 0.02; See Figure 29) and high-uniform conditions (Agent A: M = 7.18, 
SD = 1.40; Agent B: M = 7.24, SD = 1.39; t(32) = 0.30, p = .77, g = 0.04; See Figure 30), both of 
which did not significantly differ. Since the perceived trust did not significantly differ, in terms 
of the t-test or ES values, for the same-type robotic agents in either of the uniform reliability 
conditions, these values were combined to allow for comparison against the mixed-reliability 
condition. Using an independent-samples one-tailed t-test the perceived trust for the low-
reliability same-type robotic agent in the mixed reliability condition (M = 5.67, SD = 2.31) was 
compared against the averaged low-reliability same-type robotic agent trust in the low-uniform 
condition (M = 5.63, SD = 1.73; t(64) = 0.95, p = .48, g = 0.01; See Figure 33). Next the biasing 
effect on a high-reliability same-type robotic agent was examined. Using an independent-
samples one-tailed t-test high-reliability same-type robotic agent trust in the mixed-reliability 
condition (M = 6.63, SD = 1.81) was compared against the averaged high-reliability same-type 
robotic agent trust in the high-uniform condition (M = 7.21, SD = 1.27; t(63) = 1.52, p = .07, g = 
0.37; See Figure 33), again results were not significant.  
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Figure 33. Perceived trust as a function of agent reliability for same-type robotic agents. Note that 
mixed-reliability are the solid triangles and uniform-reliabilities are the hollow triangles.  
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Effect-Size Analysis of Agent and Trust 
 
The effect-sizes of the difference between the mixed and uniform agents of the same 
reliability are presented in Table 18. In absolute average terms, human agents demonstrated the 
largest average effect-size between the mixed and uniform conditions, meaning that they 
demonstrated the greatest biasing effect when presented in a mixed condition. The same-type 
robotic agents experienced the least biasing effect between the mixed and uniform conditions, 
meaning that these agents were the most insensitive to whether they were presented uniformly or 
in a mixed condition. Finally, different-type robotic agents experienced an intermediate level of 
effect-size biasing between the mixed and uniform conditions.  
Table 18. Effect-size measures for degree of difference between mixed and uniform reliability 
conditions for trust. Note that negative values indicate that the mixed value is lower than the 
uniform value, while positive values indicate that the mixed value is higher than the uniform 
value. 
Agent Type Low Reliability ES High Reliability ES Absolute Average ES 
Human +0.59 +0.35 0.47 
Different-Type 
Robotic Aid +0.23 -0.53 0.38 
Same-Type 
Robotic Aid -0.01 -0.37 0.19 
Workload 
It was hypothesized that automation trust would be positively correlated to reliance on 
the agent and negatively correlated to workload. That is, with higher levels of trust in an agent 
reliance on the agent should increase and perceived workload should decrease. On the other 
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hand, it was also believed that with lower levels of trust in an agent, reliance on the agent would 
decrease, and perceived workload of the participant would increase. There was partial support 
for this hypothesis. In regards to reliance, there was a significant positive correlation to self-
reported trust in the agent (r = .37; p < .0005). However, in regards to workload, there was not a 
significant relationship to perceived trust in the agents (r = .03, p = .60, n = 294) or participant 
reliance (r = .004, p = .94, n = 294). Thus, while users may rely more heavily on an agent’s 
decisions with increased trust, this increased reliance is not associated with a decrease in 
workload.  
Additionally, it was hypothesized that there would be a main effect for workload by agent 
type. This was examined using a 3 (agent type) by 3 (reliability condition) univariate ANOVA. 
Results indicated that there was not a main effect for agent type, F(2, 285) = 0.63, p = .53, η² = 
0.004. All other effects were also not significant. Means and standard deviations for the NASA-
TLX and its subscales are presented in Table 19. Note that two participants did not complete the 
NASA-TLX. 
Table 19. NASA-TLX means and standard deviations for search-and-rescue task. 
NASA-TLX Measure Mean Standard Deviation 
Overall Workload 70.52 13.34 
Mental Demand 80.44 16.15 
Physical Demand 21.24 19.65 
Temporal Demand 74.05 22.06 
Performance 55.12 22.24 
Effort 72.93 18.69 
Frustration 58.45 25.37 
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Behavioral Measures 
Automation Reliance and Trust 
It was hypothesized that automation reliance would be significantly correlated to 
automation trust. A Pearson correlation was conducted and there was a significant correlation 
between automation trust and automation reliance (r = .37, p < .0005). That is, as self-rated agent 
trust increased so did user reliance as measured by agreement with the agent. 
Automation Reliance Main Effect of Reliability Level 
Reliance was first analyzed using a 3 (agent type) by 3 (reliability condition) univariate 
ANOVA. There was a main effect for reliability level, F(2, 287) = 48.51, p < .0005, η² = 0.25. 
Results were in the predicted direction with higher reliability levels having higher levels of 
reliance (see Figure 34). All other effects were not significant (p > .05 in all cases). 
 
Figure 34. Reliance as a function of reliability condition. Note that error bars represent standard 
error. 
109 
Reliance Main Effect of Agent 
In examining participant reliance with the univariate ANOVA, it was evident that the 
main effect of agent type was not significant, F(2, 287) = 2.28, p = .10, η² = 0.02. That is, the 
reliance scores across all three aids were approximately 80% (see Table 20). 
Table 20. Reliance on agents across agent-type. 
Agent Type Mean SD 
Human .79 .06 
Different-Type Robotic .81 .07 
Same-Type Robotic .81 .07 
Reliance Bias by Reliability Condition 
It was hypothesized that there would be reliance bias in the mixed reliability aids 
compared to the uniform reliability aids. That is, that a low-reliability aid would negatively affect 
the reliance in a concurrent high-reliability aid, and that a high-reliability aid would positively 
affect the reliance in a concurrent low-reliability aid. A paired-samples t-test indicated that the 
reliance between the low and high-reliability agents in the mixed condition was significantly 
different, t(98) = 11.71, p < .0005, g = 1.04. Results were in the predicted direction with the low-
reliability aid (M = 0.77, SD = 0.06) being relied on significantly less than the high-reliability aid 
(M = 0.83, SD = 0.06). Conducting a paired-samples t-test for the two agents used in the 
uniform-high and uniform-low conditions indicated that they were sufficiently similar to take an 
averaged high and an averaged low reliability aid score. The uniform low-reliability aids were 
not significantly different (t(98) = 0.62, p = .54, g = 0.05). The uniform high-reliability aids were 
also not significantly different in terms of operator reliance, (t(97) = 1.38, p = .17, g = 0.10). A 
one-tailed independent-samples t-test was then conducted between low-mixed and average-low-
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uniform as well as high-mixed and average-high-uniform reliance. The last step was to calculate 
Hedges g from the means and standard deviations of each group. This gave a non-significant 
result for low-reliability (t(196) = 0.06, p = .96, g = 0.01). There was a significant result in the 
predicted direction for high-reliability condition for reliance, t(195) = 1.99, p < .05, g = 0.28 (see 
Figure 35). Such that the uniform high-reliability condition (M = 0.85, SD = 0.06) was relied on 
significantly more often than the high-reliability in the mixed condition (M = 0.83, SD = 0.06). 
 
Figure 35. Reliance as a function of reliability condition. Note that the solid squares represent the 
mixed-reliability condition and the hollow diamonds represent the uniform conditions. 
Agent Reliance: Interaction between Agent Type and Reliability 
The next step was to examine the hypothesis on whether the type of agent impacts how a 
concurrent conflicting reliability agent can bias reliance. These results were analyzed for effect-
size difference for each agent for reliance in the mixed-reliability vs. reliance in the uniform-
reliability condition.  
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Human Agent and Reliance 
  Limiting analysis to those participants in the human-agent condition only, I used a 
paired-samples t-test to examine reliance in the mixed reliability condition It was apparent that 
the low reliability aid (M = 0.75, SD = 0.06) and high reliability aid (M = 0.82, SD = 0.06) had 
significantly different operator reliance, (t(32) = 7.42, p < .0005). Paired-samples t-test were then 
used to examine reliance in the two aids used in the low-uniform (Agent A: M = 0.75, SD = 0.05; 
Agent B: M = 0.76, SD = 0.07; t(32) = 0.23, p = .82, g = 0.04) and high-uniform conditions 
(Agent A: M = 0.85, SD = 0.06; Agent B: M = 0.83, SD = 0.06; t(3237) = 2., p = .02, g = 0.32). 
While the agents in the low-uniform condition did not significantly differ, the high-uniform 
agents did significantly differ in terms of reliance. Thus, overall effect-size was calculated 
separately for the high-reliability agents. Using an independent-samples two-tailed t-test the 
reliance towards the low-reliability agent in the mixed-reliability condition (M = 0.75, SD = 
0.05) was compared against the averaged low-reliability agent reliance in the low-uniform 
condition (M = 0.75, SD = 0.06; t(64) = 0.28, p = .78, g = 0.07). This indicates that the 
concurrent presence of a high-reliability human agent did not lead participants to rely any more 
on a low reliability human agent. Next the biasing effect of a high-reliability human agent was 
examined. Since the uniform-high-reliability agents differed significantly two analyses were 
conducted. In both cases the mixed-reliability condition was lower, but in only one case 
significantly. Using an independent-samples one-tailed t-test high-reliability agent reliance in the 
mixed-reliability condition (M = 0.82, SD = 0.06) was compared against the high-reliability 
agents reliance values of either the left aid M = 0.85 (SD = 0.06; t(64) = 1.88, p = .03, g = 0.46) 
or the right aid M = 0.83 (SD = 0.06; t(64) = 0.68, p = .50, g = 0.17). An average effect-size 
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difference between mixed-high reliability and uniform-high-reliability human agents is 0.32. 
Thus, while it appears there may be a trend for positive biasing of subjective trust ratings, as 
presented earlier, reliance was generally unsusceptible to the manipulation of agent type (see 
Figure 36).  
 
 
Figure 36. Reliance as a function of agent reliability for human agents. Note that mixed-reliability 
are the solid diamonds and uniform-reliabilities are the hollow diamonds. 
 
Different-Type Robotic Agent and Reliance 
  Next I turn to the different-type robotic agents. Conducting a paired-samples t-test on 
different-type robotic agent reliance between the low and high-reliability agents, it was apparent 
that reliance on the aids did significantly differ, t(32) = 7.05, p < .0005, g = 0.99. Paired-samples 
t-test were then used to examine reliance in the two aids used in the low-uniform (Agent A: M = 
0.76, SD = 0.07; Agent B: M = 0.77, SD = 0.08; t(32) = 0.77, p = .45, g = 0.11) and high-uniform 
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conditions (Agent A: M = 0.85, SD = 0.07; Agent B: M = 0.85, SD = 0.07; t(31) = 0.06, p = .95, 
g = 0.01), both of which did not significantly differ. Using an independent-samples one-tailed t-
test the reliance towards the low-reliability agent in the mixed-reliability condition (M = 0.78, SD 
= 0.07) was compared against the averaged low-reliability agent reliance in the low-uniform 
condition (M = 0.76, SD = 0.07; t(64) = 1.07, p = .14, g = 0.26). Next the biasing effect of a 
high-reliability human agent was examined. Using an independent-samples one-tailed t-test high-
reliability agent reliance in the mixed-reliability condition (M = 0.84, SD = 0.06) was compared 
against the averaged high-reliability agent trust in the high-uniform condition (M = 0.85, SD = 
0.06; t(63) = 0.83, p = .21, g = 0.21; see Figure 37). 
 
 
Figure 37. Reliance as a function of agent reliability for different-type robotic agents. Note that 
mixed-reliability are the solid squares and uniform-reliabilities are the hollow squares. 
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Same-Type Robotic Agent and Reliance 
 Finally, the reliance bias for same-type robotic agents was examined. Conducting a 
paired-samples t-test on same-type robotic agents reliance on the low-reliability and high-
reliability aid in the mixed reliability condition, it was found that they were significantly 
different, t(32) = 5.86, p < .0005, g = 1.02. Next paired samples t-tests were conducted on 
uniform-low (M = 0.78, SD = 0.06 vs. M = 0.78, SD = 0.07; t(32) = 0.05, p = .96, g = 0.01) and 
uniform-high reliability conditions (M = 0.85, SD = 0.07 vs. M = 0.85, SD = 0.08; t(32) = 0.13, p 
= .90, g = 0.07). As these scores were not significantly different in terms of effect size or 
standard significance reliance scores within each uniform condition were combined for the next 
step of analysis. I then compared the reliance in the mixed-low-reliability aid (M = 0.77, SD = 
0.06) to the averaged-uniform reliability aids (M = 0.78, SD = 0.06) using a two-tailed 
independent samples t-test, t(64) = 0.83, p = .41, g = 0.20). Results were also not significant for 
the mixed-high-reliability aid (M = 0.83, SD = 0.06) compared to the averaged-uniform 
reliability aids (M = 0.85, SD = 0.07) using a one-tailed independent samples t-test, t(64) = 1.26, 
p = .11, g = 0.31; see Figure 38). 
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Figure 38. Reliance as a function of agent reliability for same-type robotic agents. Note that 
mixed-reliability are the solid triangles and uniform-reliabilities are the hollow triangles. 
 
Effect-Size Analysis of Agent and Reliance 
The effect-sizes of the differences by agent-type are presented in Table 21. In general all 
agents tended to have similar effect-size differences between the mixed and uniform conditions, 
but the pattern of results supported the research hypotheses. That is, human agents had the 
smallest effect-size differences for reliance; which means, that they had the least amount of 
difference in terms of agreement with a human agent when it appeared with another person of 
similar reliability or different reliability. In terms of agreement with robotic agents ES were 
slightly higher. Same-type robotic aids had the largest average effect-size difference (i.e., the 
most carryover bias), while different-type robotic aids feel in between the reliance bias of human 
and same-type agents. However, because the effect-sizes are so close the results provide only 
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limited support for our experimental hypothesis (i.e., that agent type impacts crossover bias 
between two agents, such that human agents are the most independent: smallest ES difference 
between mixed and uniform conditions, different-type robotic aids: moderate ES difference 
between mixed and uniform conditions, and same-type robotic aids: largest ES difference 
between mixed and uniform conditions). One point of possible contention of these results is that 
the single highest biasing component was the high-reliability human agents. That is, a concurrent 
low-reliability human dropped agreement with a concurrent high-reliability human agent by a 
third of a standard deviation, which was the single largest impact on reliance observed in this 
analysis! This result was especially surprising given the beneficial effects that mixed-reliability 
had on self-rated perceived trust in the human agents (both low and high). 
Table 21. Effect-size measures for degree of difference between mixed and uniform conditions 
for reliance. Note that negative values indicate that the mixed value is lower than the uniform 
value, while positive values indicate that the mixed value is higher than the uniform value. 
Agent Type Low Reliability ES High Reliability ES Absolute Average ES 
Human -0.07 -0.32 0.20 
Different-Type 
Robotic Aid +0.26 -0.21 0.24 
Same-Type 
Robotic Aid -0.20 -0.31 0.26 
Failure Salience on Reliance 
The next analysis examines how failure salience (i.e., the obviouness of the agent’s 
errors) influences the likelihood of relying on the aid in future trials. The hypotheses predicted 
that the more salient an error by the agent was the lower temporal reliance would be. Temporal 
117 
reliance is defined here as agreeing with the agent on the next correct trial. Unfortunately, due to 
programming errors experimental automation errors were not applied to high-difficulty video 
clips in the high-reliability condition. Therefore, analysis was limited to low-reliability 
conditions. As error salience is a within-subjects manipulation a repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the three types of error, with temporal reliance on the agent during the following 
trial as the dependent measure. There was a significant effect for error type in the predicted 
direction, F(2, 392) = 210.18, p < .0005, η² = 0.52. Pairwise comparisons indicated that reliance 
on the agent after an error was significantly related to the salience of the error (p < .05 in all 
cases; see Figure 39). 
 
Figure 39.Temporal reliance as a function of error salience. Note that error bars represent 
standard error. 
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Failure Salience and Agent Type 
Next the analysis on failure salience was conducted when Agent Type was added as a 
between subjects variable. There was a significant main effect for agent type on temporal 
reliance, F(2, 194) = 4.82, p = .009, η² = 0.05. However, as evidenced by the eta squared value 
this was a weak effect and pairwise comparisons indicated that a significant difference occurred 
only between the human agent and the different-type (p = .055) and same-type (p = .002) robotic 
agents (which did not significantly differ from each other; p = .26; see Figure 40). These results 
were contrary to the predicted direction, and actually indicated that participants were more 
distrusting of human agents following an error compared to robotic agents. 
 
Figure 40. Temporal reliance as a function of agent type.  
 
There was an agent by error type interaction, F(4, 388) = 3.04, p = .017, η² = 0.03. Visual 
inspection of the results (see Figure 41) indicated that temporal reliance varies more greatly for 
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agents when errors are more obvious (i.e., high or moderate salience). In these cases it appears 
that the human agents have less reliance following an error than the computer-agents. One-way 
ANOVAs confirmed this pattern of results. There was a significant difference within the high 
salience (i.e., obvious errors), F(2, 195) = 3.94, p = .02. Pairwise comparison indicated that the 
human agents were significantly different from the same-type robotic agents (p = .006) and there 
was a trend for them to be different from the different-type robotic agents as well (p = .08). The 
two robotic aids did not significantly differ from each other (p = .31). Next a one-way ANOVA 
was conducted on moderate salience errors. Results were significant, F(2, 195) = 4.55, p = .01. 
In this case pairwise comparison indicated that the human agents were significantly different 
from both robotic agents, which again did not significantly differ from each other. The final one-
way ANOVA was conducted on the low-salience (i.e., least obvious errors), F(2, 195) = 2.26, p 
= .11. Examination of pairwise comparisons indicated that the same-type and different-type 
robotic agents significantly differed in terms of temporal reliance, such that different aids had 
less observer agreement following a low-salience aid error. In low-salience errors user temporal 
reliance did not differ from between the human and robotic agents (p > .05 in both cases). 
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Figure 41.  Temporal reliance as a function of error salience by agent type. 
 
Miss and False Alarms 
A paired samples t-test was conducted on temporal reliance following misses and false 
alarms, t(295) = 15.41, p<.0005. Contrary to prior research, in this study false alarms had 
significantly lower temporal reliance (M = 80.00, SD = 14.35) than misses (M = 95.21, SD = 
9.97). The literature typically states that FA can be construed in several ways by participants 
making them more ambiguous and reducing trust and reliance levels less than misses which 
when noticed by participants indicates more clearly that the agent was indeed in error. However, 
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the literature supports that it is the clarity of the message that drives this relationship and this is 
more clearly typified in this research by the error salience. Thus, the current findings indicate 
that when error salience is controlled false alarms can be more detrimental to subsequent reliance 
compared to misses in this task. 
Individual Differences 
Participant Sex 
Participants were assigned equally to control for any participant sex effects on the main 
factors of interest in the experiment: trust and reliance. An independent samples t-test indicated 
that participant sex did not influence trust (t(294) = 0.36, p = .72) or reliance (t(294) = 0.18, p = 
.86) in the study. This effect was also ns when broken down by agent type, reliability condition, 
and agent by reliability condition (p > .05 in all cases). 
Questionnaire Data 
Participants were assigned randomly to one of twelve between-subjects condition (3 
reliability conditions * 3 agent types). As individual differences were a concern three trait 
questionnaires were administered at the start of the experiment: Anthropomorphic Tendency 
Scale (ATS), Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS), and Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS). 
The scales were given prior to study participation, and the questionnaires were designed to 
measure trait personality measures, thus by random assignment the groups should be 
approximately equal. 
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Anthropomorphic Tendency Scale (ATS) 
There are four factors within the ATS: Extreme Anthropomorphism, Anthropomorphism 
of Pets, Anthropomorphism towards Gods or Deities, and Negative Anthropomorphism. A 3 
(agent type) by 3 (reliability condition) univariate ANOVA was conducted on each of the four 
anthropomorphic factors to examine if there were any differences among the between-subjects 
groups. Additionally correlation analysis were conducted to examine if anthropomorphism 
scores correlated with the main variable of interest, these correlations were done overall, by 
agent, by reliability condition, and by agent*reliability condition (only significant correlations 
are reported in the text for a full list of correlations see Appendix W). 
Extreme Anthropomorphism 
 
Mean score for extreme anthropomorphism was 32.80 (SD = 9.78; coefficient α = 0.92). 
The analysis on extreme anthropomorphism indicated that there were no significant difference 
between groups (in all cases p > .05; See Table 22). Additional analysis indicated that there were 
no sex difference in terms of extreme anthropomorphism (t(327) = 0.29, p = .77; See Table 23). 
In regards to correlations there was a nonsignificant correlation between extreme 
anthropomorphism to trust and reliance (r = -.07 and r = -.05 respectively). There was also no 
significant correlation for trust or reliance by reliability level. When broken down by agent there 
was a small negative correlation for self-rated trust in the different-type robotic agents (r = -.29). 
By breaking agent type down by reliability condition it was demonstrated that this effect was 
caused by a moderate negative correlation between extreme anthropomorphism and self-rated 
trust in the mixed-reliability different-type robotic agent condition (r = -.47). This effect was 
further examined by looking at how extreme anthropomorphism in the different-type mixed 
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reliability was significantly correlated to trust in the low-reliability aid (r = -.62, p < .0005) but 
not to trust in the high-reliability aids (r = -.09, p = .60). This indicates that when interacting 
with different-type robots in mixed reliability those high in extreme anthropomorphism had 
lower trust in the low reliability aid than those with lower extreme anthropomorphism scores (see 
Figure 42). However, this effect did not affect reliance or trust on high-reliability aids and was 
not apparent in the human or same-type robotic agent conditions (p > .05 in all cases). 
Table 22. Extreme anthropomorphism among condition assignment. Note that SD are shown in 
parenthesis. 
Agent Type 
Reliability 
Condition Human Same-Type Robotic 
Different-Type 
Robotic 
Both High 30.99 (7.88) 32.67 (9.87) 33.00 (11.35) 
Mixed 35.51 (11.04) 31.20 (7.59) 32.63 (9.64) 
Both Low 31.66 (8.55) 32.76 (9.26) 32.63 (11.30) 
 
Table 23. Anthropomorphism by participant sex. 
ATS Factor Participant Sex N Mean SD 
Female 180 32.65 8.60 Extreme Male 149 32.97 11.06 
Female 180 39.56 6.03 Pets Male 149 38.10 6.35 
Female 180 30.26 8.58 Gods or Deities Male 149 28.26 8.34 
Female 180 12.18 4.29 Negative Male 149 11.61 4.47 
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Figure 42. Extreme anthropomorphism as a function of perceived trust of the low-reliability aid. 
Note that results are for participants in the different-type robotic mixed condition. 
 
Pet Anthropomorphism 
 
Mean score for pet anthropomorphism was 38.90 (SD = 6.21; coefficient α = 0.90). The 
analysis on pet anthropomorphism indicated that there was a significant difference between agent 
conditions for levels of pet anthropomorphism, F(2, 286) = 3.63, p = .028, η² = 0.03. The 
extremely small eta squared value indicates that even though this effect was significant it was 
extremely small. All other effects were non-significant (p > .05 in all cases; See Table 24). 
Additional analysis indicated that there were sex difference in terms of pet anthropomorphism 
(t(326) = 2.14, p = .03). These results indicated that females have significantly higher pet 
anthropomorphism scores than males, though this was a small effect, g = .24 (See Table 23).  
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Table 24. Pet anthropomorphism among condition assignment. Note that SD are shown in 
parenthesis. 
Agent Type 
Reliability 
Condition Human Same-Type Robotic 
Different-Type 
Robotic 
Both High 39.33 (5.74) 41.63 (4.04) 36.77 (6.59) 
Mixed 39.59 (5.77) 38.54 (5.53) 38.27 (6.35) 
Both Low 39.19 (6.43) 39.01 (6.76) 37.57 (7.27) 
 
In regards to correlations, the overall correlation of pet anthropomorphism to trust and 
reliance were not significant (r = .10 and r = .02 respectively). There was also no significant 
correlation for trust or reliance by agent type. However, when broken down by reliability level 
there was a small positive correlation for agent reliance in the mixed-reliability condition (r = 
.22). By breaking agent type down by reliability condition it was demonstrated that this effect 
was caused by a moderate positive correlation between pet anthropomorphism and participant 
reliance in the mixed-reliability different-type robotic agent condition (r = .42). This effect was 
further examined by looking at how pet anthropomorphism was significantly correlated to 
reliance in the low-reliability aid (r = .51, p = .003) but not to reliance in the high-reliability aids 
(r = .23, p = .19). This indicates that those high in pet anthropomorphism were more likely to 
rely on the low-reliability aid than those with lower pet anthropomorphism scores (See Figure 
43). However, this effect did not affect trust ratings on high-reliability aids and was not apparent 
in the human or same-type robotic agent conditions (p > .05 in all cases). 
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Figure 43. Pet anthropomorphism as a function of reliance on the low-reliability aid. Note that 
results are for participants in the different-type robotic mixed condition. 
 
God or Deity Anthropomorphism 
 
Mean score for God or Deity anthropomorphism was 29.36 (SD = 8.51; coefficient α = 
0.93). The analysis on God or Deity anthropomorphism indicated that there was a significant 
difference between agent condition, F(2, 287) = 3.45, p = .033, η² = 0.02. The extremely small 
eta squared value indicates that even though this effect was significant it was of negligible size. 
All other effects were not significant (p > .05 in all cases; See Table 25). Additional analysis 
indicated that there were sex difference in terms of God or Deity anthropomorphism (t(327) = 
2.13, p = .03). These results indicated that females have significantly higher God or Deity 
anthropomorphism scores than males, though this was a small effect size, g = .24 (See Table 23). 
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Table 25. God or Deity anthropomorphism among condition assignment. Note that SD are shown 
in parenthesis. 
Agent Type 
Reliability 
Condition Human Same-Type Robotic 
Different-Type 
Robotic 
Both High 27.44 (8.58) 29.69 (9.31) 29.51 (8.65) 
Mixed 26.64 (9.38) 30.80 (7.82) 28.84 (7.75) 
Both Low 26.64 (9.38) 28.93 (8.56) 34.11 (6.09) 
 
In regards to correlations, the overall correlation of God or Deity anthropomorphism to 
trust and reliance were both not significant (r = .04 and r = -.07 respectively). There were also no 
significant correlations for trust or reliance by agent type or reliability condition. However, by 
breaking agent type down by reliability condition it was demonstrated that there was a moderate 
positive correlation between God or Deity anthropomorphism and participant trust in the high-
reliability same-type robotic agent condition (r = .49) and the low-reliability different-type 
robotic agent condition (See Figures 44 and 45). However, this effect did not affect trust ratings 
on any other conditions (including mixed reliability conditions analyzed by low and high aid; p > 
.05 in all cases). 
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Figure 44. God or Deity anthropomorphism as a function of perceived trust. Note that results are 
for participants in the both high-reliability same-type robotic condition. 
 
 
Figure 45. God or Deity anthropomorphism as a function of perceived trust. Note that results are 
for participants in the both low-reliability different-type robotic condition. 
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Negative Anthropomorphism 
 
Mean score for negative anthropomorphism was 11.92 (SD = 4.38; coefficient α = 0.84). 
The analysis on negative anthropomorphism indicated that there was a significant difference 
between reliability conditions for levels of negative anthropomorphism, F(2, 287) = 3.66, p = 
.027, η² = 0.03. The extremely small eta squared value indicates that even though this effect was 
significant it was of negligible size. All other effects were not significant (p > .05 in all cases; 
See Table 26). Additional analysis indicated that there were no sex difference in terms of 
negative anthropomorphism (t(327) = 1.18, p = .24; See Table 23). 
Table 26. Negative anthropomorphism among condition assignment. Note that SD are shown in 
parenthesis. 
Agent Type 
Reliability 
Condition Human Same-Type Robotic 
Different-Type 
Robotic 
Both High 12.03 (3.86) 12.55 (4.52) 12.29 (5.27) 
Mixed 12.81 (4.46) 13.16 (4.01) 11.91 (3.99) 
Both Low 11.02 (4.57) 11.55 (4.02) 10.60 (3.66) 
 
In regards to correlations, the overall correlation of negative anthropomorphism to trust 
and reliance were both not significant (r = .02 and r = .05 respectively). There was also no 
significant correlation for trust or reliance by reliability condition. However, there was a small 
but significant positive correlation between negative anthropomorphism and agent reliance in the 
different-robotic agent condition (r = .22). By breaking agent type down by reliability condition 
it was demonstrated that there was a small to moderate negative correlation between negative 
anthropomorphism and participant reliance in the high-reliability same-type robotic agent 
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condition (r = -.35; See Figure 46) and a small to moderate positive correlation between negative 
anthropomorphism and reliance in the mixed reliability different-type robotic agent condition. 
By further analyzing the mixed-reliability different-type robotic agent effect by low and high 
reliability agent it was found that negative anthropomorphism was moderately positively related 
to reliance on the high reliability aid (See Figures 47). These results indicate that while negative 
anthropomorphism can lead to punishing the aid by not relying on it in inappropriate situations 
(i.e., both high reliability aids), it can also aid participants in allowing them to limiting their 
punitive efforts to only the unreliable aid in some conditions (i.e., mixed-reliability different-type 
robot condition). 
 
Figure 46. Negative anthropomorphism as a function of reliance. Note that results are for 
participants in the both high-reliability same-type robotic condition. 
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Figure 47. Negative anthropomorphism as a function of reliance on the high-reliability aid. Note 
that results are for participants in the mixed-reliability different-type robotic condition. 
Interpersonal Trust Scale 
Mean score for interpersonal trust was 85.10 (SD = 9.00; coefficient α = 0.52). The 
interpersonal trust scale was examined to see if the randomly assigned participants differed in 
terms of general trust level. Results from a 3 (agent type) by 3 (reliability level) univariate 
ANOVA with ITS score as the dependent measure indicated that agent type, reliability level, and 
the interaction between the two, did not differ in terms of ITS score (p > .05 in all cases). This 
indicates that by random assignment the experimental groups did not differ in ITS score 
distribution. Additional analysis indicated that there was a sex difference in terms of ITS score, 
(t(327) = 2.61, p = .01). These results indicated that females had significantly higher 
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interpersonal trust scores than males (M = 86.27, SD = 8.17 and M = 83.69, SD = 9.76 
respectively). Analysis of effect size indicated that this was a small to moderate effect, g = .29. 
In regards to correlations these correlations were done overall, by agent, by reliability 
condition, and by agent*reliability condition (only significant correlations are reported in the text 
for a full list of correlations see Appendix X). There were no overall significant correlations of 
interpersonal trust to rated trust or reliance on the agents (r = -.10 and r = -.07 respectively). In 
examining the data divided among agent type there was a negative correlation between ITS 
scores and reliance on human agents (r = -.21). Visual inspection of the data however indicated 
that this was a weak effect (see Figure 48). A second significant correlation was found in regards 
to agent-type. In this case there was a negative correlation between ITS score and trust in same-
type robotic agents (r = -.28; see Figure 49). In examining across reliability conditions there was 
a significant negative correlation between ITS scores and trust in low reliability aids (r = -.20; 
see Figure 50); such that, individuals with higher interpersonal trust have significantly lower 
self-rated trust in uniform low-reliability agents. Further analysis of this relationship indicated 
that as ITS scores increase trust in human agents (r = -.35) and same-type robotic agents in the 
uniform low-reliability conditions decreases (r = -.43; see Figure 51 and 52 respectively). It is 
also useful to mention that in regards to pretrust measures there was no correlation between ITS 
scores and trust in the aids prior to interacting with them (r = -.08, p > .05).  
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Figure 48. ITS as a function of reliance for human agents. 
 
 
Figure 49. ITS as a function of perceived trust for same-type robotic agents. 
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Figure 50. ITS as a function of perceived trust in the low-reliability condition.  
 
 
 Figure 51. ITS as a function of perceived trust in the low-reliability human agent condition. 
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Figure 52. ITS as a function of perceived trust in the low-reliability same-type robotic agent 
condition.  
Complacency Potential Rating Scale 
In analyzing the CPRS there was an overall general score and four factors: Confidence, 
Reliance, Trust, and Safety. A 3 (agent type) by 3 (reliability condition) univariate ANOVA was 
conducted on each of the five divisions of the CPRS to examine if there were any differences 
among the between-subjects groups. Additionally, correlation analyses were conducted to 
examine if complacency potential scores correlated with the main variables of interest: trust and 
reliance. These correlations were done overall, by agent, by reliability condition, and by 
agent*reliability condition (only significant correlations are reported in the text for a full list of 
correlations see Appendix Y). 
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Overall CPRS Score 
Mean score for the CPRS was 43.76 (SD = 5.49; coefficient α = 0.65). The analysis on 
overall CPRS score indicated that there was a significant difference between reliability 
condition, F(2, 287) = 4.72, p = .01, η² = 0.03. The extremely small eta squared value indicates 
that even though this effect was significant it was of negligible size. All other effects were not 
significant (p > .05 in all cases). Additional analysis indicated that there were no sex differences 
in terms of complacency potential, (t(294) = 1.39, p = .16).  
In regards to correlations there was an overall correlation of complacency potential to 
self-rated trust (r = .18, p = .002) and reliance (r = .14, p = .014). In examining the data divided 
among agent type there was a positive correlation between CPRS overall score and trust (r = .25) 
and reliance (r = .24) for same-type robotic agents. Further analysis of the relationship indicates 
that this trust correlation is driven by the same-type uniform low-reliability condition in which 
there is a moderate correlation between overall CPRS score and trust in the agents (r = .35). A 
second significant correlation was found in regards to reliability condition, that is in the mixed 
reliability condition there were positive correlations between overall CPRS to trust (r = .28) and 
reliance (r = .22). Further analysis of the mixed reliability condition, examining trust and 
reliance in the high and low reliability aids, indicated that overall CPRS was significantly 
correlated to trust in the low-reliability aid (r = .28, p = .006) and reliance in the high reliability 
aid (r = .28, p = .01). Interestingly CPRS overall score was not significantly correlated to trust in 
the high reliability aid or reliance on a concurrent low-reliability aid (p > .05 in both cases). A 
significant correlation appeared for the different-type robotic mixed condition in which overall 
CPRS score was moderately correlated with average trust (r = .56). Further examination of this 
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effect, by examining the actual trust and reliance scores for the high and low reliability aids, 
indicated that trust in the low-reliability aid (r = .47, p = .006), trust in the high reliability aid (r 
= .49, p = .004), and reliance in the high reliability aid (r = .39, p = .02) were all significantly 
positively related to CPRS overall score. CPRS overall score was not significantly correlated to 
reliance on a concurrent low-reliability aid (r = .10, p = .57). These results indicate that 
complacency potential in general increases trust and reliance, especially in ambiguous situation 
(e.g., mixed reliability). 
CPRS Confidence Factor 
Mean score for the CPRS was 16.27 (SD = 2.36; coefficient α = 0.65). The analysis on 
CPRS confidence factor indicated that there were no significant difference between groups (in all 
cases p > .05). Additional analysis indicated that there was a trend for sex differences in terms of 
complacency potential factor confidence, (t(294) = 1.90, p = .06). The trend indicated that males 
(M = 16.59, SD = 2.32) were slightly higher than females (M = 16.09, SD = 2.23), but that it was 
a small effect (g = .22). 
In regards to correlations there were no overall correlations of confidence complacency 
potential to self-rated trust (r = .09, p = .13) or reliance (r = .08, p = .18). In examining the data 
divided among agent type there was a positive correlation within same-type robotic agent 
condition for reliance (r = .20). There were no significant correlations for overall reliability level 
(p > .05 in all cases). However, when breaking the data down further into agent by reliability 
condition, it was found that within the different-type robotic aid the uniform-low reliability 
level’s participant reliance was significantly correlated to CPRS confidence score (r = .37). 
Additionally, also in the different-type robotic mixed condition, CRPS confidence score were 
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significantly positively related to trust (r = .40) and reliance (r = .36). Analyzing this effect 
further by examining the mixed condition for trust and reliance on the high and low reliability 
aids themselves I found a positive correlation for CPRS confidence score and reliance on the 
high reliability aid (r = .21, p = .04). Taking this a step further and analyzing by agent it was 
apparent that the different-type robotic aid mixed condition had significant positive correlations 
between CPRS confidence and trust in the high reliability aid (r = .39, p = .02) and reliance (r = 
.44, p = .01) in the high reliability aid.  
CPRS Reliance Factor 
Mean score for the CPRS reliance factors was 10.90 (SD = 1.94; coefficient α = 0.15). 
The analysis on CPRS reliance indicated that there were no significant difference between agent 
or reliability grouping (in all cases p > .05). Additional analysis indicated that there was a small 
sex difference in terms of CPRS reliance, (t(294) = 2.01, p = .045). The effect indicated that 
males (M = 11.10, SD = 1.98) were slightly higher than females (M = 10.64, SD = 1.95) in terms 
of reported CPRS reliance, but that it was a small effect (g = .23). 
In regards to correlations there was an overall correlation of reliance complacency 
potential to self-rated trust (r = .14, p = .02) but not on overall reliance (r = .06, p = .30). In 
examining the data divided among agent type there was a positive correlation within same-type 
robotic agent condition for trust (r = .27). Additionally in terms of reliability level there was a 
positive significant correlation for mixed-reliability trust (r = .30). When breaking the data down 
further by examining the trust and reliance within only the mixed condition by low and high 
reliability aid, it was found the CPRS reliance is significantly correlated to trust in a low 
reliability aid (r = .28, p = .01), trust in a high reliability aid (r = .21, p = .04), and reliance in a 
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high reliability aid (r = .24, p = .02). An overall correlation analysis of agent by reliability 
condition, found that the different-type robotic aid in the mixed reliability condition’s trust score 
was significantly correlated to CPRS reliance rating (r = .43). By analyzing this in detail by 
examining how user rating differed between the individual low- and high-reliability aids, I found 
that the difference in trust at this level was determined primarily by trust in the high-reliability 
aid (r = .42, p = .02) rather than the low-reliability aid (r = .33, p = .06). This indicates that 
CPRS reliance factor is positively correlated with increased ratings of self-rated trust in general 
and also in conditions of ambiguity (e.g., interacting two-agents of the same-type, mixed 
reliability conditions, etc.).  
CPRS Trust Factor 
Mean score for the CPRS was 11.09 (SD = 2.11; coefficient α = 0.39). The analysis on 
the CPRS trust factor indicated that there were no significant difference between agent or 
reliability groups (in all cases p > .05). That is, random assignment allowed a relatively equal 
distribution of CPRS trust scores across between-subjects conditions. Additional analysis 
indicated that there were no sex differences in terms of trust complacency potential, (t(294) = 
0.06, p = .95). 
In regards to correlations there was an overall correlation of trust complacency potential 
to self-rated trust (r = .18) but not on overall reliance. In examining the data divided among 
reliability condition there was a positive correlation within the low-reliability condition for trust 
(r = .20). There was no overall significant correlations among agent type. However, when results 
were examined by agent type and across reliability levels there were two significant conditions. 
These were, reported trust in the low-reliability same-type condition (r = .52; see Figure 53) and 
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trust in the mixed-reliability in the different-type aids (r = .43; see Figure 54). Further 
examination of CPRS trust within the mixed reliability condition indicated that in the different-
type aid condition score was moderately correlated to trust in the low reliability aid (r = .40, p = 
.02) and trust in the high reliability aid (r = .37, p = .03). 
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Figure 53. CPRS trust factor scores as a function of perceived trust in the low-reliability same-
type robotic agent condition. 
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Figure 54. CPRS trust factor scores as a function of perceived trust in the mixed-reliability 
different-type robotic agent condition. 
  
Overall Safety Factor 
Mean score for the CPRS safety factor was 5.49 (SD = 1.66; coefficient α = 0.15). The 
analysis on the safety factor indicated that there was a significant difference among reliability 
conditions, F(2, 287) = 5.14, p = .006, η² = 0.04. The negligible eta squared factor however 
indicates that this, while significant, was trivial result. All other results were not significant (in 
all cases p > .05). Additional analysis indicated that there were no sex differences in terms of 
safety complacency potential, (t(294) = 0.33, p = .75). 
In regards to correlations there was an overall correlation of reliance complacency 
potential to operator reliance (r = .16) but not on overall self-rated trust. In examining the data 
divided among agent-type there was a positive correlation within the same-type robotic aid 
condition for reliance (r = .22).All other correlations across agent type and reliability condition 
were not significant. 
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EXPERIMENT 4: DISCUSSION  
Subjective Measures 
The data concerning self-reported trust and automation reliance supported the hypotheses 
in several regards. First, participants were capable of accurately rating perceived trust and 
relying appropriately on the agents as a function of actual agent reliability. That is, even though 
the task was quite difficult, participants were carefully processing the responses of the agents and 
using these responses to rate perceived trust in the system. However, if trust and reliance always 
followed reliability level then the measures of mixed- vs. uniform-reliability for the low- and 
high-reliability aids would be equivalent. However, results demonstrated that there is biasing that 
does occur. Biasing occurs such that the low-reliability aid when it appears with a high reliability 
aid is viewed as significantly more trustworthy than when the low-reliability aids occur by them 
selves. On the other hand dissociation occurs because even though there is a subjective 
difference in the low-reliability aid depending on the reliability of the concurrent aid participant 
behavior toward the aid (i.e., reliance) does not change. Even though the low-reliability aid in the 
mixed condition is rated as significantly more trustworthy than the uniform low reliability aid,  
reliance on this more trustworthy aid is not different from the perceived less trustworthy aid. On 
the other hand, the high-reliability mixed- vs. uniform comparison indicates the opposite pattern 
of effects such that the agents are not rated significantly different in terms of perceived trust 
(though this effect was in the right direction), but do differ significantly in reliance, with 
participants relying less on high-reliability aids that occur in conjunction with a low-reliability 
aid. 
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These results can be construed in several ways. First in regards to perceived trust this 
indicates that the magnitude of the effect is much stronger for biasing trust upwards, when a low-
reliability agent is portrayed with a high-reliability agent, then for biasing trust downwards when 
a high-reliability agent is portrayed with a low-reliability agent. This effect is particularly 
interesting when one takes into account that reliance on the aids differs for the high-reliability 
agents but not for low-reliability agents. The results of this study could be taken to indicate that 
operators respond in a more opened minded approach in a mixed-condition. That is, in the case 
of interacting with mixed-reliability participants are more critical in agreeing with high-
reliability aids (reliance decreases – though their overall perceived trust in the agent is essentially 
the same), participants also become more willing to ascribe trust to a low-reliability agent (trust 
increase – though reliance does not change, that is operators still carefully weigh each of their 
agreements). This finding is supported by the fact that workload does not differ among reliability 
conditions, even under high-trust (i.e., high-reliability) situations workload is equivalent to 
workload in low-trust (i.e., low-reliability) situations. This indicates that operators are still 
mentally processing the task themselves regardless of their agents’ reliability. Therefore it stands 
to reason that their reactions to the agents may be colored by their simultaneous processing of an 
agent of an alternative reliability. This effect may be more prevalent in this study since a low 
level of automation was used, that is while automation makes a recommendation an operator 
must select it to choose it. With higher levels of automation there may be a greater impact on 
reliance, such that operators become more complacent and less likely to process every trial when 
the automation is more autonomous. A higher level of automation should be studied to examine 
this issue. 
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Regarding agent-type and perceived trust and reliance it was believed that users would 
trust, rely on, and have less perceived workload when working with a pair of human agents. 
However, the main effect for agent-type was not significant across all three measures. This 
indicates that participants were not influenced by ‘what’ the agent was when determining their 
overall trust, reliance, and workload. However, agent-type did influence temporal reliance when 
observing agent errors. While, this effect was expected its pattern was contrary to that 
hypothesized, in this study human agents had significantly less temporal reliance, compared to 
robotic-agents, following an observed easy or moderate salience error. It was originally believed 
that operators would be more forgiving of humans that made mistakes and less forgiving of 
machines that made mistakes (polarization bias), but this opposite effect occurred and indicates 
that users are actually more aware and punitively responsive to errors in other humans. Though 
the hypotheses that people would be more forgiving of people erring on more difficult trials but 
not simple ones was supported. However, the robotic agents did not followed the hypothesized 
pattern of results (i.e., that any error would cause an equivalent drop in reliance). There are 
several potential explanations for these findings. First, operators may assume that when human 
agents make simple errors that they are not focusing on the task (e.g., humans may be distracted 
or possibly not trying very hard); this could cause the operator to be negatively conditioned to 
agreeing with them on the next trial. On the other hand a robotic agent could make a simple error 
and this could be construed to be an accidental glitch (e.g., interpreting a stereo as an IED) that is 
not a byproduct of negligence or inattention of the aid but merely bugs in the program. While 
both would negatively impact overall reliance, purposeful and emotionally laden interpretations 
of human errors could lead to greater drops in temporal reliance then ‘unintentional’ robotic 
errors. This was supported by the fact that low-salience errors (i.e., difficult trials) did not 
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experience this decrement for human operators. That is, when the participant found the trial quite 
difficult themselves they became equally likely to negatively respond to the human on the next 
trial compared to the robots. There are two alternative reasons for this explanation, the first is 
that humans are more accepting of human-agent errors on difficult trials (i.e., they attribute faults 
less to negligence and more to the difficulty of the task), the second explanation is that at this 
level of difficulty many participants may have been unaware of the errors completely, thereby 
minimizing the effectiveness to detect this effect. It would be recommended in a future study to 
obtain a measure of participant error detection (i.e., whether the participant detected the agent 
failure) and to analyze the temporal reliance in only those conditions where users did indeed 
notice the failure. An alternative explanation could be that operators treat “intelligent” machines 
with the same or more forgiveness than they would treat humans with. While observers may be 
more critical of a calculator returning the correct answer every time, they may be more lenient to 
more complex forms of automation. In this way “intelligent” automation benefits from both 
worlds in that operators do not ascribe negative emotional connotations to the agent’s errors and 
they also are forgiving of mistakes realizing that the system is imperfect but can on the whole 
work quite well. This theory should be examined by future research. 
Biasing-Effects and Trust 
Agent-type also appeared to effect trust biasing on the mixed vs. uniform reliability 
conditions. However, the pattern of trust biasing conflicts with the experimental hypothesis, 
which had predicted the opposite pattern of results: that humans would be viewed as the most 
independent agents (lowest ES difference), different-type robots would be viewed as semi-
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independent (moderate ES difference), and same-type robots would be viewed as the least 
independent (largest ES difference). The rational for this argument was that two human beings 
are unique, and interacting with one person should not influence your trust in another person 
albeit if they are concurrent and of mixed reliability. However, two robotic agents of the same-
type, whom you have been informed are operating under similar mathematical algorithms and 
created by the same company, should appear to be less independent. Thus, an error on the part of 
an inaccurate robot should be more likely to bias trust in a concurrent accurate robot, making an 
operator trust it less. The opposite effect could occur where an accurate robot could bias trust in a 
concurrent inaccurate robot, making an operator trust it more. As reported earlier, in general it 
was observed that the mixed reliability condition did cause a biasing effect which caused greater 
trust in inaccurate agents and less trust in accurate agents However, the predicted pattern of agent 
biasing was not supported by the experiment. It appears that people interact with automation in a 
complex manner when it comes to determining their perception of agent trust. While it was 
demonstrated that people could indeed differentiate the difference between a high reliability aid 
and a low reliability aid, depending on what they thought those aids were influenced their 
adjustment in their trust level. The data indicated that, contrary to the hypotheses, the human 
agents had the largest perceived changes in trust between mixed and uniform conditions. This 
indicates that human beings are actually very sensitive to performance differences between 
people, and that individuals change their criteria for trustworthiness in their human teammates 
quite dramatically based on the combination of people they are viewing. For example, high-
reliability agents when paired with a low-reliability agent have significantly higher ratings of 
trustworthiness compared to the uniform-high-reliability human agents. In this way it appears 
that a human agent’s stellar performance contrasted against a less reliable human performer 
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actually causes people to consistently rate the trust in the stellar performer much higher than they 
would if they just viewed two high-performers. Surprisingly though our less stellar performer in 
the human agent condition is not in contrast worse at the task, but instead benefits from 
association with the high performer. The moral of the story appears that if you are good at a task 
surround yourself with people who are not and you will be perceived as be more trusted by your 
colleagues, on the other hand if you are not good at a task it would be wise to surround yourself 
with people who are so that by association you can seem more trustworthy.  
On the other hand when you interact with automation the story becomes slightly 
different. According to this study, when one interacts with two agents of the same-type, the high-
reliability aid suffers in terms of trustworthiness by being associated with a lower reliability aid. 
This is the equivalent of losing faith in a particular device when you experience low reliability on 
a similar device. One becomes less trusting of the high reliability aid because of the now salient 
chance of errors. Additionally, when the inanimate aids are of similar make and model there is 
no trust benefit to the low reliability aid for occurring concurrently with a high reliability aid. 
This is a very cynical model of trust, such that mixed reliability only brings no change or 
decreased trust, a very strong contrast to the human-agent condition. 
The final group of analysis for perceived trust is the different-type robotic aids. In this 
condition the hypotheses supported the hypotheses in terms of the different-type robotic aids 
having a mixed effect between what occurs for the human and same-type robotic agents. The 
pattern of results follows the originally anticipated direction, such that a concurrent high 
reliability aid raises trust in a low reliability aid (similar to what occurs with low-reliability 
human agents) and a concurrent low reliability aid decreases trust in a high reliability aid (similar 
to what occurs with high-reliability same-type robotic agents). However, it was unanticipated 
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that this biasing would occur to such a point that there was not a significant difference in regards 
to self-rated trust in the low- and high-reliability agents in the mixed-reliability different-type 
robotic agent condition. That is, while participants were able to determine high- and low-
reliability in the uniform conditions, the degree of bias in the mixed condition made the trust 
ratings between the low and high reliability aids not significantly different. This could have 
detrimental consequences in an applied setting in which individuals could fail to identify 
inaccurate machine teammates because their inaccuracies are masked by the biasing effect of 
more reliable machine teammates. 
Biasing-Effects and Reliance 
As mentioned earlier reliance data demonstrated that people were able to adjust their 
reliance so that they could rely more on reliable aids and less on non-reliable aids. By examining 
the amount of bias that occurs when a reliability condition is paired with a concurrent different 
reliability, it was also apparent that the reliance bias between agents was minimal and in general 
followed the predicted pattern of results: humans the least bias, different-type robotic an 
intermediate amount of bias, and same-type robotic agents the most bias. This was particularly 
interesting considering the odd pattern of results for perceived trust in the agents. For example, 
ratings of trust for human agents were highly positively biased in the mixed-reliability condition; 
it appeared that by adding a comparison, both human agents increase in terms of trustworthiness. 
On the other hand, in terms of reliance, a mixed-reliability condition actually lead to less reliance 
on the high-reliability human agent and no change in reliance on the low-reliability human agent. 
Is there cognitive dissonance that is driving this hypocrisy? Why do participants report increased 
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trust in the agents but then not follow their subjective reports with changes in their behavior? 
One speculation is that individuals are more cautious with actions than with words, while trust 
ratings varied more significantly across the groups reliability ratings were more consistent 
(though this may also be due to the greater precision of the reliance measure). However, there is 
additional evidence for a cautious reliance approach, in that the low-reliability aid rarely 
benefited from its relationship to a high-reliability aid. Indeed, in all but one case individuals 
mitigated their reliance on both the high- and low-reliability aids when they were paired with an 
aid of conflicting reliability. Even in the case of high-reliability humans in whom trust was rated 
as significantly higher in a mixed-condition, participants still hedged their bets by not increasing 
their reliance. One possible explanation for this finding is that mixed-reliability allowed 
participants to be more open-minded about whether or not they agreed with the aid. As Table 21 
demonstrates in all but one condition the mixed-reliability ead to less reliance on the agent (even 
compared to the low-uniform conditions). This indicates that teammate conflicting reliability 
levels make it more acceptable to disagree with either teammate’s recommendation. This finding 
exemplifies why it is important to gather both subjective and objective data on user perceptions 
toward automation. If trust always followed reliance there would be little reason to collect them 
both. Thus how the subjective measure of trust links to the behavioral measure of reliance and 
the conditions in which trust and reliance dissociate are of distinct importance. There are 
practical reasons to predict the conditions that will cause dissociations, particularly to alert 
designers to the kinds of biases that they will encounter in operators of complex automated 
systems. 
An alternative hypothesis concerns the temporal nature of the measurements themselves. 
Trust is measured at the end of the experiment, so as to gain a general measure of trust in the 
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agent. On the other hand, reliance is measured on a trial-by-trial basis. Human memory does not 
sum trust in the same way as a computer program sums their reliance score. Trust summed in this 
experiment means greater trust for the low-reliability aid. These after-the-fact ratings of trust 
indicate that biasing occurs to the benefit of the low-reliability aids. That is, participant’s 
subjective evaluation of trust in the agents is positively affected by exposure to a higher 
reliability aid. Though its interesting that this effect does not extend to greater reliance on a trial-
by-trial basis. These trial-by-trial reliance measures summed means less reliance for high-
reliability aid in a mixed condition. On a trial-by-trial basis operators are more susceptible to 
negatively biasing their reliance on high-reliability aids when they are presented with a 
concurrent low-reliability aid. That is, observed errors in the low-reliability aid may prompt the 
observer to disagree with the high-reliability aid more often. Though again it is interesting that 
overall trust scores do not change. 
Individual Differences 
This last section examines individual differences and how they related to participant trust 
and reliance in the task. These analyses were done in an exploratory fashion. 
Sex Differences 
Participant sex overall did not affect user reliance on the aids or trust in the aids (p>.05 in 
both cases). This was expected because the automation literature has not demonstrated a sex 
effect. There were however some interesting sex effects in regards to several factors measured by 
the individual differences questionnaires, these included pet anthropomorphism, God or Deity 
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anthropomorphism, interpersonal trust, complacency confidence, and complacency reliance. 
However, these effects were relatively small (g ranged from 0.22 to 0.29) and may be more 
important predictors of performance in more specific cases (e.g., studies dealing with pets may 
show a slightly different pattern of results for female participants that is not present for male 
participants). 
ATS 
Through random assignment ATS scores were relatively equivalent across conditions, 
and if there were differences eta squared values indicated that the differences were negligible. 
This allowed for some interesting effects to be observed. For example, extreme 
anthropomorphism was significantly related to the rating of trust individuals would assign a low-
reliability aid in the different-type mixed reliability condition. This is interesting because it 
indicates that people higher in extreme anthropomorphism have a stronger negative reaction to 
low reliability aids when those aids appear physically different. That is they appear more 
heightened to the independence of the aids in this condition than those with lower extreme 
anthropomorphism scores, and this is reflected in their subjective-trust ratings. However, higher 
levels of pet anthropomorphism had an opposite effect; participants became more likely to rely 
on a low-reliability aid in the different-type mixed condition. This effect is unusual, individuals 
with high pet anthropomorphism are more likely to ascribe human like traits to a familiar 
animate object (i.e., pets), but it is somewhat unclear how this trait relates to reliance upon faulty 
aids when those aids are different inanimate robotic agents. It is the author’s speculation that this 
effect may be from anthropomorphism of pets being somewhat related to anthropomorphism of 
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inanimate objects. Some of the questions querying pet anthropomorphism query participants on 
whether they would reward a pet for doing something good and apologize for hurting a pet. In 
this manner if individuals rewarded a robot for doing something good, that could be construed as 
agreeing with the aid when it is correct. While apologizing for hurting a pet, could loosely be 
construed as being considerate to a pet or in this case considerate of an agent’s recommendation. 
Therefore, those high in pet anthropomorphism may be more likely to agree with the aid when it 
is right to ‘reward’ it, while those low in pet anthropomorphism may not feel bad for ignoring 
(i.e., being inconsiderate of the aids recommendation) low-reliability agent recommendations, 
thus leading to the significant difference in reliance. However, this is only apparent in the 
different-type robotic condition, perhaps because two same-type robots may be too similar to 
activate pet anthropomorphism. However, this speculation should be studied further in future 
studies. 
Another interesting effect uncovered by the ATS is that anthropomorphism of God or 
Diety leads to greater ratings of trust in two instances: high-reliability same-type robotic agents 
and low-reliability different-type conditions. While religious faith has been found to be 
positively related to generalized level of trust, these results were in very specific circumstances 
Visual inspection of trust graphed across all the conditions indicated that as anthropomorphism 
of God increased so did rated trust in the agents in general, but that possibly by chance these two 
groups had fewer deviations from this general pattern and more favorable pattern of scores. It 
was also a limitation that affiliated religion was not recorded; several participants reported 
trouble answering the God anthropomorphism questions because they were Atheist or Agnostic. 
It might clarify results if they were removed from analysis. It might also clarify results to divide 
among the remaining religions as some participants reported that they believe that God became 
153 
man thus they choose high anthropomorphism while other participants mentioned that God is 
much greater than man so that they reported much lower anthropomorphism. However, in 
regards to trust religious affiliation is know to be positively correlated to generalized trust, thus it 
would be interesting to extend this to examine whether this relationship is related to how one 
anthropomorphizes their God or Deity. 
 The final analysis of the ATS concerned negative anthropomorphism, that is how likely 
one is to lash out at an inanimate object when it does something you do not like. Results 
indicated that negative anthropomorphism can be beneficial or harmful depending on the 
situation. That is, negative anthropomorphism can lead to punishing the aid by not relying on it 
in inappropriate situations (e.g., both high reliability aids that look similar), but it can also 
facilitate participants in allowing them to limit their punitive efforts to only the unreliable aid in 
some conditions (e.g., the different-type aid mixed condition in which negative 
anthropomorphism was correlated with greater reliance on the high reliability aid). This indicates 
that negative anthropomorphism may help participants by having them harshly judge one 
inanimate object but not a concurrent more reliable inanimate object, but that this relationship is 
in part determined by external physical cues. 
ITS 
The results regarding interpersonal trust scores were quite surprising, the indicate that 
those high in interpersonal trust were in general actually less trusting of the agents after 
interacting with two unreliable aids then those scoring lower on the interpersonal trust scale. This 
provides empirical evidence that not only are high generalized trust individuals not gullible, but 
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that they also respond more harshly to those items that violate their trust (i.e., they rate perceived 
trust lower after interacting with low reliability aids). 
CPRS 
Analysis of the CPRS scores were found to be relatively lower than those found by Singh 
et al (1993; current study: M = 43.76, SD = 5.49 vs. Singh et al. study: M = 57.69 SD = 6.09). 
The CPRS tended to have a small positive correlation to gaming experience (r = .11, p = .05). 
However, the CPRS did not obtain significance in relation to participant age, sex, or computer 
experience (p > .10 in both cases). In regards to age and computer experience this was unusual 
because age and computer experience are typically related to CPRS scores. However, our lack of 
finding a correlation with age is most likely due to the restriction on the range of ages examined 
(M = 21, SD = 5). On the other hand, computer experience, as measured by number of hours a 
week spent on a computer, was  normally distributed but still not related to CPRS scores (r = -
.05). This indicates that computer experience does not necessarily lead to automation 
complacency, and that other factors are at work (e.g., type rather than quantity of computer 
experience) or other individual variables within the sample studied. 
Across the main variables of interest, trust and reliance, overall CPRS was significantly 
positively related to trust and reliance on the agents. This was especially present in conditions of 
ambiguity (e.g., same-type agents, mixed reliability condition) and in cases in which the observer 
should not have relied upon the agents (e.g., when participants became complacent in the same-
type low reliability agents and trust in the low-reliability aid in the mixed reliability condition). 
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However, in the mixed reliability condition overall complacency in general increased trust in 
both high and low reliability aids, but it only increased reliance on high reliability aids. 
Examining the factors of CPRS it was not surprising to see that automation confidence 
was significantly related to reliance and trust in automation in conditions of ambiguity (i.e., 
same-type agents, different-type low reliability agents). Complacency reliance was surprisingly 
not related to reliance but was related to self-rated trust again in conditions of ambiguity (i.e., 
same-type agents, different-type low reliability agents, and mixed reliability conditions). 
Complacency trust was significantly correlated with trust overall, and again was significant in 
cases of ambiguity (i.e., same-type agents, and low reliability conditions).  The last factor safety 
indicated that it was correlated to reliance especially in terms of an ambiguous situation (i.e., 
interacting with two of the same type aids).  
Overall the results of the CPRS indicate that automation complacency does indeed 
increase reliance and trust in automation; however, these effects differ based on the nature of the 
task. It seems that in general complacency helps guide behavior when the task is ambiguous; that 
is, the operator is interacting with aids that differ in their reliability or appear physically the 
same. In this way operators who have higher levels of complacency may give-up their choice 
(i.e., rely or trust an agent) more quickly in cases of uncertainty because they trust that the agent 
will operate in their best interest. Interestingly, it appears that this complacency does affect trust 
in low-reliability aids but does not affect reliance in low-reliability aids as much. This may mean 
that those high in complacency are more likely to trust their teammates (regardless of their 
reliability) and actually rely on high reliability aids, but that often they do not typically have a 
greater predisposition to rely on low reliability aids. 
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Limitations to the Current Study 
A limitation to the study is that some individuals questioned the human agents’ similarity. 
The male and female human agents were strikingly similar, due to the facial compilation 
software, and some participants found that uncanny and it may have weakened the effect of the 
manipulation. It may be beneficial in future studies to actually not use averaged faces so as to 
increase the believability of the manipulation. While this reduces the control of the agent 
manipulation, in studies of trust it is imperative to limit skepticism in participants. However, the 
human agents were believable to many participants as they often used pronouns (e.g., “he” and 
“she”) when discussing their teammates in the open ended question on the exit questionnaire.  
Another limitation is this study is the measure of overall trust was a single question on a 
nine-point Likert scale given once at the end of the experiment. Many studies in this realm use 
the same or a similar Likert scale to garner information on trust but query participants 
continuously throughout the session, often after every trial. However, trust is an attitude that 
develops over time and by querying participants repeatedly on this attitude the researcher may 
not be measuring trust so much as belief the aid was just correct on the previous trial. By limiting 
the trust query to the end I minimized distraction to the participants and obtained an overall view 
of the agent (not a point by point report). However, other studies that have had their participants 
perform trial by trial ratings may have increased accuracy and power of this measure to detect an 
effect. In order to examine whether a temporal facet of the measures lead to the surprising trust 
and reliance dissociations it would be fruitful to replicate this study taking a point-by-point 
measure of trust. This would allow the examination of whether operators are more critical of 
their trust on a trial-by-trial basis. 
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Additionally, temporal reliance for low-salience errors was found to not significantly 
differ between humans and automation. However, this lack of effect may have been due to the 
low salience errors being so difficult that they were not detectable by the operators; hence, 
operators were unaware of the automation error because the trial was difficult artificially 
demonstrating no difference among the agents. It would be recommended in future studies to 
measure participant error detection and to limit analysis to users who did in fact detect the 
automation failure. Alternatively, the division of error salience could be shifted up to ensure 
participants noticing the errors and their evaluation of the difficulty of the error then impacting 
their perceived trust and reliance on the agents. 
Proposed Future Research 
The current research was a first step at examining how human operators calibrate their 
trust and reliance to fellow humans and/or robotic agents. For robotic agents responses were 
examined for whether people believed they were working with two agents of the same- or 
different-type. For human agents only different-type agents were used (i.e., a male and a female 
agent). It poses an interesting question about whether it is possible to vary the perceived 
independence of human agents. Would humans that are more similar, such as identical twins, 
clones, or more realistically individuals who are very similar based on their dress, training, and 
appearance, have different patterns of trust and reliance bias compared to two distinct 
individuals? The findings of this study also indicated that individuals did not respond differently 
to the agents if they were male or female; however, it would be noteworthy to examine when 
operators interact with teams of the same or different sex. In groups of all males is there more 
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distrust than groups of all females, additionally if the participant is the opposite sex/different 
age/different race than the human agents would that result in them feeling more like an outsider 
and relying more on their teammates? Would facial expressions impact users perception and 
behavior toward these human teammates? Additionally, what about the characteristics of the 
robotic agents? In the current study two standard but distinct robotic agents were employed; 
however, it would be interesting to examine how anthropomorphic robots (e.g., the Sony QRIO 
or AIBO) might bridge the gap between the differences in how trust and reliance spreads in 
human vs. robotic systems. These questions examine how different characteristics of the agent 
can influence the social interaction between the agents and the operator. The purpose of the 
current work was merely to see if there is a difference between how trust and reliance spreads in 
human compared to robotic teams, now that it is evident that it does spread differently the next 
step is naturally to see how characteristics of the agents can influence this spread (possibly 
through human agent conformity or increasing anthropomorphic characteristics of robotic 
agents). 
The present study investigated the spread of bias in a system in which an operator 
monitored two agents; it would be of interest to investigate how trust and reliance were biased in 
more complex systems (3+ agents to monitor). Would bias between the agents decrease as more 
agents were being monitored, similar to an averaging out effect? Or alternatively would there be 
more bias because the complexity of the task may prevent users from developing accurate 
representations of each agent’s reliability? The effect of the experimental test bed is another 
avenue for future research. The current study operated under a scenario that people’s lives were 
in danger while many previous trust studies have investigated trust using juice pasteurization 
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tasks. Perceived importance of the task may effect how individuals allocate their trust and 
reliance in agents. 
The addition of stress and subsequent examination of its impact on operator trust and 
reliance is another avenue of future research. I believe that stress would put participants in a 
situation of greater need for reliance on automation, and that while trust levels may still fluctuate 
reliance would be much more stable due to its greater need. Increased stress may however cause 
a stabilization of trust levels if the operator becomes so stressed that it impairs their ability to 
monitor the agents adequately to establish a set level of trust relative to their observed 
performance. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The four studies entailed in this report allowed for the examination of task, which was 
calibrated to be difficult but possible for manual performance, when that task was paired with an 
automated aid that differed in reliability, perceived agent characteristics, and error salience. 
These results are based on a task in which operators monitored the decisions of agents on remote 
unmanned vehicles. Other possible applications of missions in which human operators would act 
through remote vehicles are hazardous material handling, emergency response operations (e.g., 
bomb removal), fire operations in searching burning buildings, extreme environments (e.g., Mars 
Land Rover), and even medical applications (e.g., nanomachines). For example even in the case 
of injecting nanomachines with the goal of clearing plague from arteries, much of the process 
could be preprogrammed but a physician/operator to monitor the activity and to provide ongoing 
regulation, especially in the cases of unexpected circumstances. The environment of operation 
and vehicle dynamics may be radically different, but the fundamental interface contains a 
number of commonalties (Mouloua, Gilson, & Hancock, 2003). 
One of the most essential elements of any social organization, whether it is a professional 
soccer team or a military reconnaissance unit, is the willingness of the members of that social 
group to trust one another. The efficiency, adjustment, and even survival of any social group 
depend upon the presence or absence of such trust (Rotter, 1967). In fact, almost all of our daily 
activities, from buying gasoline, paying taxes, going to the dentist, flying to a convention involve 
explicitly trusting someone else (Rotter, 1971). Rotter (1980) has argued that as distrust 
increases the social fabric disintegrates, in order to support a complex society we must accept 
greater dependence on others. If trust in general weakens then this stands to reason that the social 
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interaction may also weaken and possibly collapse. Trust in regards to user reliance on human 
and robotic agents appears to be a fruitful area of investigation, and the previous analysis 
demonstrats that people respond in complex and intelligent ways to imperfect teammates. This 
interaction is of particular interest to engineers who should focus on how their design and the 
environment in which the operator will be interacting with the agent will influence trust and 
reliance on the aids. Without appropriate trust reliance on the system goes down, and the system 
may fall into disuse and eventually be abandoned. On the other hand, with too much trust 
operators may fall to detect automation failures and the safety of the system may come into 
question. Engineers must take the social-interaction into account to ensure that their systems are 
used safely. 
These studies represent a first step in examining the complex interaction in how 
individuals cooperate to complete a task when paired with teammates. Applications of this work 
include understanding how subjective states impact reliance on automation and human 
colleagues. This has important connotations for human-human and human-machine systems in 
aviation, navigation, process control, military, and other applications. It also has important 
implications for automated tasks from human-human systems to human-machine systems. The 
present data suggest that while operators are able to differentiate between reliability levels in 
terms of trust and reliance, trust becomes quite biased when dealing with two agents of mixed 
reliability. However, individuals seem to be able to keep their reliance upon these agents to 
relatively nonbiased levels. So it appears that people are able to compensate their behavior to 
control for changes in subjective state at least in the bounds of this study. Additionally, some 
differences in agent type on biasing between trust and reliance, were found lending empirical 
support to the notion that humans and automation are not interchangeable and that users respond 
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differently to the exact same recommendations depending on how they respond socially to that 
agent (i.e., respond believing agent is robotic [same or different type] or respond believing the 
agent is human). 
Guidelines 
Drawing on the conclusions of this study several guidelines for system design, for when 
an operator and dual agents interact, have been created. 
1. If possible use multiple agents of similiar high reliability. 
2. If mixing agents of different reliabilities can not be avoided, expect and design for 
a drop in reliance across both the low reliability aid and the high reliability aids. 
3. When using robotic aids, to prevent polarization bias stress the ‘intelligent’ aspect 
of the robotic automation.  
4. In all cases, but particularly for those interacting with other human agents, there is 
a drop in reliance following obvious errors. So design for residual drop in reliance 
that may occur after teammate errors.  
5. Dissociations can occur between trust and reliance, so even if operators report 
verbally trusting a system their actual use of that system should also be examined. 
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS OF COMMONLY USED TERMS 
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DEFINITIONS 
 
Automation: Any sensing, detection, information-processing, decision-making, or control action 
that could be performed by humans, but is actually performed by a machine 
(Moray, Inagaki, & Itoh, 2000, p. 44). Alternative definition: The execution by a 
machine agent of a function that was previously carried out by a human 
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
 
Automation Reliance: Defined in terms of performance or behavioral measures such as 
automation utilization and efficiency (Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001, p. 356). 
 
Automation Trust: Defined in terms of subjective measures, such as users’ confidence ratings 
in the automation or their verbal estimates of the automation’s reliability 
(Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001, p. 356). 
 
Automation Use: The voluntary activation or disengagement of automation by human operators 
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
 
Disuse: The neglect or underutilization of automation. Often represented by ignoring or turning 
off automated alarms or safety systems. A common cause of disuse is a high level 
of false alarms in the system (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997, p. 233). 
 
Misuse: Overreliance on automation, that is using automation when it should not be used, which 
can result in failing to monitor it effectively (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997, p. 233). 
 
Reliability: The accuracy of the machine or the likelihood that an objective can be achieved by 
automation (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002, p. 67). 
 
Self-Confidence: Anticipated performance during manual control (Lee & Moray, 1994, p. 154). 
 
Trust: Automation is seen as trustworthy to the extent that it is predictable, dependable, and 
inspires faith that it will behave as expected in unknown situations (Beck, 
Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002, p. 68). Also defined as the expectancy held by an 
individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of 
another individual or group can be relied upon (Rotter, 1967, p. 651). 
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Informed Consent Form 
 
Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study. 
  You must be 18 years of age or older to participate. 
Project title: Empirical Examination of Trust in Automation across Multiple Agents in a Search and Rescue 
Operation. 
Purpose of the research study:  The purpose of this data collection effort is to determine the impact of using 
automated decision aids in a search-and-rescue scenario.  The current effort seeks to determine under what 
conditions automated decision aids increases or decreases reliance upon these decision aids.   
What you will be asked to do in the study:   You will be asked to view a computer display running a 
simulated scenario of a search-and-rescue scenario using one unmanned ground vehicle (UGV). You will be asked 
to monitor the video images from the UGV for critical signals (e.g., enemy units, civilians, or weapons). At the end 
of the session you will be asked to complete several questionnaires about your experience performing the search-
and-rescue scenario.   
Time required:  Approximately one (1) hour.  
Risks: Minimal.  The risks to you are no greater than operating any other computer.   
Benefits/Compensation:  Participants will be offered the benefit of 2 points of course credit in undergraduate 
psychology (equivalent to 1 hour research).  
Confidentiality:  Your identity will be kept confidential.  Your information will be assigned a participant number.  
The list connecting your name to this number will not be released to anyone who is not directly involved in 
conducting this study.  Your name will not be used in any report.  
Voluntary participation:  Your participation in this study is voluntary.  There is no penalty for not participating. 
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty.      
Whom to contact if you have questions about the study: Dr James L. Szalma, Department of Psychology, 
University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL.  Telephone (407) 823-0920, email jszalma@mail.ucf.edu.   
Whom to contact about your rights in the study: Research at the University of Central Florida involving 
human participants is carried out under the oversight of the Institutional Review Board (UCF).  For information 
about participants’ rights please contact: Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of 
Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at 
(407) 823-2901.             
___  I have read the procedure described above. 
___  I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure. 
 
 
      /     
Participant      Date 
      /     
Principle Investigator     Date 
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Experimenter Script – Please Read Italic Sections Aloud to Participant 
 
The goal of this study is to examine how interface design impacts one’s interaction with a distributed robot, in this 
case an unmanned ground vehicle (commonly referred to as a UGV – these are typically similar to remote control 
cars that are equipped with special equipment such as webcams). UGVs are frequently used when the environment 
is too dangerous for a human operator. 
 
In the following simulation you are operating under the premise that a group of terrorist have released a dangerous 
chemical into a commercial office building, and we are sending in a reconnaissance UGV to ascertain the location 
of terrorists, improvised explosive devices (IEDs – basically a bomb), and unconscious civilians before 
reinforcements arrive. You can see examples of these objects at the top of your screen (POINT OUT IED – 
PARTICIPANTS HAVE TROUBLE FINDING THIS).  
 
We need you to monitor the video feed from the UGV and for each room report whether you detect the presence of a 
terrorist, IED, civilian, or if that the room is clear. Due to time constraints the UGV must automatically move 
through the building as quickly as possible, you will not be controlling the movement of the UGV, thus you will have 
only one chance to view each room.  
 
After the robot has sent each signal, it will conserve battery by turning off the video while it is moving to the next 
room, during this short time period the response keys (POINT OUT RESPONSE KEYS – COMPARE 
ACTIVATED PRACTICE KEY TO DEACTIVATED RESPONSE KEYS) will be activated and you can report 
your observation. You will not be able to change your answer after pressing a key. Additionally you may notice that 
after you respond it may take several seconds to move on to the next video, this is perfectly normal. Try to respond 
as quickly and accurately as possible. 
 
You will find a pair of headphones to the left on the monitor, please wear these during the experiment. No sound will 
come out of the headphones, they are merely meant to attenuate any extraneous noise. 
 
Now the most important item I will mention is that at several points in the experiment a message will pop-up stating, 
“Please complete the form and press OK when you are ready to continue.” When this message appears do NOT 
immediately click OK. I will give you a questionnaire; after you COMPLETE the questionnaire you may then click 
OK to resume the simulation. 
 
Do you have any questions or concerns at this point? 
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Participant #: ____ ______ 
Experimenter: __________
Date: _________________ 
 
1. Did you feel that you had enough time to view each video clip (with 5 being neither too much nor too 
little time)? 
Definitely Not         0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10      Definitely Too 
 Enough Time                Much Time 
           
2. Did you feel that you had enough time to respond to each video clip (with 5 being neither too much nor 
too little time)? 
Definitely Not         0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10      Definitely Too 
 Enough Time                Much Time 
 
3. Do you believe you would have been able to monitor two video feeds at the same time? 
Definitely not 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10     Definitely yes 
 
4. Do you believe you would have been able to respond to two video feeds at the same time? 
Definitely not 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10     Definitely yes 
 
5. Do you believe you would have been able to monitor four video feeds at the same time? 
Definitely not 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10     Definitely yes 
 
6. Do you believe you would have been able to respond to four video feeds at the same time? 
Definitely not 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10     Definitely yes 
 
7. Please rate the MENTAL DEMAND of the task: How much mental and perceptual activity was 
required? 
Low 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10     High 
 
8. Please rate the PHYSICAL DEMAND of the task: How much physical activity was required? 
Low 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10     High 
 
9. Please rate the TEMPORAL DEMAND of the task: How much time pressure did you feel due to the 
pace at which the task elements occurred? 
Low 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10     High 
 
10. Please rate your PERFORMANCE: How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the 
goals of the task? 
Low 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10     High 
 
11. Please rate your EFFORT: How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to accomplish 
your level of performance? 
Low 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10     High 
 
12. Please rate your FRUSTRATION: How discouraged, irritated, stressed and annoyed did you feel 
during the task? 
Low 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10     High 
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 Group 
Condition  
Video with Errors (parenthesis contain # participants missing the 
video) 
Total Errors 
1 G1C3.avi (1), G1I2.avi(7), G1N2.avi(1), G1T2.avi(1) 10 
2 G2C3.avi(1), G2I1.avi(7),G2I2.avi(4), G2I3(3), G2N2.avi(1) 16 
3 G3I2.avi(2), G3I3.avi(14), G3N2.avi(1), G3N3.avi(1) 18 
4 G4C1.avi(7), G4C2.avi(1), G4I1(3), G4I3.avi(2), G4N2.avi(1) 14 
5 G5C1.avi(1), G5I1.avi(1), G5I3.avi(3), G5N1.avi(1), G5N2.avi(4) 10 
6 G6C2.avi(4), G6I1.avi(9), G6I3.avi(3), G6N1.avi(1), G6N3.avi(10) 27 
7 G7I2.avi(10), G7I3(1), G7N2.avi(2), G7N3.avi(1) 14 
8 G8I2.avi(3), G8N2.avi(1) 4 
9 G9C3.avi(22), G9I1.avi(7), G9I2.avi(7), G9I3.avi(1), G9N1.avi(5), 
G9N2.avi(4), G9N3.avi(1) 
47 
 Note – File names of video files are written so that the first two characters reflect the condition (e.g., G1 equals 
group 1, G2 group 2 and so forth). The third letter represents rather the clip presented a T for terrorist, C for 
civilian, I for IED, or N for nothing. The fourth, and final letter, represented which of the three clips of each stimuli 
type was presented (e.g., the three civilian videos for group one were named G1C1.avi, G1C2.avi, and G1C3.avi), 
the numbers were assigned only for organizational reasons only. The .avi simply is the file extension for the video 
files which were in AVI format. 
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174 
Participant Number:___________________ 
Date:___________________ 
Experimenter:___________________ 
Condition:___________________ 
Demographic Questionnaire 
1. What is your sex? (circle one)  Male  Female 
 
2. What is your age? ___________ 
 
3. How many hours do you work on a computer per day? (circle one) 
0 <1 hour  1-2 hours 3-4 hours 5-6 hours 7+ hours 
 
4. How many hours a day do you play video games on average? (circle one) 
 
0 <1 hour  1-2 hours 3-4 hours 5-6 hours 7+ hours   
IF YOU DO PLAY VIDEO GAMES, please describe what type: 
______________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Are you are have you ever been involved in a search-and-rescue operation? (circle one) 
Yes  No 
IF YES, please describe: 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Are you familiar with any Unmanned/Uninhabited Vehicle (UV) system?  
Yes  No 
IF YES, please describe your experience: 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Do you have normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing? 
Yes  No 
IF NO, please describe:____________________________________________________________ 
 
8. You have just opened an airport. As part of your responsibility for running an airport you have to ensure 
that proper baggage screening procedures are in place to make sure that no illegal devices are allowed onto 
aircraft. You have two choices for how to screen bags. Company A sells an object recognition computer 
program that screens bags for illegal devices. Company B trains human operators to screen bags for illegal 
devices. Assuming that cost is not an issue, which service do you trust to do the task better?  
Company A: Computer  Company B: Human  Equal 
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Experimenter Script – Please Read Italic Sections Aloud to Participant 
 
The goal of this study is to examine how interface design impacts one’s interaction with a distributed robot, in this 
case an unmanned ground vehicle (commonly referred to as a UGV – these are typically similar to remote control 
cars that are equipped with special equipment such as webcams). UGVs are frequently used when the environment 
is too dangerous for a human operator. 
 
In the following simulation you are operating under the premise that a group of terrorist have released a dangerous 
chemical into a commercial office building, and we are sending in a reconnaissance UGV to ascertain the location 
of terrorists, improvised explosive devices (IEDs – basically a bomb), and unconscious civilians before 
reinforcements arrive. You can see examples of these objects at the top of your screen (POINT OUT IED – 
PARTICIPANTS HAVE TROUBLE FINDING THIS).  
 
We need you to monitor the video feed from the UGV and for each room report whether you detect the presence of a 
terrorist, IED, civilian, or if that the room is clear. Due to time constraints the UGV must automatically move 
through the building as quickly as possible, you will not be controlling the movement of the UGV, thus you will have 
only one chance to view each room.  
 
After the robot has sent each signal, it will conserve battery by turning off the video while it is moving to the next 
room, during this short time period the response keys (POINT OUT RESPONSE KEYS – COMPARE 
ACTIVATED PRACTICE KEY TO DEACTIVATED RESPONSE KEYS) will be activated and you can report 
your observation. You will not be able to change your answer after pressing a key. Additionally you may notice that 
after you respond it may take several seconds to move on to the next video, this is perfectly normal. Try to respond 
as quickly and accurately as possible. 
 
You will find a pair of headphones to the left on the monitor, please wear these during the experiment. No sound will 
come out of the headphones, they are merely meant to attenuate any extraneous noise. 
 
Do you have any questions or concerns at this point? 
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Civilian Dif Index IED Dif Index Terrorist Dif Index 
C01.avi 98.46 I01.avi 63.08 T01.avi 96.92 
C02.avi 96.92 I02.avi 75.38 T02.avi 100.00 
C03.avi 100.00 I03.avi 69.23 T03.avi 100.00 
C04.avi 90.77 I04.avi 90.77 T04.avi 100.00 
C05.avi 89.23 I05.avi 89.23 T05.avi 100.00 
C06.avi 96.92 I06.avi 69.23 T06.avi 96.92 
C07.avi 98.46 I07.avi 98.46 T07.avi 98.46 
C08.avi 98.46 I08.avi 84.62 T08.avi 100.00 
C09.avi 100.00 I09.avi 80.00 T09.avi 100.00 
C10.avi 89.23 I10.avi 100.00 T10.avi 95.38 
C11.avi 98.46 I11.avi 49.23 T11.avi 96.92 
C12.avi 98.46 I12.avi 93.85 T12.avi 98.46 
C13.avi 95.38 I13.avi 29.23 T13.avi 96.92 
C14.avi 100.00 I14.avi 87.69 T14.avi 98.46 
C15.avi 98.46 I15.avi 93.85 T15.avi 96.92 
C16.avi 96.92 I16.avi 64.62 T16.avi 95.38 
C17.avi 100.00 I17.avi 92.31 T17.avi 98.46 
C18.avi 95.38 I18.avi 86.15 T18.avi 96.92 
C19.avi 100.00 I19.avi 92.31 T19.avi 98.46 
C20.avi 96.92 I20.avi 73.85 T20.avi 98.46 
C21.avi 96.92 I21.avi 76.92 T21.avi 98.46 
C22.avi 90.77 I22.avi 86.15 T22.avi 96.92 
C23.avi 95.38 I23.avi 47.69 T23.avi 98.46 
C24.avi 93.85 I24.avi 64.62 T24.avi 98.46 
C25.avi 81.54 I25.avi 98.46 T25.avi 100.00 
C26.avi 56.92 I26.avi 81.54 T26.avi 98.46 
C27.avi 87.69 I27.avi 86.15 T27.avi 98.46 
C28.avi 87.69 I28.avi 78.46 T28.avi 96.92 
C29.avi 98.46 I29.avi 64.62 T29.avi 96.92 
C30.avi 89.23 I30.avi 93.85 T30.avi 100.00 
C31.avi 98.46 I31.avi 78.46 T31.avi 96.92 
C32.avi 98.46 I32.avi 75.38 T32.avi 98.46 
C33.avi 98.46 I33.avi 30.77 T33.avi 98.46 
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Civilian Dif Index IED Dif Index Terrorist Dif Index 
C34.avi 95.38 I34.avi 63.08 T34.avi 100.00 
C35.avi 96.92 I35.avi 52.31 T35.avi 96.92 
C36.avi 60.00 I36.avi 53.85 T36.avi 98.46 
C37.avi 81.54 I37.avi 66.15 T37.avi 100.00 
C38.avi 92.31 I38.avi 67.69 T38.avi 100.00 
C39.avi 98.46 I39.avi 27.69 T39.avi 100.00 
C40.avi 98.46 I40.avi 47.69 T40.avi 96.92 
C41.avi 95.38 I41.avi 33.85 T41.avi 100.00 
C42.avi 96.92 I42.avi 50.77 T42.avi 98.46 
C43.avi 98.46 I43.avi 76.92 T43.avi 98.46 
C44.avi 56.92 I44.avi 66.15 T44.avi 100.00 
C45.avi 63.08 I45.avi 92.31 T45.avi 96.92 
C46.avi 98.46 I46.avi 92.31 T46.avi 100.00 
C47.avi 98.46 I47.avi 87.69 T47.avi 96.92 
C48.avi 73.85 I48.avi 75.38 T48.avi 98.46 
C49.avi 80.00 I49.avi 60.00 T49.avi 100.00 
C50.avi 98.46 I50.avi 64.62 T50.avi 98.46 
C51.avi 84.62 I51.avi 32.31 T51.avi 98.46 
C52.avi 16.92 I52.avi 83.08 T52.avi 98.46 
C53.avi 67.69 I53.avi 83.08 T53.avi 96.92 
C54.avi 100.00 I54.avi 69.23 T54.avi 96.92 
C55.avi 87.69 I55.avi 84.62 T55.avi 98.46 
C56.avi 73.85 I56.avi 66.15 T56.avi 100.00 
C57.avi 89.23 I57.avi 75.38 T57.avi 95.38 
C58.avi 87.69 I58.avi 84.62 T58.avi 95.38 
C59.avi 89.23 I59.avi 73.85 T59.avi 98.46 
C60.avi 95.38 I60.avi 80.00 T60.avi 98.46 
C61.avi 98.46 I61.avi 84.62 T61.avi 98.46 
C62.avi 98.46 I62.avi 87.69 T62.avi 98.46 
C63.avi 100.00 I63.avi 83.08 T63.avi 95.38 
C64.avi 86.15 I64.avi 98.46 T64.avi 100.00 
C65.avi 93.85 I65.avi 92.31 T65.avi 96.92 
C66.avi 100.00 I66.avi 90.77 T66.avi 98.46 
C67.avi 96.92 I67.avi 83.08 T67.avi 100.00 
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Civilian Dif Index IED Dif Index Terrorist Dif Index 
C68.avi 93.85 I68.avi 61.54 T68.avi 95.38 
C69.avi 80.00 I69.avi 87.69 T69.avi 98.46 
C70.avi 83.08 I70.avi 61.54 T70.avi 100.00 
C71.avi 49.23 I71.avi 98.46 T71.avi 100.00 
C72.avi 100.00 I72.avi 98.46 T72.avi 96.92 
C73.avi 89.23 I73.avi 96.92 T73.avi 95.38 
C74.avi 36.92 I74.avi 89.23 T74.avi 100.00 
C75.avi 41.54 I75.avi 92.31 T75.avi 93.85 
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Informed Consent Form 
Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study. 
  You must be 18 years of age or older to participate. 
Project title: Empirical Examination of Trust in Automation across Multiple Agents in a Search and Rescue 
Operation. 
Purpose of the research study:  The purpose of this data collection effort is to determine the impact of using 
automated decision aids in a search-and-rescue scenario.  The current effort seeks to determine under what 
conditions automated decision aids increases or decreases reliance upon these decision aids.   
What you will be asked to do in the study:   You will be asked to view a computer display running a 
simulated scenario of a search-and-rescue scenario using either one or two unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). You 
will be asked to monitor the video images from these UGVs for critical signals (e.g., enemy units, civilians, or 
weapons). You may receive automated decision aids while completing this task. At the end of the session you will 
be asked to complete several questionnaires about your experience performing the search-and-rescue scenario.   
Time required:  Approximately thirty minutes (0.5 hour).  
Risks: Minimal.  The risks to you are no greater than operating any other computer.   
Benefits/Compensation:  Participants will be offered the benefit of 1 point of course credit in undergraduate 
psychology (equivalent to 30 minutes research).  
Confidentiality:  Your identity will be kept confidential.  Your information will be assigned a participant number.  
The list connecting your name to this number will not be released to anyone who is not directly involved in 
conducting this study.  Your name will not be used in any report.  
Voluntary participation:  Your participation in this study is voluntary.  There is no penalty for not participating. 
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty.      
Whom to contact if you have questions about the study: Dr James L. Szalma, Department of Psychology, 
University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL.  Telephone (407) 823-0920, email jszalma@mail.ucf.edu.   
Whom to contact about your rights in the study: Research at the University of Central Florida involving 
human participants is carried out under the oversight of the Institutional Review Board (UCF).  For information 
about participants’ rights please contact: Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of 
Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at 
(407) 823-2901.             
___  I have read the procedure described above. 
___  I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure. 
 
 
      /     
Participant      Date 
      /     
Principle Investigator     Date 
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Experimenter Script – Please Read Italic Sections Aloud to Participant 
 
Welcome everyone, thank you for coming in today. Before we begin, please note that the 
task we will be involved in today is a simulation. We are conducting a scientific experiment 
which seeks to better understand how people interact with automated agents like unmanned 
ground vehicles. In order to obtain accurate results, we need to mimic a real-world situation as 
closely as possible. Therefore, today we will be working under the scenario that a terrorist 
organization has infiltrated a commercial office building somewhere in the United States. 
However, before we begin, I must again stress the fact that this is a simulation: there has been no 
real terrorist attack, nor is anyone’s life truly in danger. 
Are there any questions at this point? 
We will now begin our background briefing. Please open your information packets to the 
first page. The person you see here is Augustus Sol Invictus, the merciless leader of the Invictus 
Terror Organization (or ITO), an extremist group bent on the destruction of the free world. There 
are no known photographs of his face; he, along with all of the members of the ITO are rarely 
seen, and when they are seen they always wear the  black mask and uniform you see in the 
photograph, making our estimations of their numbers highly unreliable. We know very little of 
the ITO, other than that they are unpredictable, and very dangerous. This morning, the ITO 
infiltrated a commercial office building occupied by more than a hundred U.S. civilians. There is 
evidence that they released a gaseous chemical agent throughout the building. If you turn to page 
two of your information packet you can see an aerial surveillance photo of the building. 
Preliminary intelligence reports indicate that there are probably civilians in the building 
who are still alive, but may have been rendered unconscious by the gaseous chemical agent. 
However, it is unclear how many civilians there are or where they are located within the 
building. Several of our own military forces have managed to covertly gain access into the 
building. They have reported seeing a number of IED’s (or improvised explosive devices, which 
are basically bombs) placed throughout the building. We have received an image of the type of 
IED they have found, it is shown on page three of your information packet. Military intelligence 
estimates a high likelihood that a full assault on the building might lead to the detonation of the 
explosives after American forces have entered the building in order to maximize the number of 
casualties. Battalion headquarters has decided to deploy an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) to 
identify the locations of IEDs, terrorist suspects, as well as the locations of any unconscious 
civilians. The UGV will patrol the building and transmit a video feed of each room. An example 
of the UGV is shown on page four of your information packet. This is where you come in. 
At this point, please turn to page five in your information packet to read your 
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instructions. I will read these out loud and you should read along silently. 
Your job will be to monitor the video feed from the UGV as it patrols through each room 
in the building. The navigation of the UGV is fully automated and does not require any control 
for its movement; that is, it has been programmed to move from room to room on its own.  
The UGV will scan through each room, one at a time, and transmit the video feed to you. 
Your mission is to monitor the video feeds sent in by the UGV and report what is in each room. 
You may report your observation by selecting one of the response buttons below the video player 
while the UGV moves onto the next room.  
Although it takes the UGV several seconds to move from one room to the next, we ask 
that you still respond as quickly as possible. If you do not respond by the time the UGV has 
moved on to the next room it will not wait for you, it will automatically begin presenting the next 
video feed and you will not have a chance to go back.  
To prevent detection of the outgoing video feed by the Invictus Terror Organization, the 
UGV has been programmed to randomly switch the frequency at which it transmits its video 
feed. This is done randomly and may result in some video clips being presented at clearer 
frequencies than others. 
To aid you in your mission, the UGV may be equipped with an automated object 
recognition system that allows it to recognize objects (e.g., IEDs). Please keep in mind that when 
the system is engaged, it will provide a recommendation that it believes is correct, but it is still 
ultimately your decision which response to select. 
When you have completed the mission you may open the Exit Questionnaire envelope at 
your desk. Please open this only after you have completed the mission. When you have finished 
the questionnaire please come to the front of the room and you will be debriefed and receive 
your compensation (cash payment or extra credit).  
To help you focus on the task we ask that, during the mission, you wear the noise 
canceling headphones, located to the left of the monitor. No noise will come out of the 
headphones, they are used solely to block out environmental noise. 
Do you have any questions regarding your mission? 
At this point you are ready to begin your training. Please close the information packet and 
place it somewhere where you can see the example pictures shown on the back. The training 
scenario will give you a chance to see how the task will work, and show you examples of the 
objects you will need to watch for. Please click the “Practice” button to begin the training. The 
first practice clip will contain a terrorist, press OK to view the clip, then when you are prompted 
to respond, click the “Terrorist” button below the video player. 
(After participants have identified the terrorist, instruct them what to identify in the next 
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three clips as the videos are playing; first IED, then Civilian, then Empty) 
The next four practice clips will show you what the automated object recognition system 
looks like. It will make a recommendation, but is still up to you to make the final selection (by 
clicking one of the four response buttons or the agree aid button). Use of the aid is completely 
optional and the responsibility of the final decision is your own and you can choose to either 
accept the aid’s proposed diagnosis or to ignore it.  
(Wait until participants identify all 4 clips, then continue). 
The practice session is now complete. Does anyone have any questions about the task? 
You may click the OK button to exit the training. The remainder of the experiment will 
be self-paced and I will not give you any more instructions. When you have competed the study 
fill out the questionairre about your experiences and come up to the front and I will compensate 
you for your participation. Does anyone have any final questions before we get started? 
Please put your headphones on. They are adjustable, so take a minute to make them as 
comfortable as possible. I will come around to turn them on, once I have turned your headphones 
on you may begin the mission. 
(Turn on all headphones) 
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Operation Silent Snake 
 
 
 
 
Highly Sensitive Material 
 
 
Do not open 
until instructed 
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Operation Silent Snake 
 
 
Figure 1: Augustus Sol Invictus, leader of the Invictus Terror Organization 
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Operation Silent Snake 
 
 
Figure 2: The attack site 
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Operation Silent Snake 
 
 
    
Figure 3: Improvised Explosive Device (IED) found in the building 
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Operation Silent Snake 
 
Figure 4: The tread driven all-terrain autonomous surveillance robot 
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Operation Silent Snake 
 
Your Mission 
Your job will be to monitor the video feed from the UGV as it patrols through 
each room in the building. The navigation of the UGV is fully automated and does not 
require any control for its movement; that is, it has been programmed to move from 
room to room on its own.  
The UGV will scan through each room, one at a time, and transmit the video 
feed to you. Your mission is to monitor the video feeds sent in by the UGV and report 
what is in each room. You may report your observation by selecting one of the 
response buttons below the video player while the UGV moves onto the next room.  
Although it takes the UGV several seconds to move from one room to the next, 
we ask that you still respond as quickly as possible. If you do not respond by the time 
the UGV has moved on to the next room it will not wait for you, it will automatically 
begin presenting the next video feed and you will not have a chance to go back.  
To prevent detection of the outgoing video feed by the Invictus Terror 
Organization, the UGV has been programmed to randomly switch the frequency at 
which it transmits its video feed. This is done randomly and may result in some video 
clips being presented at clearer frequencies than others. 
To aid you in your mission, the UGV may be equipped with an automated object 
recognition system that allows it to recognize objects (e.g., IEDs). Please keep in mind 
that when the system is engaged, it will provide a recommendation that it believes is 
correct, but it is still ultimately your decision which response to select. 
When you have completed the mission you may open the Exit Questionnaire 
envelope at your desk. Please open this only after you have completed the mission. 
When you have finished the questionnaire please come to the front of the room and 
you will be debriefed and receive your compensation (cash payment or extra credit).  
To help you focus on the task we ask that, during the mission, you wear the 
noise canceling headphones, located to the left of the monitor. No noise will come out 
of the headphones, they are used solely to block out environmental noise. 
Do you have any questions regarding your mission? 
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APPENDIX M: INFOMED CONSENT FOR EXPERIMENT 4 
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Informed Consent Form 
Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study. 
You must be 18 years of age or older to participate. 
Project Title: Robot Search-and-Rescue Study 
Purpose of the Research Study: The purpose of this data collection effort is to determine the impact of using 
automated decision aids in a search-and-rescue scenario. 
What you will be asked to do in the Study: You will be asked to view a computer display running a simulated 
search-and-rescue scenario using two unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). You will be asked to monitor the video 
images from the UGV for critical signals (e.g., enemy units, unconscious civilians, or improvised explosive 
devices). You may, or may not, receive recommendations while completing this task. The study will take 
approximately 1 hour. At the end of the study you will be asked to complete a brief questionnaire about your 
experience. 
Time Required: 60 minutes (1 hour). 
Risks: Minimal. The risks to you are no greater than operating any other computer. 
Benefits/Compensation: Participants will be offered the benefit of 2 point of course credit in undergraduate 
psychology (equivalent to 1 hour research) or $8.00 US paid compensation. 
Confidentiality: Your identity will be anonymous. Your information will be assigned a participant number. The list 
connecting your name will not be released to anyone who is not directly involved in conducting this study. Your 
name will not be used in any report. 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in this study is voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating. 
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. 
Whom to Contact if you have Questions about the Study: Jennifer Ross, Graduate Research Fellow, University 
of Central Florida, phone: 407-687-4435, e-mail: jmross@mail.ucf.edu, or Dr. James L. Szalma, Department of 
Psychology, University of Central Florida, phone: 407-823-2901, e-mail: jszalma@mail.ucf.edu.  
Whom to Contact about your rights in the study: Research at the University of Central Florida involving human 
participants is carried out under the oversight of the Institutional Review Board. Questions or concerns about 
research participants’ rights may be directed to the UCF IRB office, University of Central Florida, Office of 
Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246, or by campus mail 
32816-0150. The hours of operation are 8:00 am until 5:00 pm, Monday through Friday except on University of 
Central Florida official holidays. The telephone numbers are (407) 882-2276 and (407) 823-2901. 
I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure. 
  I elect to receive 2pts course credit for the course of my choosing through Sona System. 
  I elect to receive $8 hour for my participation. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Participant Name Printed 
_______________________________________________________________/_________________________ 
Participant Signature                  Date 
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ATS 
 
Please read each statement carefully.  Indicate the strength of your agreement with each statement by filling in the 
blank using the following 5-point scale.  There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements.  We are 
interested in your honest reactions and opinions. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
_____ 1. I would yell at a COMPUTER if it did something I did not like. 
_____ 2. I would not praise a GOD OR HIGHER POWER when it does something I like. 
_____ 3. A GOD OR HIGHER POWER does not have a personality like a person has a personality. 
_____ 4. I would hit a CAR if it did something I did not like. 
_____ 5. A GOD OR HIGHER POWER has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 6. I would hit a BACKPACK if it did something I did not like. 
_____ 7. A GOD OR HIGHER POWER cannot communicate with people. 
_____ 8. I would not praise a PET when it does something I like. 
_____ 9. I would hit a MICROWAVE if it did something I did not like. 
_____ 10. When I am clearly upset,  a GOD OR HIGHER POWER does not know. 
_____ 11. A BACKPACK does not have a personality like a person has a personality. 
_____ 12. I do not act as if a GOD OR HIGHER POWER has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 13. When I talk to a PET, I do not believe it understands me. 
_____ 14. I would yell at a CAR if it did something I did not like. 
_____ 15. When I am clearly upset, an OCEAN does not know. 
_____ 16. A GOD OR HIGHER POWER is intelligent like a human is intelligent. 
_____ 17. If I were to get rid of a BACKPACK, it would feel abandoned. 
_____ 18. When I talk to a GOD OR HIGHER POWER, I do not believe it understands me. 
_____ 19. I would hit a COMPUTER if it did something I did not like. 
_____ 20. A PET has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 21. I treat a BACKPACK like a human. 
_____ 22. I would apologize to a GOD OR HIGHER POWER for accidentally hurting it. 
_____ 23. I would talk to a CAR. 
_____ 24. A PET does not have a personality like a person has a personality. 
_____ 25. I would talk to a COMPUTER. 
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_____ 26. I would apologize to a PET for accidentally hurting it. 
_____ 27. A PET is intelligent like a human is intelligent. 
_____ 28. When I am clearly upset, a CAR does not know. 
_____ 29. A CAR has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 30. When I am clearly upset, a PET does not know. 
_____ 31. I do not act as if a STOMACH has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 32. A PET likes certain people better than others. 
_____ 33. A PET cannot communicate with people. 
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  1 2 3 4 5 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
_____ 34. I would not buy a present for a PET. 
_____ 35. I do not act as if a MICROWAVE has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 36. A COMPUTER does not do things just to annoy me. 
_____ 37. I would not apologize to a GOD OR HIGHER POWER for neglecting it. 
_____ 38. If I were to get rid of a COMPUTER, it would feel abandoned. 
_____ 39. I would not praise a HOUSE PLANT when it does something I like. 
_____ 40. A MICROWAVE has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 41. A MICROWAVE is intelligent like a human is intelligent. 
_____ 42. When I am clearly upset, a COMPUTER does not know. 
_____ 43. If a PET were to be destroyed, I would not mourn it like I would mourn the loss of a human. 
_____ 44. I do not act as if a COMPUTER has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 45. A COMPUTER does not have a personality like a person has a personality. 
_____ 46. A STUFFED TOY is intelligent like a human is intelligent. 
_____ 47. I would not buy a present for a HOUSE PLANT. 
_____ 48. A MICROWAVE likes certain people better than others. 
_____ 49. LUCK is intelligent like a human is intelligent. 
_____ 50. I treat an INSECT like a human. 
_____ 51. A STUFFED TOY does not have a personality like a person has a personality. 
_____ 52. When I am clearly upset, a MICROWAVE does not know. 
_____ 53. I would not praise a MICROWAVE when it does something I like. 
_____ 54. A STUFFED TOY cannot communicate with people. 
_____ 55. I would talk to a GOD OR HIGHER POWER. 
_____ 56. I would not apologize to a COMPUTER for neglecting it. 
_____ 57. An OCEAN does not do things just to annoy me. 
_____ 58. I do not act as if an OCEAN has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 59. A STOMACH does not have a personality like a person has a personality. 
_____ 60. If I were to get rid of a MICROWAVE, it would feel abandoned. 
_____ 61. A COMPUTER has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 62. An OCEAN does not have a personality like a person has a personality. 
_____ 63. I would not apologize to a BACKPACK for neglecting it. 
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_____ 64. I do not act as if a CAR has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 65. I treat a PET like a human. 
_____ 66. I do not act as if a PET has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 67. I would name a PET. 
_____ 68. I treat a COMPUTER like a human. 
_____ 69. I would talk to a PET. 
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  1 2 3 4 5 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
_____ 70. If I were to get rid of a STUFFED TOY, it would feel abandoned. 
_____ 71. If I were to get rid of a PET, it would feel abandoned. 
_____ 72. I treat a GOD OR HIGHER POWER like a human. 
_____ 73. A MICROWAVE does not do things just to annoy me. 
_____ 74. I do not act as if LUCK has a spirit or life-force like people do. 
_____ 75. I would not buy a present for a BACKPACK. 
_____ 76. If I were to get rid of a HOUSE PLANT, it would feel abandoned. 
_____ 77. When I talk to a CAR, I do not believe it understands me. 
_____ 78. I treat a MICROWAVE like a human. 
205 
APPENDIX O: INTERPERSONAL TRUST SCALE 
206 
Interpersonal Trust Scale 
 
Please mark an ‘X’ in the box above the statement that best describes how you feel about that statement.  
 
1. Hypocrisy is on the increase in our society. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
2. In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they have provided evidence that 
they are trustworthy. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
3. This country has a dark future unless we can attract better people into politics. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
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4. Fear and social disgrace or punishment rather than conscience prevents most people from 
breaking the law. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
5. Using the honor system of not having a teacher present during exams would probably result in 
increased cheating. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
6. Parents usually can be relied on to keep their promises. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
7. The United Nations will never be an effective force in keeping world peace. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
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8. The judiciary is a place where we can all get unbiased treatment. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
9. Most people would be horrified if they knew how much news that the public hears and sees is 
distorted. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
10. It is safe to believe that in spite of what people say most people are primarily interested in their 
own welfare. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
11. Even though we have reports in newspaper, radio, and T.V., it is hard to get objective accounts of 
public events. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
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12. The future seems very promising. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
13. If we really knew what was going on in international politics, the public would have reason to be 
more frightened than they now seem to be. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
14. Most elected officials are really sincere in their campaign promises. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
15. Many major national sports contests are fixed in one way or another. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
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16. Most experts can be relied upon to tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
17. Most parents can be relied upon to carry out their threats of punishment. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
18. Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
19. In these competitive times one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
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20. Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they preach. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
21. Most salesmen are honest in describing their products. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
22. Most students in school would not cheat even if they were sure of getting away with it. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
23. Most repairmen will not overcharge even if they think you are ignorant of their specialty. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
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24. A large share of accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
25. Most people answer public opinion polls honestly. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
agree 
 Mildly 
agree 
 Agree and 
disagree 
equally 
 Mildly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
disagree 
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Complacency Potential Rating Scale 
 
Please mark an ‘X’ in the box above the statement that best describes how you feel about that 
statement.  
 
1. I think that automated devices used in medicine, such as CT scans and ultrasound, 
provide very reliable medical diagnosis. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Mildly 
Disagree 
 Disagree 
and agree 
equally 
 Mildly 
Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
2. Automated devices in medicine save time and money in the diagnosis and treatment of 
disease. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Mildly 
Disagree 
 Disagree 
and agree 
equally 
 Mildly 
Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
3. If I need to have a tumor in my body removed, I would choose to undergo computer-
aided surgery using laser technology because it is more reliable and safer than manual 
surgery. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Mildly 
Disagree 
 Disagree 
and agree 
equally 
 Mildly 
Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
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4. Automated systems used in modern aircraft, such as the automatic landing system, have 
made air journeys safer. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Mildly 
Disagree 
 Disagree 
and agree 
equally 
 Mildly 
Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
5. ATMs provide a safeguard against the inappropriate use of an individual’s bank account 
by dishonest people. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Mildly 
Disagree 
 Disagree 
and agree 
equally 
 Mildly 
Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
6. Automated devices used in aviation and banking have made work easier for both 
employees and customers. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Mildly 
Disagree 
 Disagree 
and agree 
equally 
 Mildly 
Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
7. Even though the automatic cruise control in my car is set at a speed below the speed 
limit, I worry when I pass a police radar speed trap in case the automatic control is not 
working properly. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Mildly 
Disagree 
 Disagree 
and agree 
equally 
 Mildly 
Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
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8. Manually sorting through card catalogues is more reliable than computer-aided searches 
for finding items in a library. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Mildly 
Disagree 
 Disagree 
and agree 
equally 
 Mildly 
Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
9. I would rather purchase an item using a computer than have to deal with a sales 
representative on the phone because my order is more likely to be correct using the 
computer. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Mildly 
Disagree 
 Disagree 
and agree 
equally 
 Mildly 
Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
10. Bank transactions have become safer with the introduction of computer technology for 
the transfer of funds. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Mildly 
Disagree 
 Disagree 
and agree 
equally 
 Mildly 
Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
11. I feel safer depositing my money at an ATM than with a human teller. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Mildly 
Disagree 
 Disagree 
and agree 
equally 
 Mildly 
Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
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12. I have to tape an important TV program for a class assignment. To ensure that the correct 
program is recorded, I would use the automatic programming facility on my VCR rather 
than manual taping. 
 
                   
 1    2    3    4    5  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Mildly 
Disagree 
 Disagree 
and agree 
equally 
 Mildly 
Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
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Experimenter Script – Please Read Italic Sections Aloud to Participant 
 
The goal of this study is to examine how interface design impacts one’s interaction with a distributed agent, in this 
case an unmanned ground vehicle (commonly referred to as a UGV – these are typically similar to remote control 
cars that are equipped with special equipment such as webcams). UGVs are frequently used when the environment 
is too dangerous for a human operator. 
 
In the following simulation you are operating under the premise that a group of terrorist have released a dangerous 
chemical into a commercial office building, and we are sending in two reconnaissance UGVs to ascertain the 
location of terrorists, improvised explosive devices (IEDs – basically a bomb), and unconscious civilians before 
reinforcements arrive. You can see examples of these objects at the top of your screen (POINT OUT IED – 
PARTICIPANTS HAVE TROUBLE FINDING THIS).  
 
We need you to monitor the video feeds from these two UGVs for each room. For each UGV please report whether 
you detect the presence of a terrorist, IED, civilian, or if that the room is clear. Due to time constraints the UGVs 
must move through different parts of the office building. So the videos that you see will be from two different rooms. 
The UGVs will automatically move through the building as quickly as possible. You will not be controlling the 
movement of the UGVs, thus you will have only one chance to view each of the rooms.  
 
After the UGVs have sent each signal, it will conserve battery by turning off their video feeds while moving to the 
next room, during this short time period the response keys (POINT OUT RESPONSE KEYS – COMPARE 
ACTIVATED PRACTICE KEY TO DEACTIVATED RESPONSE KEYS) will be activated and you can report 
your observation. You will not be able to change your answer after pressing a key. Additionally you may notice that 
after you respond it may take several seconds to move on to the next video, this is perfectly normal. Try to respond 
as quickly and accurately as possible. 
 
You will find a pair of headphones to the left on the monitor, please wear these during the experiment. No sound will 
come out of the headphones, they are merely meant to attenuate any extraneous noise. 
 
Do you have any questions or concerns at this point? (HAVE PARTICIPANT DO FIRST 4 PRACTICE TRIALS). 
 
Now you will have the option in this study to accept the recommendation of your teammates. Your teammates will 
report their recommendations (POINT OUT AID RESPONSE BOX ON SCREEN). Following your teammates’ 
recommendations is completely optional and the final decisions are your responsibility. You may choose to agree 
with your teammates or select your own response. However, be sure to respond to each trial, any trials you do not 
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respond to will be counted as incorrect. Before you begin I’d like to tell you a little bit about your teammates… 
 
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (READ ONLY ONE TO EACH PARTICIPANT) 
 
HUMAN CONDITION 
Your teammates are two undergraduate students who have previously completed the experiment..  
 
SIMILAR AUTOMATION 
Your teammates are two “contrast detectors.” They work by using a computer algorithm to analyze the visual scene 
for the target people and objects. These contrast detectors were developed to work with these specific UGV robots. 
The contrast detectors will not receive feedback on whether you have accepted or rejected their recommendations.  
 
DISSIMILAR AUTOMATION 
Your teammates are two different “contrast detectors.” They work by using computer algorithms to analyze the 
visual scene for the target people and objects. A different computer algorithm was created for each of the UGV 
robots you will be using in this study. The contrast detectors will not receive feedback on whether you have accepted 
or rejected their recommendations.  
 
Do you have any questions or concerns at this point? (HAVE PARTICIPANT DO LAST 4 PRACTICE TRIALS 
WITH AID). Are you ready to begin the study? 
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Participant #: _______________ 
 
 
1. How well do you think Teammate A will perform during the 60 trials? 
Not Very Well         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       Very Well 
 
2. How well do you think Teammate B will perform the 60 trials? 
Not Very Well         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       Very Well 
 
3. How well do you think You will perform the 120 trials? 
Not Very Well         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       Very Well 
 
4. Who do you think will make more errors during the 120 trials? I will make…
Many More Errors         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       Far Fewer Errors 
 
5. How many errors do you think You will make during the 120 trials?  
 I will make about _____ errors (numerical value b/n 0-120) 
 
6. How many errors do you think Teammate A will make during the 60 trials? 
  Agent A will make about _____ errors (numerical value b/n 0-120) 
 
7. How many errors do you think Teammate B will make during the 60 trials? 
 Agent B will make about _____ errors (numerical value b/n 0-120) 
 
8. To what extent do you believe you can trust the decisions of Teammate A? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
9. To what extent do you believe you can trust the decisions of Teammate B? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
10. To what extent do you believe you can trust the decisions You will make? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
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11. How would you rate the expected performance of Teammate A relative to your expected 
performance? Agent A will perform… 
Better Than I   1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9        Much Worse Than I  
Will Perform            Will Perform          
 
12. How would you rate the expected performance of Teammate B relative to your expected 
performance? Agent A will perform… 
Better Than I   1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9        Much Worse Than I  
Will Perform           Will Perform     
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4 
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Participant # ________________ 
Please answer the following questions regarding how you 
feel about YOUR performance only. 
 
1. How high was your self-confidence in performing the search-and-rescue task? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
4. Please complete the computer-based questionnaire using the following definitions: 
 
Mental Demand 
How much mental and perceptual activity was required (e.g., thinking, deciding, calculating, 
remembering, looking, searching, etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, simple or complex, 
exacting or forgiving? 
 
Physical Demand 
How much physical activity was required (e.g., pushing, pulling, turning, controlling, activating, 
etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, slow or brisk, restful or laborious? 
 
Temporal Demand 
How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the tasks or task elements 
occurred? Was the pace slow and leisurely or rapid and frantic? 
 
Performance 
How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals of the task set by the experimenter 
(or yourself)? How satisfied were you with your performance in accomplishing these goals? 
 
Effort 
How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to accomplish your level of performance? 
Frustration Level 
 
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and annoyed versus secure, gratified, content, relaxed 
and complacent did you feel during the task?          
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Participant #: ____ ______ 
 
Please answer the following questions regarding how you 
feel about Teammate A only. 
 
1. To what extent does Teammate A perform this search-and-rescue task effectively? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
5. To what extent can you anticipate Teammate A’s behavior with some degree of confidence? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
3. To what extent is the Teammate A free of errors? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
4. To what extent do you have a strong belief and trust in Teammate A to do the search-and-rescue 
task in the future without being monitored? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
5. How much did you trust the decisions of Teammate A overall? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
6. What percentage of responses by Teammate A do you think were correct? 
     ___________ (enter a value between 0% to 100%) 
 
7. How often did you notice an error made by Teammate A? 
Not At All         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       Many Times 
 
8. To what extent did you lose trust in Teammate A when you noticed it made an error? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
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9. Hypothetical Scenario: Imagine that there are ten more video clips that need to be examined for 
terrorists, civilians, and IEDs. Also imagine that we were to offer you an additional compensation, of 
either $5.00 or an extra credit point for each of these ten additional video clips that is correctly 
identified. However, due to a software problem only you or Teammate A can make the decisions. 
Would you prefer that this additional compensation be based on the decisions made by the automated 
aid or the decisions made by you? (circle one) 
 Teammate A Decisions   My Own Decisions 
 
10. We would like to know what led to your decision to base your performance on either your 
decisions or on Teammate A’s decisions. Please tell us everything you thought of in coming to this 
decision. Do not worry about spelling or grammatical errors. Please ask the experimenter for 
additional paper if necessary. 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
229 
Participant #: ____ ______ 
 
Please answer the following questions regarding how you 
feel about Teammate B only. 
 
1. To what extent does Teammate B perform this search-and-rescue task effectively? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
6. To what extent can you anticipate Teammate B’s behavior with some degree of confidence? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
3. To what extent is the Teammate B free of errors? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
4. To what extent do you have a strong belief and trust in Teammate B to do the search-and-rescue 
task in the future without being monitored? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
5. How much did you trust the decisions of Teammate B overall? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
 
6. What percentage of responses by Teammate B do you think were correct? 
     ___________ (enter a value between 0% to 100%) 
 
7. How often did you notice an error made by Teammate B? 
Not At All         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       Many Times 
 
8. To what extent did you lose trust in Teammate B when you noticed it made an error? 
Very Little         1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       A Great Amount 
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9. Hypothetical Scenario: Imagine that there are ten more video clips that need to be examined for 
terrorists, civilians, and IEDs. Also imagine that we were to offer you an additional compensation, of 
either $5.00 or an extra credit point for each of these ten additional video clips that is correctly 
identified. However, due to a software problem only you or Teammate B can make the decisions. 
Would you prefer that this additional compensation be based on the decisions made by the automated 
aid or the decisions made by you? (circle one) 
 Teammate B Decisions   My Own Decisions 
 
10. We would like to know what led to your decision to base your performance on either your 
decisions or on Teammate B’s decisions. Please tell us everything you thought of in coming to this 
decision. Do not worry about spelling or grammatical errors. Please ask the experimenter for 
additional paper if necessary. 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Debriefing Form Robot Search-and-Rescue Study 
 
You have now completed the study, thank you for your participation! This form is for you to take 
with you and explains the purpose of our research. Please do not share this form with others who 
plan to participate in this study as it may bias their responses. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the issue of trust in multiple teammates. That is, how 
one’s trust in a teammate changes given the type of teammates they are interacting with and the 
reliability (i.e., accuracy) of the teammates. In the study you just completed, you were informed 
that two distributed human agents or two intelligent robotic agents provided you with 
recommendations after each video clip, as to what kind of signal was present in the clip. 
However, another human or robot did not actually provide you with recommendations in the 
preceding study. In order to standardize participant experience, that is to ensure that everyone 
had the same experience with their teammates, your teammate’s responses (robotic and human) 
were predetermined upon the condition you were randomly assigned to. Depending on the 
condition you were assigned to your teammates may have both been very accurate, both very 
inaccurate, or a mixture (with one accurate and one inaccurate).  
 
If you have any complaints, concerns, or questions about this research, or you would like any 
information about the results of the study once it is completed feel free to contact Ms. Jennifer 
Ross at jmross@mail.ucf.edu / 407-687-4435 or Dr. James Szalma at jszalma@mail.ucf.edu / 
407-823-0920.  
 
Your responses are confidential to the experimenters and will be published anonymously as 
group data.  
 
If you are interested in obtaining more information on this topic we would recommend the 
following articles available through the UCF library: 
• Muir, B. M., & Moray, N. Trust in automation: Part 2. Experimental studies of trust and 
human intervention in automated systems. Ergonomics, 37, (1996), 1905--1922. 
• Parasuraman, R. & Riley, V. Humans and automation: Use, misuse, disuse, and abuse. 
Human Factors, 39, (1997), 230--253. 
 
Finally, thank you again for helping us with this research. 
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APPENDIX V: OVERALL MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
ACROSS ALL CONDITIONS FOR STUDY 4 
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   Uniform-High Mixed Uniform-Low 
Mixed-
High 
Mixed-
Low 
Human Trust 6.65 (1.83) 6.76 (0.94) 5.41 (1.42) 
7.21 
(1.29) 
6.3 
(1.57) 
 Reliance 83.89 (5.62) 78.51 (5.46) 75.45 (5.19) 
81.91 
(6.35) 
75.03 
(5.76) 
 Performance 82.88 (4.82) 78.51 (4.87) 76.64 (3.32) 
81.72 
(6.00) 
75.30 
(5.50) 
 
Self-
confidence 5.25 (1.76) 5.55 (2.12) 5.21 (1.82) N/A N/A 
 Workload 68.99 (14.50) 70.79 (9.47) 73.61 (10.97) N/A N/A 
Different-
Type 
Robotic Trust 7.20 (1.05) 6.39 (1.65) 5.71 (1.56) 
6.64 
(1.60) 
6.15 
(2.25) 
 Reliance 85.34 (6.14) 80.96 (5.68) 76.11 (6.85) 
84.05 
(5.87) 
77.89 
(6.56) 
 Performance 83.96 (5.31) 79.65 (3.49) 75.83 (6.04) 
83.03 
(5.16) 
76.26 
(4.45) 
 
Self-
confidence 5.53 (1.78) 5.09 (2.11) 4.61 (1.89) N/A N/A 
 Workload 68.24 (14.00) 73.02 (13.06) 72.09 (18.13) N/A N/A 
Same-
Type 
Robotic Trust 7.21 (1.27) 6.05 (1.78) 5.53 (1.75) 
6.66 
(1.84) 
5.64 
(2.28) 
 Reliance 84.90 (6.80) 79.80 (5.32) 77.90 (5.76) 
82.91 
(5.90) 
76.67 
(6.35) 
 Performance 83.76 (6.06) 79.95 (3.42) 77.88 (3.66) 
82.32 
(4.86) 
77.58 
(4.79) 
 
Self-
confidence 5.12 (2.15) 5.45 (2.17) 5.18 (1.70) N/A N/A 
 Workload 67.70 (13.04) 70.72 (14.06) 69.39 (11.48) N/A N/A 
       
Control Performance 76.62 (4.36)     
 
Self-
confidence 4.52 (1.81)     
 Workload 71.40 (13.83)     
Note: Values for each of the mixed-reliability agents are presented individually on the right of 
the table and averaged in the fourth column. 
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APPENDIX W: ATS QUESTIONNAIRE FACTORS CORRELATIONS TO 
TRUST AND RELIANCE 
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Overall correlations for the four factors: Extreme, Pet, God or Deity, and Negative 
Anthropomorphism. No overall correlations were significant (p > .05 in all cases).  
 
Type 
Anthropomorphism 
Dependent 
Measure Correlation Significance N 
Trust -.07 .24 296 Extreme Reliance -.05 .07 296 
Trust .10 .52 295 Pet Reliance .02 .77 295 
Trust .04 .37 296 God or Deity Reliance -.07 .80 296 
Trust .02 .24 296 Negative Reliance .05 .43 296 
 
Next correlations were broken down by agent type: Human, Same-Type Robotic, or 
Different-Type Robotic. 
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Type 
Anthropomorphism 
Agent Dependent 
Measure Correlation Significance N 
Trust .07 .50 99 Human Reliance .01 .89 99 
Trust .03 .75 99 Same Reliance -.07 .52 99 
Trust -.29** .004 98 
Extreme 
Dif. Reliance -.09 .358 98 
Trust .09 .37 98 Human Reliance -.03 .74 98 
Trust .17 .10 99 Same Reliance .04 .68 99 
Trust .08 .41 98 
Pet 
Dif. Reliance .05 .65 98 
Trust -.03 .79 99 Human Reliance -.09 .38 99 
Trust .13 .19 99 Same Reliance -.04 .70 99 
Trust -.02 .86 98 
God or Deity 
Dif. Reliance -.13 .22 98 
Trust .07 .50 99 Human Reliance -.08 .44 99 
Trust .04 .72 99 Same Reliance -.03 .81 99 
Trust -.05 .66 98 
Negative 
Dif. Reliance .22* .03 98 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Next correlations were broken down by reliability condition: Both High, Both Low, and 
Mixed. 
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Type 
Anthropomorphism Reliability 
Dependent 
Measure Correlation Significance N 
Trust -.04 .71 98 High Reliance -.06 .53 98 
Trust -.12 .26 99 Mixed Reliance -.08 .42 99 
Trust -.06 .53 99 
Extreme 
Low Reliance -.02 .89 99 
Trust .14 .18 97 High Reliance -.08 .45 97 
Trust .01 .93 99 Mixed Reliance .22* .03 99 
Trust .13 .19 99 
Pet 
Low Reliance -.13 .19 99 
Trust .11 .28 98 High Reliance -.06 .55 98 
Trust -.07 .51 99 Mixed Reliance -.12 .23 99 
Trust .13 .20 99 
God or Deity 
Low Reliance .02 .81 99 
Trust -.01 .93 98 High Reliance -.10 .34 98 
Trust -.07 .49 99 Mixed Reliance .02 .82 99 
Trust -.02 .86 99 
Negative 
Low Reliance .07 .50 99 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
The final breakdown looked at agent by reliability condition. 
 
Agent 
Type 
Anthropomorphism 
Reliability
Dependent 
Measure 
Correlation Significance N 
Trust .12 .49 33 High 
Reliance .15 .37 33 
Trust -.06 .76 33 Mixed 
Reliance -.16 .37 33 
Trust .02 .92 33 
Extreme 
Low 
Reliance .26 .15 33 
Trust .33 .07 32 
H
um
an
 
Pet 
High 
Reliance -.20 .29 32 
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Agent 
Type 
Anthropomorphism 
Reliability
Dependent 
Measure 
Correlation Significance N 
Trust -.01 .96 33 Mixed 
Reliance .35 .05 33 
Trust -.12 .53 33 Low 
Reliance -.27 .13 33 
Trust -.09 .62 33 High 
Reliance -.07 .70 33 
Trust -.14 .44 33 Mixed 
Reliance -.28 .11 33 
Trust -.01 .97 33 
God or Deity 
Low 
Reliance .00 1.00 33 
Trust .10 .59 33 High 
Reliance -.07 .70 33 
Trust -.20 .27 33 Mixed 
Reliance -.31 .08 33 
Trust .04 .82 33 
Negative 
Low 
Reliance -.04 .83 33 
Trust -.16 .37 33 High 
Reliance -.31 .08 33 
Trust .17 .34 33 Mixed 
Reliance .17 .34 33 
Trust .06 .74 33 
Extreme 
Low 
Reliance .01 .96 33 
Trust .02 .91 33 High 
Reliance -.01 .97 33 
Trust .02 .91 33 Mixed 
Reliance -.07 .69 33 
Trust .18 .33 33 
Pet 
Low 
Reliance -.11 .55 33 
Trust .49** .004 33 High 
Reliance -.02 .91 33 
Trust -.05 .79 33 
Sa
m
e-
Ty
pe
 R
ob
ot
ic
 
God or Deity 
Mixed 
Reliance -.08 .64 33 
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Agent 
Type 
Anthropomorphism 
Reliability
Dependent 
Measure 
Correlation Significance N 
Trust .04 .82 33 Low 
Reliance -.07 .71 33 
Trust .02 .92 33 High 
Reliance -.35* .05 33 
Trust -.01 .98 33 Mixed 
Reliance .10 .59 33 
Trust .02 .92 33 
Negative 
Low 
Reliance .18 .33 33 
Trust -.18 .33 32 High 
Reliance .01 .98 32 
Trust -.47** .01 33 Mixed 
Reliance -.13 .46 33 
Trust -.27 .12 33 
Extreme 
Low 
Reliance -.24 .19 33 
Trust .00 1.00 32 High 
Reliance -.03 .89 32 
Trust -.13 .87 33 Mixed 
Reliance .42* .02 33 
Trust .32 .07 33 
Pet 
Low 
Reliance -.08 .67 33 
Trust -.11 .56 32 High 
Reliance -.14 .44 32 
Trust -.01 .98 33 Mixed 
Reliance .03 .89 33 
Trust .39* .03 33 
God or Deity 
Low 
Reliance .16 .38 33 
Trust -.21 .25 32 High 
Reliance .11 .53 32 
Trust -.06 .78 33 Mixed 
Reliance .36* .04 33 
Trust -.12 .50 33 
D
iff
er
en
t-T
yp
e 
R
ob
ot
ic
 
Negative 
Low 
Reliance .04 .81 33 
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* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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APPENDIX X: ITS QUESTIONNAIRE CORRELATIONS TO TRUST AND 
RELIANCE 
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Overall ITS correlations, no overall correlations were significant (p > .05 in all cases).  
 
Dependent Measure Correlation Significance N 
Trust -.10 .07 296 
Reliance -.07 .24 296 
 
Next ITS correlations were broken down by agent type: Human, Same-Type Robotic, or 
Different-Type Robotic. 
 
Agent Dependent 
Measure Correlation Significance N 
Trust -.12 .24 99 Human Reliance -.21* .04 99 
Trust -.28** .01 99 Same Reliance -.17 .10 99 
Trust .10 .33 98 Dif. Reliance .13 .20 98 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Next ITS correlations were broken down by reliability condition: Both High, Both Low, 
and Mixed. 
 
Reliability Dependent Measure Correlation Significance N 
Trust .07 .48 98 High Reliance .00 .98 98 
Trust -.08 .46 99 Mixed Reliance -.12 .24 99 
Trust -.20* .05 99 Low Reliance .01 .92 99 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
The final breakdown looked at agent by reliability condition. 
 
244 
Agent Type Reliability 
Dependent 
Measure 
Correlation Significance N 
Trust .04 .81 33 High 
Reliance -.21 .24 33 
Trust -.10 .59 33 Mixed 
Reliance -.30 .09 33 
Trust -.35* .05 33 
Human 
Low 
Reliance -.25 .15 33 
Trust .31 .08 32 High 
Reliance .32 .07 32 
Trust .07 .71 33 Mixed 
Reliance .07 .70 33 
Trust .16 .37 33 
Different-Type 
Robotic 
Low 
Reliance .27 .13 33 
Trust -.02 .90 33 High 
Reliance -.09 .63 33 
Trust -.18 .31 33 Mixed 
Reliance -.13 .46 33 
Trust -.43* .01 33 
Same-Type Robotic 
Low 
Reliance -.15 .42 33 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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APPENDIX Y: CPRS QUESTIONNAIRE OVERALL AND FACTOR 
CORRELATIONS TO TRUST AND RELIANCE 
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Overall correlations for the four factors: Extreme, Pet, God or Deity, and Negative 
Anthropomorphism. No overall correlations were significant (p > .05 in all cases).  
 
Type CPRS Dependent Measure Correlation Significance N 
Trust .18** .002 296 Overall Reliance .14* .014 296 
Trust .09 .134 296 Confidence Reliance .08 .185 296 
Trust .14* .015 296 Reliance Reliance .06 .298 296 
Trust .18* .002 296 Trust Reliance .11 .065 296 
Trust .09 .109 296 Safety Reliance .16** .007 296 
 
Next correlations were broken down by agent type: Human, Same-Type Robotic, or 
Different-Type Robotic. 
 
Type CPRS Agent Dependent Measure Correlation Significance N 
Trust .13 .19 99 Human Reliance .14 .16 99 
Trust .25* .01 99 Same Reliance .24* .02 99 
Trust .17 .10 98 
Overall 
 
Dif. Reliance .05 .60 98 
Trust .09 .37 99 Human Reliance .03 .76 99 
Trust .05 .62 99 Same Reliance .20* .05 99 
Trust .12 .24 98 
Confidence 
Dif. Reliance .02 .86 98 
Trust .08 .42 99 Human Reliance .14 .17 99 
Trust .27** .01 99 Same Reliance .09 .36 99 
Trust .07 .48 98 
Reliance 
Dif. Reliance -.05 .65 98 
Trust .17 .09 99 Human Reliance .11 .26 99 
Trust .19 .07 99 
Trust 
Same Reliance .12 .23 99 
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Type CPRS Agent Dependent Measure Correlation Significance N 
Trust .17 .09 98 Dif. Reliance .07 .50 98 
Trust .01 .94 99 Human Reliance .13 .19 99 
Trust .16 .11 99 Same Reliance .22* .03 99 
Trust .09 .38 98 
Safety 
Dif. Reliance .12 .26 98 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Next correlations were broken down by reliability condition: Both High, Both Low, and 
Mixed.  
 
Type CPRS Agent Dependent Measure Correlation Significance N 
Trust .01 .93 98 High Reliance .05 .60 98 
Trust .28** .01 99 Mixed Reliance .22* .03 99 
Trust .09 .37 99 
Overall 
 
Low Reliance -.06 .59 99 
Trust .02 .86 98 High Reliance .05 .62 98 
Trust .17 .10 99 Mixed Reliance .19 .06 99 
Trust -.02 .85 99 
Confidence 
Low Reliance -.12 .25 99 
Trust -.00 .97 98 High Reliance -.01 .89 98 
Trust .30** .00 99 Mixed Reliance .15 .15 99 
Trust .01 .91 99 
Reliance 
Low Reliance -.13 .21 99 
Trust .10 .32 98 High Reliance -.01 .92 98 
Trust .12 .23 99 Mixed Reliance .15 .15 99 
Trust .20* .05 99 
Trust 
Low Reliance .07 .53 99 
Trust -.12 .25 98 Safety High Reliance .13 .21 98 
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Type CPRS Agent Dependent Measure Correlation Significance N 
Trust .15 .15 99 Mixed Reliance .08 .44 99 
Trust .06 .57 99 Low Reliance .03 .76 99 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
The final breakdown looked at agent by reliability condition. 
 
Agent Type CPRS Reliability
Dependent 
Measure 
Correlation Significance N 
Trust .11 .56 33 High 
Reliance -.01 .98 33 
Trust .16 .36 33 Mixed 
Reliance .28 .11 33 
Trust .10 .59 33 
Overall 
Low 
Reliance .09 .63 33 
Trust .09 .62 33 High 
Reliance -.17 .33 33 
Trust .22 .21 33 Mixed 
Reliance .25 .17 33 
Trust .00 .98 33 
Confidence 
Low 
Reliance .10 .58 33 
Trust .27 .13 33 High 
Reliance -.02 .91 33 
Trust .14 .43 33 Mixed 
Reliance .15 .40 33 
Trust .09 .62 33 
Reliance 
Low 
Reliance -.03 .89 33 
Trust .33 .06 33 High 
Reliance .00 1.00 33 
Trust -.03 .87 33 Mixed 
Reliance .18 .33 33 
Trust .20 .26 33 
H
um
an
 
Trust 
Low 
Reliance .15 .41 33 
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Agent Type CPRS Reliability
Dependent 
Measure 
Correlation Significance N 
Trust -.13 .47 33 High 
Reliance -.10 .57 33 
Trust .03 .86 33 Mixed 
Reliance .18 .33 33 
Trust -.03 .88 33 
Safety 
Low 
Reliance .05 .79 33 
Trust -.13 .47 33 High 
Reliance .10 .57 33 
Trust .12 .49 33 Mixed 
Reliance .10 .58 33 
Trust .35* .05 33 
Overall 
Low 
Reliance .13 .48 33 
Trust -.08 .68 33 High 
Reliance .17 .35 33 
Trust -.02 .90 33 Mixed 
Reliance .07 .69 33 
Trust -.02 .93 33 
Confidence 
Low 
Reliance .16 .38 33 
Trust .05 .79 33 High 
Reliance -.08 .66 33 
Trust .24 .19 33 Mixed 
Reliance .01 .97 33 
Trust .17 .34 33 
Reliance 
Low 
Reliance -.09 .63 33 
Trust -.24 .18 33 High 
Reliance -.03 .86 33 
Trust -.01 .94 33 Mixed 
Reliance .13 .47 33 
Trust .52** .002 33 
Trust 
Low 
Reliance .09 .62 33 
Trust -.03 .87 33 
Sa
m
e-
Ty
pe
 R
ob
ot
ic
 
Safety 
High 
Reliance .23 .19 33 
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Agent Type CPRS Reliability
Dependent 
Measure 
Correlation Significance N 
Trust .16 .37 33 Mixed 
Reliance .04 .82 33 
Trust .09 .61 33 Low 
Reliance .15 .40 33 
Trust -.11 .57 32 High 
Reliance .01 .95 32 
Trust .56** .001 33 Mixed 
Reliance .26 .14 33 
Trust -.12 .49 33 
Overall 
Low 
Reliance -.26 .15 33 
Trust -.07 .70 32 High 
Reliance .13 .49 32 
Trust .40* .02 33 Mixed 
Reliance .36* .04 33 
Trust -.04 .81 33 
Confidence 
Low 
Reliance -.37* .04 33 
Trust -.14 .46 32 High 
Reliance -.25 .17 32 
Trust .43* .01 33 Mixed 
Reliance .21 .24 33 
Trust -.28 .12 33 
Reliance 
Low 
Reliance -.25 .17 33 
Trust .16 .38 32 High 
Reliance -.02 .90 32 
Trust .45** .01 33 Mixed 
Reliance .07 .70 33 
Trust -.10 .58 33 
Trust 
Low 
Reliance -.03 .88 33 
Trust -.28 .13 32 High 
Reliance .18 .34 32 
Trust .21 .25 33 
D
iff
er
en
t-T
yp
e 
R
ob
ot
ic
 
Safety 
Mixed 
Reliance .02 .91 33 
251 
Agent Type CPRS Reliability
Dependent 
Measure 
Correlation Significance N 
Trust .07 .68 33 Low 
Reliance -.05 .80 33 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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APPENDIX Z: IRB APPROVAL FORMS 
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